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The monograph you are holding would definitely never have 
been written if I had not happened upon some notes made of the 
lectures given by Juri Lotman in the late autumn of 1967 (these 
notes have now been published, in a complete form and for the 
first time, in the Appendix to this book). Although the notes are 
declarative, and even occasionally incomplete (as notes always 
are), the ideas from these guided my curiosity throughout many 
decades, and helped to eventually find the answer to the question 
that arose for me as a university student during the study of 
magic tales: why do children not tire of listening to the same 
magic tale, over and over again? How can this particular interest 
by children towards fairytales as a genre be explained? No 
satisfactory answer to this question was forthcoming from the 
study of folklore at the end of the 1960s. 
Beyond the physical lines of the notes of the "Lectures" I 
could see the concept that a person's magic, religious, as well as 
a play and artistic communicative relationship with some­
one/something is a specific intellectual operation, which has an 
apriority and universal nature. This idea was most intriguing. 
Ways of resolving this question that was tormenting me 
gradually began to become clear to me in the course of delving 
into Juri Lotman's semiotics, but I nevertheless felt for a long 
time like someone who knows the tune of a song but cannot find 
the words. 
The following pages do indeed reflect the path taken in search 
of these words. Taking into account the words that have already 
been published, it can be said that this process has lasted for the 
last eight years. 
I have given presentations at about ten international conferen­
ces on the topics contained in the first three, of the total, five 
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chapters, and the first four chapters have also been published, in 
varying forms (Lepik 2000; 2001a; 2001b; 2001c; 2001 d; 2001 e; 
200If; 2002a; 2002b; 2003; 2007a; 2007b). In the final two 
chapters — which play a key role in this book and where both 
have been written in 2006-2007 (the standpoints in the latter 
chapter are now being published for the first time) — I believe I 
have found the words that I have sought. 
In analyses dedicated to Juri Lotman one can observe various 
attempts to universalize his culture semiotic theory. Whereas the 
attitude of the first monograph dedicated to Lotman was to 
proceed from the synthesis of literature and semiotics (Shukman 
1977), in one of the more recent monographs it is indeed the 
problems of language and communication that hold a central 
place. Secondary modelling systems have been compared with 
universal language, together with the same type of examinations 
done by Umberto Eco (Andrews 2003: 16; see also Andrews 
1999). Lotman's cultural semiotics has been synthesized over the 
years with ethnology by Portis-Winner, who sees universality 
through the concept of semiosphere: "Lotman's concept of 
semiosphere unites all the aspects of cultural semiotics, all 
heterogenic semiotic systems or "languages", which constantly 
change and which, in the abstract sense, have a certain number of 
qualities that unite them." (Portis-Winner 2002: 63; see also 
Portis-Winner 1999). 
The purpose of this work is not the systematic analysis of the 
studies dedicated to Juri Lotman. It is only important to ascertain 
that the concept of universals, in the meaning and in the sphere 
of implementation that is the focus of my book, has not been 
covered in earlier studies. Nevertheless, some methodological 
attempts at generalization have been attempted. Thus there have 
been studies of the use of terms by Lotman (Kim Su Kwan 
2003), the importance of Lotman in the transition from static to 
dynamic cultural analysis has been emphasized (Merrell 2001, 
Žylko 2001, Eco 2000), and this has been done in a general 
methodological mode of culture theory (Rastier 2001), in a mode 
of cultural ecology (Aran and Barei 2002) and a trans-
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disciplinary mode (Machado 2003). These works clearly 
indicate, however, that Lotman's scholarly heritage also provides 
a reason to seek such generalizations that are not immediately 
apparent or that have found only implicit expression. 
Since the bases for compiling the book have been the articles 
that have been written over eight years (with the aim of 
eventually preparing a monograph), terminological nuances can 
be found in the earlier texts (the material for Chapters 1-3), 
which may diverge from the wording of the later chapters. In 
reviewing the texts, I nevertheless made the assessment that these 
diversions were within the limits of synonymity, and decided not 
to lapse into such details whilst creating the whole. Chapter 5 has 
grouped these certain contradictions under a common denomina­
tor. 
In preparing this monograph, and organizing it for 
publication, I have been provided with invaluable support and 
assistance by the Department of Semiotics at the University of 
Tartu. I am particularly grateful to Professor Peeter Torop and 
Professor Kalevi Kull, and to Silvi Salupere, Irina Avramets, and 
the translator of this book, Tiia Raudma. I have also received 
great assistance from Anne Saagpakk in the preparation of the 
manuscript. 
The book itself, however, could not have been published 
without the financial assistance provided to me by the Estonian 
Ministry of Culture and the Estonian Culture Endowment. I am 
very grateful to them. 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this monograph is to describe the communicative 
algorithms of the intellect, and their textual equivalents, as sign-
creating universals. Although the author was indeed inspired by 
one specific exotic section in the lectures of Juri Lotman, is 
appropriate to begin with the admission that the Tartu professor 
had a constant interest in universal signifying processes through­
out his creative career. In universality (resp. "stability"), he has 
seen one of the fundamental characteristics of culture: 
Culture represents the most complete mechanism — created by 
humanity — from amongst those that change entropy into 
information. It is a mechanism that must preserve and transmit 
information, but at the same time must continue to increase its 
volume. Becoming continually more complicated internally, and 
self-development, are its laws. This is why culture must 
simultaneously signal its own stability as well as dynamism — it 
must be, and at the same time, must not be a structure. Only in such 
conditions can it fulfil all the tasks that the collective has 
determined for it. (Lotman 1970h: 104) 
In implementing the criteria of Porphyrios's eternally durable 
classification, it could be claimed that Juri Lotman treats 
universals in the spirit of moderate nominalism or conceptualism. 
In other words it means that a Person in this conception is an 
object to whom a collection of characteristics is attributed that is 
common to all single individuals, which expresses the 
understanding of any person whatsoever. A Person is identical to 
this collection of characteristics. Universals or general concepts 
(in contrast to radical nominalism) do not exist here only as 
names, signs, "making the air shake", as medieval scholars 
ironically said, but universals, being products of the intellect are 
forms of perception that are prior to experience. In other words, 
it could be said that they express certain capacities of the human 
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intellect, which constitute a definite system of algorithms. The 
universal algorithms find signified expression in the variety of 
human activity, primarily of course in communication — as in 
speech reality. 
The treatment here of the concept of 'universal' distances 
itself from the approaches of the logical treatment of universals 
(e.g. Armstrong 1989), the linguistic treatment (e.g. Greenberg, 
Osgood, Jenkins 1970), the cognitive-linguistic treatment (e.g. 
Lakoff 1990 [1987]), the ethnological treatment (e.g. Kluckhohn 
1970 [1962]) and the psychoanalytical treatment (e.g. Freud 1938 
[1906]), but also from analysis in the spirit of Carl Jung's 
archetypes of collective non-consciousness (Jung et al. 1964). 
Proceeding from the nature of Lotman's culture concept it may 
be claimed that the presence in communication processes of 
universal characteristics that are intrinsic to intellect depends on 
the context — or in a wider sense, on the nature of the speech 
reality. It follows from this that universals are definitely not 
phenomena that are statistically determined. In speech reality, 
the algorithms of the intellect may also change into numerous 
textual variations. And these can be supported by universals that 
lack intellect-based apriority. The latter are outside the focus of 
this analysis. 
In his studies, Lotman has described various cultural 
universals: for example, the function that structures the begin­
ning and end of cultural texts, the generative difference between 
communication and autocommunication, the semiosphere, the 
importance of honour and fame (in Russian culture), the 
"vertical" isomorphism of the intellect, text and culture, etc. This 
book concentrates on describing the universal characteristics of 
the intellect, as the apriority mechanism that stores, organizes 
and transmits information. Of these characteristics, five universal 
communicative functions (algorithms) of the intellect, which are 
textually realized as mythological, magical, religious, antithetic 
and metaphorical code signals, are examined more closely. 
The constructive components of the concept of code signal 
are (1) the phenomenological concept of the intellect; (2) the 
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category of code text; (3) the category of ritual, and (4) treating 
text as a signal. 
1. In Lotman's words, intellect is the ability to command 
language, to store, organize and mediate signified 
information, as well as to carry out algorithmitized 
operations for the transformation of information, and to 
produce new information. Lotman has dedicated — to 
the detailed analysis of this concept — the articles 
"Culture as a collective intellect, and the problems of 
artificial intelligence" (1977), "The phenomenon of 
culture" (1978), and "Brain - text - culture - artificial 
intelligence" (1990). 
2. Code text is described as a text type in the works of 
Vladimir Toporov, Juri Lotman and other scholars of the 
Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics, where the formal 
characteristics (code) dominate to the detriment of 
substantive characteristics (textual semantics), and which 
have the character of formalizing and forming (cultural) 
memory. Toporov introduces the "St Petersburg text", as 
a concept of code text, and indicates the system of time-
space and other constant characteristics — common 
thread in the St Petersburg-themed belletristic, from 
Pushkin to Dostoyevski (on whom Toporov particularly 
focuses) up to Bitov. 
3. The next important constitutive characteristic of code 
signal is the genetic and structural link of code signal 
with the concept of ritual, when the latter is treated as an 
integral system of communication codes and functions 
— between the profane and sacral worlds. Lotman 
reached the systematic analysis of the concept of ritual in 
the final years of his scholastic activity, when he 
published the article, "Dynamics of culture" (1992) 
which is fully dedicated to the place of ritual and rituality 
in the cyclical and historical world scene, and in the 
development of the intellect. 
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4. Treating text as signal reduces text to an elementary 
concept, or to a behavioural act that can be interpreted 
pragmatically, which is directed to a listener located in 
exactly the same chronotype and/or in exactly the same 
situational space. Signal does not presume feedback, nor 
does it require translation — otherwise it would not fulfil 
its task. The foundation for the formal analysis of the 
communicative functions of text in the Tartu-Moscow 
school of semiotics was laid by Aleksandr Pyatigorski in 
his weighty article "Some general observations on text as 
a variety of signal" (1962). He developed this topic 
further together with Lotman in the article "Text and 
function" (1968), which also is of considerable 
significance. 
The monograph attempts to open up the apriority and universal 
character of code signals, and to describe their characteristics in 
verbal and other behavioural texts. 
The Latin word 'contextus' means connection and linkage. 
Therefore, the widening of our topic proceeds from the title of 
the monograph, "Universals in the Context of Juri Lotman's 
Semiotics code signals are projected onto the integral system of 
Lotman's semiotics, where the constitutive axis is already other 
universals, without which it is not possible to interpret these 
universals that I call code signals. What I mean by "other 
universals" is primarily the vertical isomorphism of culture, 
through which the analogy of the principles of structure and 
functioning, as well as mutually exchangeable functionality, is 
attributed to intellect, text and culture. Such an analogy of the 
principles of structure and functioning is postulated by Lotman 
on the basis of four basic characteristics, which are the semiotic 
heterogeneity, memory, the self-reproduction of meanings, and 
the existence of a communication-regulative selection block of 
all three phenomena. 
Mythological, magical, and other relevant code signals are 
speech phenomena, and therefore it is not magic, religion, etc 
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that will be analyzed in this book but magicality, religiosity, 
metaphorically, etc, as the base structures ot semiosis an 
communication. They are base structures due to their prominent 
role in the reproductive processes in communication. 
Juri Lotman, as already noted in the Foreword, "sketched in 
his last lecture (see Appendix) a schema with six elements, of 
which those relevant to us are the magical, religious and artistic 
functions (and the play-function that is structurally isomorphic 
with the latter). In later articles (together with Boris Uspenski), 
and to some extent in other contexts, there was an analysis of 
antithesis, and a particularly thorough analysis of the universality 
of mythological semiosis — without hardly using the term 
"universality". Therefore, all the elements of the system that will 
be examined here have been looked at by Juri Lotman, but for 
various reasons these five elements were not linked into a 
system. 
There are also good reasons for this, which should now be 
mentioned. 
Although Lotman defined the concept of the intellect, and the 
theoretically fundamental ideas of the vertical isomorphism of 
intellect, text and culture, he did not call 'magicality', 
'religiosity', 'antitheticism' or 'metaphoricism' as algorithms of 
the intellect, not in his original schema or even later (the 
exception was 'mythological', which he analysed, together with 
Uspenski, as a cognitive phenomenon, on the basis of features 
that are characteristic of logic). This is somewhat odd if we 
consider that his analysis of the intellect, and many other 
concepts that he used in semiotic discussions, attuned him to 
develop his thinking in this direction. 
Having engrossed myself in Lotman's works as a whole I can 
now presume that Lotman did not finish his examination of the 
reproductive processes of the intellect (including the universals 
of the intellect), apparently due to the fact that innovation had 
become the dominating motive in his work, as well as Prigogine 
and the bifurcation processes. 
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As to the "abandoned" universals, it seems that Lotman had 
not formulated a deductive viewpoint, a common basis, which 
would have linked these intellectual phenomena into a system. 
One (very important) attempt to construct such a whole was the 
wording of the semiosphere-concept, but this remained a "long­
distance view" as regards the more detailed observation of the 
internal text processes. (For more detail, see Voigt 1995: 197— 
198.) 
And this led to the idea which I wished to prove, and this is 
that all five intellectual algorithms, as code signals, are a sign-
creating system, where ritual and rituality are the ancient textual 
equivalents. All code signals, as became apparent, are explicitly 
exhibited in ritual and form a system of communicative 
functions. It is most important here to note that it was delving 
into the structure of ritual in particular that permitted the author 
to answer the question: what guarantees the durability of code 
signals as the constructive elements of culture (and in a narrower 
sense, of communication). 
In order to be able to prove this I needed to answer six 
important questions: 
(1) whether, besides the "semiotic functions", which formed the 
1967 schema, there were other functions that could be treated as 
belonging to the same group?; (2) what is it in culture that gives 
birth to the repertoire of functions indicated by Lotman?; (3) are 
there common characteristics for these functions, and if there are, 
what are they?; (4) do the texts that fulfil these functions form a 
systemic whole, and what characterizes this system?; (5) what are 
the sources for this wholeness? and (6) what guarantees the 
constantly on-going reproductivity of communicative functions (i.e. 
continuing in the active memory of culture)? 
The study of cultural universals does not hold the promise of 
praise for any scholar, since carrying out such a task is associated 
with uncomfortable theoretical complications and moves 
inconveniently across an open interdisciplinary field of study. In 
the course of the writing, the author had to resolve, in addition to 
semiotic issues, also linguistic, folkloric, ethnological, philoso­
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phical, cultural-historic and communication-theoretical problems. 
For example, one central field of study outside semiotics was the 
determination of the roots of Juri Lotman's semiotic conception, 
in the course of which the important influence of the philosophy 
of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, on the work 
of the Tartu professor became apparent. 
The author freely admits that it is only a theoretical model 
that is being offered to the reader, which would require further 
theoretical and empirical documented analysis (including the 
field of the implementation of the model). Nevertheless, I believe 
that in the heuristic sense this system of ideas does have an 
implementation field, and theoretically this should open a certain 
new perspective for the cultural-semiotic interpretation of texts. 
Code signals in cultures are ritualizing text-generators. This 
opinion can be illustrated by an analysis of advertising, which 
would summarize the ideas of the monograph. 
The structure of this work is as follows: 
Chapter 1 (Universals in connection with the interpretation of 
magic in Juri Lotman's semiotics) looks at Juri Lotman's two 
interpretations of magic, which are mutually exclusive. Chapter 1 
also examines Lotman's understandings of universals and the 
place of his "Lectures" schema in the context of Lotman's entire 
cultural-semiotic views. Chapter 2 (Specifics of mythological 
and magical semiosis) is dedicated to systematic description of 
the concept of magicality in the way that the author of the 
monograph understands this phenomenon. There, magicality and 
mythologicality are compared and differentiated, based on the 
analysis by Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski on the specifics of 
mythological sign-creation. Chapter 3 (Antithesis in culture and 
sign-creation) concentrates on the analysis of the antithetic 
communicative function and of its universal signifying forms 
which is compared with the analysis by Lotman and Uspenski in 
which antithesis is interpreted in a somewhat different more 
general context. The dominant place of antithetic communicative 
structures in the political ideology of totalitarian societies ' I 
characterized. In Chapter 4 (Uniqueness and universal it 
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magic in culture) there is a return to the concept of magic but in a 
context that is as wide as possible, in order to, on the one hand, 
compare Lotman's viewpoint with the other possible customary 
interpretations of magic (magicality), and on the other hand, to 
describe those methodological sources, from which Lotman's 
viewpoint on communicative functions proceeds. In this 
connection, I discovered that Lotman's basic semiotic terms bore 
a close relationship with the phenomenological views. 
Apparently, the intuitive determinations characteristic of Lotman, 
and structures built on essence (intellect, vertical isomorphism, 
monad, semiosphere), are characterized by closeness to Husserl's 
philosophical views. Chapter 5 (Universal forms of the reproduc­
tivity of intellect) is the longest of the thesis, and its content is 
central. Here the material from the previous chapters is 
synthesized, and a detailed analysis of the concept of code signal 
is carried out. The genetic kinship relationship of code signal 
with ritual thus becomes clear, as well as the dependence of the 
structure of the code signal on the character of the 
communication between the sacral and profane sphere. The 
system of shifters is also described, which ensures the stability of 
code signals. 
In the structure of the work, it is the final two chapters, which 
were prepared during the last two years, that are perhaps the most 
substantial. The first chapters are dedicated to the study of 
magicality and antithesis, since Juri Lotman's analysis of these 
two topics has been rather scant. Religiosity has proved to be 
little-studied (by both Lotman and this author), and this is a pity. 
Nevertheless, the author believes that the logic of the study as a 
whole, and the analogy with the structure of the four sister-
algorithms, should describe sufficiently clearly the place of this 
phenomenon in the "third", sign-world of culture. 
The system of concepts, which the author uses in the study of 
code signals, is associated with the Tartu-Moscow school of 
semiotics, into which environment, the author — due to the 
views that he holds — dares to also include himself. This general 
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attitude is expressed in the nature and terminology of the 
analysis, and naturally also in the choice of selected references. 
1 
UNIVERSALS IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
INTERPRETATION OF MAGIC IN JURI LOTMAN'S 
SEMIOTICS 
1.1. Points of departure for the interpretation of universals 
As an introduction, some light needs to be shed on those points 
of departure that provided the bases for the first phase of Juri 
Lotman's universals-quest. A narrower goal is to assess the 
implementation of these points of departure using the example of 
the interpretation of magic. This task is particularly interesting 
for three reasons. Firstly, Juri Lotman has two conceptual 
schemata for magic, one of which was completed in 1967 
(referred to as Mg 1; see Appendix, Lecture IV), and the other 
(Mg 2) was published fourteen years later (Lotman 1993a 
[1981]), and the interpretation of magic in Mg 2 is notably 
different to Mg 1. Secondly, Mg 1 is one of the first attempts in 
the universalistic interpretation of culture in Juri Lotman's 
semiotics, and, thirdly, Mg 1 has never been published. 
Mg 1 is actually a fragment of notes taken during the series of 
lectures held at the University of Tartu, to be more precise — 
the fourth lecture of the series, which has rather a loose 
association with the first part of the lecture series (except for the 
first lecture). In the fourth lecture, Lotman is feeling his way 
regarding the possibilities of creating a universal typology of 
texts and text functions. One of the "building blocks" for this 
typology is indeed magic. 
However, we need to begin with the central concept of 
universal and universality. According to the topic of this 
monograph, I shall attempt to shed light upon this concept in the 
way it was expressed in the semiotics of Juri Lotman, at the time 
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of the creation of the Tartu-Moscow school. A detailed 
theoretical analysis of universalities in Lotman's work presumes 
systematic study of all the relevant writings by the scholar and 
his co-authors. 
The ideas and conceptual principles of Juri Lotman's 
semiotics are dynamic, hard to grasp and to define. Regarding 
our present topic, we can see that although the universality theme 
is present in some form or another throughout Lotman's semiotic 
heritage — either as an important motive, background or facet — 
no monographs with information on the development of this 
topic have been published by him. There are also no other 
authors who have written a monographic critique of Lotman's 
universals-analysis. These other authors of course include 
Lotman's co-authors, primarily Boris Uspenski, Vyacheslav 
Ivanov and Aleksandr Pyatigorski, together with whom, or 
having being directly inspired by whom, the Tartu professor has 
written cultural semiotic works, where the universalistic 
treatment dominated or was substantially represented.1 
At the Second summer school of semioticians in August 1966 
at Kääriku, Juri Lotman formulated for the first time the need for 
a description of the universals of culture and the compilation of 
an applicable "cultural grammar" (Lotman 1966b: 83)2. In the 
' One of Juri Lotman's co-authors, Boris Uspenski, in his thorough theoretical 
work on the problem of universals, has remained within the limits of linguistics 
(Uspenski 1963; 1965; 1970). In implementing universalistic analysis in 
cultural semiotics, the joint work of Juri Lotman with Boris Uspenski, which 
began in the 1970s and lasted for years, is particularly noteworthy: Lotman and 
Uspenski 1971; 1973; 1975, 1994 [1977J; 1982. With Aleksandr Pyatigorski he 
published in this contcxt an important analysis of the semiotic relationship 
between text and function (Lotman and Pyatigorski 1968). The work by 
Vyacheslav Ivanov regarding the reflection of the psycho-physiological 
functions of the left and right brain hemispheres in the basic codes of culture 
(Ivanov 1978a) was extensively developed by Juri Lotman in his later articles 
(Lotman 1983; 1984; 1990 and elsewhere). 
2 Summer schools were held in the University of Tartu sports camp at Kääriku 
from 1964 onwards. The fourth summer school in 1970 turned out to be the last-
it was closed due to a joint effort by officials of the KGB and the Estonian SSR 
communist party. 
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introduction to the compendium of the summer school's 
presentations, the organizers indicated the need to differentiate 
with particular attention "those most general elements whose 
universality may make clearer the common description of the 
various modelling systems ..." (Zamechaniya 1966: 4-5). The 
need for such a task was argued by Juri Lotman in his 1967 
article "On the Problem of Cultural Typology". The article was 
published in Volume III of the "Sign Systems Studies" (Lotman 
1967b). In the editor's foreword to the collection, Juri Lotman 
wrote of a methodological foundation for a cultural grammar 
(Lotman 1967a). In this foreword he sets out his understanding 
of cultural universals in radical opposition to Hegel's philosophy 
of history. Hegel postulated that the concept of world is realized 
at each stage of its development in only one national culture, 
which at that moment, from the standpoint of the world's 
historical process, is unique. But a unique phenomenon, argues 
Juri Lotman, can have no special feature — describing 
uniqueness requires the unavoidable contrast of at least two 
systems. Indeed, this is the origin of the defectiveness of the 
Hegelian concept of history: in emphasizing uniqueness, Hegel 
even makes all the differences between the epochs absolute. 
Everything that is not a difference in the comparison of epochs is 
left unmarked, because it cannot be noteworthy. Lotman 
postulates that — because of this very misconception — it is 
important in principle to not deny the existence of other, possible 
non-human civilizations. Only the imagined viewpoint of a 
culture external to the Earth enables the understanding that 
human culture has common characteristics that encompass it as a 
typologizing whole. "That which is common to all epochs and 
civilizations — such a neutral element, not containing 
information, changes human culture to a source of information of 
its specifics" (Lotman 1967a: 6). In the course of such study, it is 
unavoidably apparent that some of the typological characteristics 
of culture are characteristic for whatever human culture, but 
some do not suit the common typology. These "most general 
characteristics", which unify cultures and are characteristic for 
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human culture as a whole, are described by Lotman, in his 
methodological introduction, as cultural universals (Lotman 
1967a: 6). 
In the already mentioned second publication of the same 
collection, Juri Lotman states directly that the task of cultural 
typology is 
(1) the description of such basic types of cultural codes, which form 
the basis for the "languages" of the various cultures and their 
comparative characteristics; (2) the determination of the universals 
of various cultures of humankind, and — as a result — (3) the 
creation of a unified system of the typological features of the basic 
codes of cultures and a general structure of the universal features of 
human culture (Lotman 1967b: 31, emphasis and numbering — P. 
L] 
The described logic of research, in the opinion of Juri Lotman, 
would enable the creation of a "cultural grammar", and this 
would "hopefully lay the foundation for moving on to the 
construction of a structured history for culture" (Lotman 1967b: 
34). 
The object and the subject of this program, from the 
standpoint of the history of the Tartu-Moscow semiotic school, 
has rather a unique place. 
Regarding the object of the research, the program can be 
described as a call to turn away from the specific genre, 
compositional or other narrow semiotic problems, of literature, 
folklore (myth) or religion, to the study of the major and general 
issues of culture — to cultural semiotics. (Nevertheless, the 
"special attention" of the second summer school was 
concentrated on texts, and limited to the examination of single 
problems (see Zamechaniya 1966: 4).) At first glance it seems 
that the cultural semiotic subject matter (text = culture) was 
primarily (?) the personal field of interest for Juri Lotman and 
Boris Uspenski. Cultural semiotics became the common basic 
problem for the Kääriku group in 1970, when the work of the 
fourth summer school was concentrated on studying the "unity of 
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culture" — cultural semiotics par excellence (Predlozheniya 
1970: 3; cf. Chernov 1988: 13). Three years later, "Theses" was 
indeed published, which was considered the policy document for 
the school (Ivanov et al. 1998 [1973])\ and where cultural 
semiotics, which studies a "certain unity" of a person's 
informational activity, is termed a science that analyses the 
"functional correlation of different sign systems" (Ivanov et al. 
1998: 61). (It should be added that the introductory paragraph 
1.0.0. of "Theses", which is quoted here, is to a great extent in 
accordance with both the content and wording of the aims of the 
Fourth summer school, which were probably prepared as an 
introduction to the summer school compendium by Juri Lotman. 
This wording hints at the attempt to interpret cultural semiotics in 
a universalistic key.) 
In the 1966-1967 policy positions, Lotman treats universals 
with untypical maximalism and with laconic conviction4. The 
field and methods of his research into universals changed 
repeatedly over the years, "grammatical" rigidity was replaced 
by a more flexible and dynamic approach, but the discovery of 
the "mechanisms" of culture, whereby human cultures are 
similar, remained a common subject in Juri Lotman's scientific 
works to the end of his life.5 
3 
"Theses" — and this was not coincidental — was not published in the Soviet 
Union (not even in Tartu), but in the space of one year in Poland, The Hague, 
and Paris. The Brezhnev reaction had accelerated. 
4 To date, Lotman had examined / was examining two universalistic problems: 
the aesthetics of sameness and difference in an artistic text (Lotman 1994a 
[1964]: 222-232), and the structural role of beginning and end in cultural texts 
(in culture) (Lotman 1966: 69-74). Boris Uspenski, and Aleksandr Pyatigorski, 
who joined him in 1967, moved in the direction of cultural typological 
"invariant schémas" (Zamechaniya 1966: 4) with their personological analyses 
(Uspenski 1966; Pyatigorski and Uspenski 1967). 
5 Lotman was fond of the term "mechanism" — this is apparent in his many 
works. As a concept this word expresses for him a generally algorithmized, 
interlinked system, which is complete, autonomous and understandably — 
universal. This concept also tends to "ignore" the semiotic border between 
language (code) and speech (text). 
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The starting point for universalistic research is for Lotman 
clearly associated with Ferdinand de Saussure"s holistic language 
concept. This expressed the hope of also discovering in other 
modelling systems a stable identity for grammatical categories 
which is characteristic of natural language: "A system, which is 
not organized in this way, is not a language, this means that it 
cannot be used for the preservation and transmittal of 
information." Such a feature of secondary modelled systems, in 
Juri Lotman's opinion, makes it possible to speak of the 
existence of the "universal constants" of language (code), which 
guarantee its identity (Lotman 1967a: 6). 
These methodological points of departure lead Lotman 
(together with some colleagues) to treat object-language and 
meta-language as phenomena of one and the same level, or (as 
characterized, after the fact — and as self-criticism — by 
Aleksandr Pyatigorski) "to the naturalization of culture, to 
treating culture as "'nature'" (Pyatigorski 1994: 326). (In Juri 
Lotman's eyes, this rebuke became rather a challenge, but the 
description of its later fate cannot be included here. (For more 
detail, see 5.2.2.) 
The most extensive "naturalized" analysis of the universal 
constants characteristic of culture during the period under 
observation is presented in the article "The Problem of Signs and 
Sign Systems, and the Typology of Russian Culture, 11th -19th 
Centuries" (Lotman 1970e) and "The Semiotics of the Individual 
and Society" in Lecture IV (incl. Mg 1). In the former, the 
various types of Russian culture are examined as the historically 
changing realization of various cultural codes. In every culture, 
some (few) of the codes always become dominant. The domi­
nance phenomenon is explained by Lotman, saying that "the 
communicative systems are also modelling systems and a 
culture, in constructing a model of the world, also creates a 
model of itself ' (Lotman 1970e: 12-13). 
In the second universalistic analysis, which is Lecture IV, Juri 
Lotman proceeds from the understanding that text and the 
immanent rules (code) that determine its structure are not 
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sufficient to decipher the text, or are even useless (cf Lotman 
1966a: 84-85). He introduces the phenomenon of function, 
which can change the meaning of the text completely. In Mg 1 he 
interprets culture as a collection of social functions. This 
however means leaving the immanent structure of the text. 
Lotman provides certain functions a universal status (see 
Appendix, Lecture IV). Function: 
- is a permanent abstract construct which survives the texts 
(as is language in relation to speech) 
- is autonomous regarding text 
- is realized in texts and also in intertextual 
communication as a relationship between speaker and 
listener. This is interpreted via expressive and illocutive 
terms, which permits the treatment of the speaker-
listener relationship as mutual positioning 
- is consequently typologically describable. However, 
space and time features are considered by Lotman as 
those "most general of elements, whose universality may 
simplify the common description of various modelling 
systems" (Zamechaniya 1966: 4-5; Lotman 1966a: 85-
91; Lotman, Pyatigorski 1968). 
Juri Lotman, in his Lecture IV, has thus interpreted magic, 
religion, science and art as social functions, which are realized 
topologically and communicatively. The noted functions as 
abstract constructs are of a universal nature, which generate 
cultures, and span the historic and geographical boundaries of 
cultures. Functions live longer than texts, and may in principle 
adapt to any text whatsoever. I consider this schema by Juri 
Lotman as a theoretical idea with great potential (despite the fact 
that in my opinion the religion and magic concepts in Lecture IV 
have been imprecisely treated). 
The uniqueness of the 1966/1967 program is also apparent in 
another fact, which appears for the first time soon after Mg 1 was 
completed. On closer inspection, it can be seen that neither in the 
Third Summer School compendium (Summer School III, 1968) 
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nor in the Fourth Summer School compendium (Summer School 
IV, 1970), in the introduction (see Predlozheniya 1970: 3-5) or 
in the compendium articles, including Juri Lotman's), are the 
terms universalism, cultural universal, human culture or the 
basic code(s) of human culture used any more. In the 1973 
"Theses" these terms are also missing; in the place of human 
culture there is consistent emphasis on the heritage of Slavic 
culture. The word universal appears in "Theses" only once — in 
the description of the reconstruction of Slavic texts there is an 
off-hand comment that the highest purely semantic level being 
reconstructed "is in the final analysis transferable to the language 
of certain universal notions" (Ivanov et al. 1998 [1973]: 74). In 
Mg 2, there is a comparison of the Russian and the western 
European legal systems (the latter being based on the Roman 
tradition), and here there is also no rising to the level of 
"humanity". 
In this development logic, which may initially seem 
paradoxical, there are a number of converging facts. At first 
glance they seem to indicate that Juri Lotman was distancing 
himself from the study of universalism. But it is more likely that 
this was a quite sudden change to a more moderate position, but 
after a certain delay subsequent to the completion of Mg 1. 
Lotman did not want to follow in the footsteps of those scholars 
who use "impressionism" on a higher level of research as a 
replacement for the precise study of text on an elementary level 
6 The adjective universal does however appear once in one of Juri Lotman's 
notes on the correlation between number and the types of culture, from which 
he says one can conclude that the paradigmatic structure of culture "encourages 
the transformation of number into a universal symbol of culture" (Lotman 1968: 
107). By the way, in the Summer School III compendium there is no Foreword. 
Such an introduction (usually worded by Juri Lotman) usually emphasized the 
general goals and unifying concepts. 
7 To some extent we need to take into account that the planning and writing of 
two monographs on artistic texts (Lotman 1970d; 1972) in 1969-1971 
apparently did not permit him to dedicate himself to the systematic study of the 
more general problems of culture. 
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(Lotman 1969b: 480). He distances himself clearly from static 
models which had acquired a bad reputation in structuralism, and 
emphasizes that the internal and contextual (incl. energetic and 
dialogical) correlations of cultural texts demand a very thorough 
multi-level analysis of both the static and dynamic structures. 
The dynamics of the text ends up in conflict with the principle of 
"grammatical unity", which results in Lotman starting to search 
for more abstract universalistic features for texts (culture) 
(Lotman 1969b: 478^80). 
In his article "On the Metalanguage of a Typological 
Description of Culture", Lotman undertakes an analysis which is 
in accordance with such criteria. He describes the typological 
features of the universal space models of culture (Lotman 
1969a). 
1.2. Two opposing interpretations 
In the analysis of Mg 2, magic is already treated in the form of 
such a typological model, where the magical function is a higher-
level text in relation to text(s) — in a way, a metatext (Lotman 
1993 [1981]). In the case of Mg 1, as I have already indicated, 
text and function were observed as phenomena on the one and 
same level: culture in such a case was transformed into a 
collection of functions, and the text(s) were derived from this 
(those) function(s) as elements of the same level (cf. Lotman, 
Pyatigorski 1968: 75). 
If Mg 1 and Mg 2 are compared, not according to the 
method of study of culture, but according to the subject for the 
study of which the method is being implemented, then one is 
surprised by the fact that Mg 1 and Mg 2 contradict each other to 
a great degree.8 But it is not possible to accept, without some 
reservations, the content of either interpretation of magic. 
8 Of course one needs to take into account, in the following comparison, the 
problems associated with a text critical assessment of the lecture notes in 
manuscript form. 
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Mg 2 is characterized by four features. These are. 
"bilateralism" (1) (i.e. both the parties in the magic act are in the 
roles of both subject ("speaker") and object ("listener"). The 
parties enter into a "contract" relationship (2), which is 
characterized by "compulsoriness" (3) — both parties use force 
regarding the other (in a certain sense), and the "equivalence" 
(equilibrium) of conventional, signifying relationships (4) 
(Lotman 1993a [1981]: 345). 
In both Mg 1 and in Mg 2 there are the basic attributes of 
magic: the subject and object of the magic act, communication 
between them, its signification (<decipherability), the act and a 
certain power, the might which ensures the magic of the act. 
As opposed to the "bilateralism", and the equilibrium of the 
"equivalent" exchange in Mg 2, the magical situation for Mg 1 is 
unilateral. One of the parties "thinks" that he is not able to 
"influence in a practical way" the other: he expects "an 
unexplained gift". He does create a "correlation" between 
himself and the "inexplicable power" "with some kind of act" in 
order to "deserve" it, but his hope is accompanied by an 
"opinion" that the intangible power cannot be influenced. This is 
reminiscent of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in criticizing James 
Frazer's understanding of magic remarked that "the expression of 
a wish in magic is eo ipso the expression of its fulfilment". As 
Wittgenstein claims, an opinion may be "flawed" (therefore also 
deserving of suspicion). But a "religious symbol" (I would add 
here the magic index as well), "is not based on opinion" 
(Tambiah 1999 [1990]: 58-59).9 It is clear that placing a magic 
act in a rational context is not justified. 
The force controlling a magic situation, making something 
happen — the agens — is Mg 1 's speaker, the "unknown 
power", in Lotman's terminology. The subject of the magic (the 
individual) is the listener. Lotman believes that a magic situation 
9 The manuscript by Ludwig Wittgenstein about James Frazer's concept of 
magic was published by Stanley Tambiah in his monograph (see Tambiah 1999 
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occurs only if the listener is not in control of the legitimacy, 
which is the basis for the speaker to "give" something that is 
"unexplainable". With his schema, Lotman deviates from the 
established traditions of the interpretation of magic (not to 
mention — although in the future perspective! — from his own 
Mg 210) (Frazer 2001 [1890]: 35-52; Jakobson 1968 [I960]: 355; 
Nöth 1986: 391-392; 1990: 147-148). Juri Lotman's claim that 
"to be a listener was not a remnant from the past" (Mg 1) is 
indeed applicable to religion but not to magic. Magic is the 
performative act of a subject (Tambiah 1999: 58-60), where the 
content is always the object being influenced indirectly 
(communication) and/or instrumentally, and which is 
"manipulation" with certain "supernatural" phenomena (Clark 
1997: 282-283; 214-215). 
In seeing the listener in the subject, Lotman is partially right. 
As can be seen further on, the subject has both a listening-
function as well as a speaking-function; the listening-function is 
associated with the mythological structure of the magic agens, 
but the performative speaking-function with the agens's magic 
act itself. And the listening connects the agens with "history" — 
with the patrum more11 ritualized norms which the subject of the 
magic act must be able to use. 
This is the reason why, in analyzing magic, confusion can 
easily occur in defining the concept of the magician. One must 
also take into account that the concept of magician is on the one 
hand associated with something from the beyond, non-human 
(this is in accordance with Lotman's "unknown power"), but on 
the other hand, psychologists, culturologists and semioticians 
have indicated something that can be summarized by Tambiah's 
conclusion on Wittgenstein's analysis of Frazer: "Wittgenstein is 
claiming that 'civilized' man has within him the same 
10 In one even later work (1992b:20), Lotman nevertheless accords the role of 
speaker to the listener described in Mgl. he indeed presents the hypothesis that 
the historical origin of speaking (beginning to speak) is associated with the 
magical act. 
11 patrum more (Lt) — ancestors. 
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symbolizing and ritualizing tendencies as the 'primitive'. This is 
synchronic and not an evolutionary posture". (Tambiah 1999: 
60). 
Who is it then that can in a magical situation fulfil the role of 
an agensi Can it only be a power, which is from the beyond or 
"designated" in the beyond, or can it be any actant who steps into 
such a role? In my opinion, one can find an answer to this 
question in Boris Uspenski's detailed study which is dedicated to 
the history of the formation of the structure and functions of 
Russian expressive phraseology (the Russian matn). The cultural 
function of magic as agens became more profane and 
"democratic", analogously to the way in which the fertilization of 
the Earth-Mother by the Heavenly-Father (Lightning God), 
ended up as a ritual with magic functions associated with the 
antagonist of God — the dog. Subsequently, the ritual was 
degraded even further — into obscenity. Functionally, all actants 
on a microcosmic level have a magic role (Uspenski 1994a: 99-
104)b On the level of behaviour, the magic features of the 
Russian mat are easily apparent, particularly to the "stranger". 
And also the person turning on the television may end up 
immediately, as a victim of advertising, in the manipulating field 
of "magicians" (cf. Nöth 1990: 151-152). 
Juri Lotman also contrasts magic and science as listener and 
speaker texts, emphasizing the procedural features of the speaker 
text. The procedural feature, however, is a determining charac­
teristic of both structures, as has been consistently claimed in 
culture studies, since the time of Tylor and Frazer (Frazer 2001 
[1890]: 54, 66; Malinowski 1998 [1925]: 76, 85-86; Hoebel 
1966: 470). The argument has only been about the magical 
procedures causality—non-causality, genuineness—falseness, 
It should be added as explanation that the lexemes mat' = mother and mat 
must be kept separate. The latter signs in Russian a certain paradigm of 
expressive obscene expression? which have received their name from 
expressions where the object is mother. 
13 Boris Uspenski refers directly to magic relations on one level fUsnenski 1QQ4 [1983, 1987]: 103). I uspenski 1УУ4 
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naturalness—supernaturalness, rationality—esotericïty (Lévy-
Bruhl 1925: 42; Frazer 2001: 887-888; Malinowski 1998: 70-71 
et al.). 
The path-model, on which Juri Lotman bases his analysis of 
science, is analogous with magical proceduralism. For example, 
the individual progress of a Sufi for unification with God is 
indeed termed the path (ar. tarïqa). This word also designates 
the concepts of method and procedure.14 The path is a step-by-
step series of increasingly esoteric procedures (instructions) 
directed towards oneself, where each step is associated with 
carrying out ritualized acts (procedures) intended to achieve a 
certain goal. The relationship between the act and its goal does 
not formally differ at all from the structure of any other magic 
act15 (Arasteh 1970). Oswald Spengler does not err when he 
considers Islam to be a thoroughly magical culture!16 
It is also questionable to differentiate between magic and 
religion according to the formulae "it is being done to me"—"I am 
being given the truth". Giving the truth may simultaneously be 
being done to me. And being done to me could also mean giving 
the truth. The observed confusion or inconsistency of Juri 
Lotman (and many other authors) in the identification of the 
(verbal) activity of magic (the subject) is associated with the fact 
that the structure of the agens is being looked at as being one­
sided. It is usually not thought, as there was already reason to 
indicate previously, that a magician (subject = "speaker") in 
14 Franz Rosenthal, referring to al-Ghazali, writes "The views of various kinds 
of Islamic religious thinkers do not essentially differ amongst themselves 
regarding that which relates to practical methods and procedures (tariq al-
amaty\Rozenthal 1978 [1970]: 177). 
15 Haljand Udam indicates that "in the Semitic tradition, which also includes 
Islam, the word of God (logos) is grammatically in the imperative form and not 
a neutral noun" (Udam 1992: 125). According to Roman Jakobson's semiotic 
magic-schema, conatives are the elements that create the linguistic structure of 
magic (Jakobson 1968 [1969]: 355). (By the way: the Sufis have understand-
dably never described their views as "magic".) 
16 It should however be noted that Oswald Spengler made his conclusions on 
the basis of other characteristics. 
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command of the agens is simultaneously engaged in two 
communicational relationships. (For more detail, see Chapter 2.) 
As the actant of the mythological structure of the agens, he is 
definitely associated with getting. Bronislaw Malinowski already 
indicated that the magician appeals to "ancestors and the heroes 
of culture from whom the magic has been gotten" [my emphasis 
— P. L.] (Malinowski 1998: 74). But this is only one side of the 
magic procedure. The denominator of the other side could be 
considered to be I am doing and here the agens is manifested as 
an effective power. Such a purposeful performative activity has 
been described on the linguistic level by John Austin (Austin 
1962). Following his lead, this was brought into the description 
of magic by Roman Jakobson (Jakobson 1968 [I960]; see also 
Chapter 2. 
The dominant structural element of Mg 2 is considered by 
Lotman to be contractuality (Lotman 1993a [1981]: 345). One 
must firstly note that contr actuality, bilateralism and 
equivalency, as features characterizing magic are partially over­
lapping mutual concepts. It seems that the characterization of 
magic using particularly these features has tended to be 
influenced by the attempt to construct, for the comparison of Mg 
2 and religious "self-sacrifice" a symmetric (4-4) and antithetic 
model (bilateralism (in magic) contra unilateralism (in a religi­
ous relationship); equivalency-its lack; being mandatory-hs 
lack; contract-unconditional (self-)sacrifice) (Lotman 1993a: 
345-346). But it is perhaps more important that contractuality 
does not unfortunately seem to be a compulsory feature of a 
magic act. Even using an intuitive assessment, one may be 
certain that the majority of magic texts are not contracts (with the 
devil). The opposite is also not confirmed by the tradition of 
magic study. In his article, Lotman does not argue the 
justification of this feature in the formal structure of magic as a 
universal relationship. He even avoids such a postulation of the 
question, and indeed takes the analysis of magic into a narrower 
framework — to the comparison of the contractuality based on 
Roman law with the religious spirit of Russian Orthodoxy, being 
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the opposite of contractuality. The interpretation of contracts in 
the Russian cultural space could be considered most successful, 
original and interesting. The whole concept of the article seems 
indeed to be constructed on this analysis. The treatment of the 
Roman emperor cult as a magic-"contractual" system does 
however create serious objections. 
As a point of departure, it must be stated that in the name of, 
on account of and because of religion, contracts have always 
been made in every culture. Certain social issues, such as the 
propagation, propagating, assessing etc of various confessions 
must be differentiated from the formal structure of religious 
communication. If a contract (say with the devil) can be 
considered an immanent structural feature for certain types of 
magical acts, then someone's contract with Roman authorities 
regarding the recognition of the emperor cult can only be 
considered a political instrument for the propagation of the 
emperor cult. 
If the basis for the assessment of the emperor cult is taken 
from the court recordings of the Christian martyrs' cases, and the 
bureaucratic formalism of the emperor cult, which the Christians 
have always used for the promotion of the virtues of Christianity, 
then one could truly be left with an impression of the 
contractual ity of Roman emperor worship. The court recordings 
of the martyrs' cases are often compiled with an emphasis on the 
opportunity to be set free. The pattern is as follows: All you need 
to do is to "sign" / "bring a sacrifice to the sacrificial altar" / 
"swear in the name of the god-like spirit of the emperor" / 
"sacrifice before the portrait of the emperor", by which you 
recognize the superiority of emperor worship (to Christianity), 
and you will save yourself and walk free! (Stauffer 1966 [1952]: 
205-207). "Thus the emperor worship was essentially not so 
much a matter of faith, as a matter of public order and discipline, 
a civil obligation for civilians and a service obligation for 
soldiers," is also Ethelbert Stauffer's summarization (Stauffer 
1966:203). 
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The above conclusion must not lead us astray! Those people 
who had contact with the Stalinist cult remember all too well that 
in addition to the "service obligation" to worship Stalin, there 
was also a religious relationship which was strange and powerful, 
and which was responsible for the formation of the entire culture. 
This also was clearly the case in Rome.17 This connection can be 
seen in Ethelbert Stauffer's book, and from Juri Lotman's own 
assurance on the universality of the religious function. This is 
why it is not possible to agree with the conclusion drawn in 
Lotman's 1981 article that Roman emperor worship was not a 
religious but a magic system. 
It is known from history that at least Caligula, Nero, 
Domitianus and Commodus actually considered themselves to be 
gods. Caesar's successor Octavianus received the additional 
name of Divi Filius (son of god). Henceforth the Roman emperor 
is called "Lord, our God", and he is considered, as is documented 
by Stauffer, the "bringer of grace", "godly Saviour". Miracles are 
associated with the emperor, including the emperor "going to 
heaven" (Stauffer 1966: 201-202). In the throne room, "the 
gathering greets the 'countenance of the most holy emperor' as if 
it were a revelation from another world. When he opens his 
mouth, all listen as if to a voice from the heavens. This is how 
the senate procedures become procedures for the worship of a 
god. There is a kind of parliamentary liturgy." Announcements 
of imperial orders in the provinces were preceded by 
proclamations such as "the godly decision by our godly lord 
commands" or "the heavenly regulations of the godly command 
thus order" or "the godly mercy of the all-holy emperor does 
will". In all the major towns of the country imperial temples were 
erected with statues and altars in front of them, where sacrifices 
and incense were brought to the portrait of the emperor (Stauffer 
1966: 202-203). 
Besides Tacitus, many other authors have drawn attention to such a 
connection, see for example: Wissova, G. Religion und Kultus der Römer О 
Aufl.). München, 1912. 1 
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These features permit a description of the Roman emperor 
worship as also (or primarily?) a religious system which, 
according to all its characteristics, suits the "self-sacrificing" 
religious model constructed by Juri Lotman. 
In conclusion, it could be said that the universalistic schema 
used in Juri Lotman's treatment of magic provide many promi­
sing analysis opportunities. But their specific implementation in 
the context of Mg 1 and Mg 2 bears some traces of deformation 
of the object of research. 
2 
SPECIFICS OF MYTHOLOGICAL AND MAGICAL 
SEMIOSIS 
2.1. Basic terms 
The conflicting ways of approaching the concept of magic (not 
only in Lotman's works) presume a systematic examination of 
this concept.1 Taking the schema sketched by Lotman as a basis, 
'magic' is constructed here as a sign-creating concept — being 
thus in accordance with criteria that could also be the foundation 
for the semiotic interpretation of the other algorithms of the 
intellect. The conceptual schema from which the author proceeds 
is initially worded in the implementation of the analysis of magic 
and antithesis (the latter being examined in the following 
chapter). In Chapters 4 and 5, this schema should acquire a more 
systematic and argumented aspect as a deductively constructed 
model. 
The author admits that magic, as the choice of example 
subject for this analysis (not taking into account the 
contradictions in the previous chapter) was most subjective — 
this was inspired, as mentioned in the Foreword, by Lotman's 
intriguing idea of treating magic as an intellectual instrument. 
1 Considering the topic and research goals of this monograph, a systematic 
overview of the histoiy of the study of magic, and the various conceptions of 
magic, will not be provided here. However, the author has familiarized himself 
with these in order to produce the following analysis of the content, using 
mainly the following sources: (Betz 1987; Cassirer 1966 [1925]; Clark 1997; 
Eliade 1995 [1963]; Eliade 1998 [1958]; Frazer 2001 [1890]; Gurevich 1972; 
Hill 1987; Hoppâl 2003 [2002]; Leach 1991 (1971); Mauss 2000 [1904]; Lévi-
Strauss 1967 [1958]; Malinowski 1965 [1935] I and II; Malinowski 1998 
[1925]; Meletinski 1976; Middleton 1987; Tambiah 1968- Tambiah 1999 
[1990]; Turner 1983 [1973]. 
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The choice of antithesis as the second example subject was the 
result of much more rational deliberations (see Chapter 3 for 
more detail). 
The author proceeds from the fact that myth and magic are 
different things. A person who is familiar with writings on the 
topic knows that this claim is not at all trivial. Various authors 
over the years have associated the one and same characteristics 
sometimes to myth and then to magic. For example, in his 
analysis of "magical semiosis", Barend van Heusden writes that 
"the magic world is filled with particulars and with relations of 
similarity. Animals, men, landscapes, the weather, all are related 
on the basis of similarities." (Heusden 1997: 123). Lucien Lévy-
Bruhl's participation law is on occasion interpreted as "radical 
magical oneness" (Undusk 1994b: 702-703). But Maurice 
Leenhardt, a professional anthropologist, interpreted the same 
law "as the central feature of the 'mythical sensibility'" (cited by 
Tambiah 1999: 106; italics — P. L.). Juri Lotman, Boris 
Uspenski and Zara Mints justifiably emphasize mythological 
identification as the main determining characteristic of 
mythological thought (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 282-288; 
Lotman and Mints 1981: 37). More examples of such contra­
dictions could be described. 
Consistency in differentiating between myth and magic is 
even more important for reasons of content, which are more 
profound than reasons of term usage. It is clear to all that myth 
and magic are closely intertwined, for example, in the folklore 
genres. However, this fact has tended to overshadow the 
probability that both myth and magic have a different origin and 
can be reduced to certain elementary, universal, but different, 
semiosic operations resp. cognitive structures (schemata). There 
is very little research reference material published on this issue. 
One of the more recent hints in accordance with this discussion 
logic has been written by Stanley Tambiah: "There are cognitive 
structures and processes associated with learning and memory 
that are known to be universal, and others that can be or might be 
isolated in the future as universals" (Tambiah 1999: 112). 
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The universality of the magical and mythological semiosic 
(cognitive) structures in the hypothesis is supported by linguistic 
culture-semiotic and psychology based research. 
Psychologists have discovered that in ontogenesis a child 
undergoes certain definite stages in its speech development (sign 
creation). Already in its first weeks of life, a long time before the 
child learns, in its second year, "to represent an object which is 
absent or an event which is not perceived" by means of icons and 
symbols, "indexes (including the 'signals' involved in 
conditioning) already play a role" (Piaget 1970: 717). The child 
does not yet feel itself to be a separate subject regarding objects: 
the outside world is comprised of "egocentric" objects. (For J. 
Piaget's comments on this also see Uexküll 1986: 127). Jean 
Piaget has elsewhere compared a child's initial indexical 
semiosis, which precedes representational designating 
operations, with a magical act (Piaget 1951). The manifestation 
of magical perception in ontogenesis is also claimed by W. 
LaBarre (LaBarre 1979: 61). 
E. Winner, A. K. Rosenstiel and H. Gardner, who have 
studied experimentally the way children begin to comprehend 
metaphors, call the first stage of this process "the magic stage". 
But in these authors' work, which is quoted by Jüri Allik, there is 
(yet again!) a description of magic as if it were myth, because 
there is talk of the identification of guards with a rock in the 
interpretation of the sentence "The prison guard was a hard rock" 
(Allik 1981: 106). The magic stage of semiosis has been 
described by Roman Jakobson using linguistic terminology. He 
suggests that the initial stage of language development has a 
deictic nature. In this case, sentences formed by a child refer only 
to directly perceived objects, resulting in a verbal act in that 
particular situation (Jakobson 1985b: 94—95). 
But a child undergoes yet another important semiosic stage 
while young. According to Henri Wallon and Roman Jakobson, 
the acquisition of language does not begin with the constitution 
of isolated objects — nomination, but through the apposition of 
objects. Creating opposition pairs belong to the child's first 
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logical operations (Wallon 1945; Jakobson 1971a: 649). A more 
abstract sign creation stage in a child's ontogenesis is introduced 
by speech imitation and identification activity, for which the 
semiosic designator is understandably the icon. The iconic stage 
of semiosis is associated in particular with mythological 
cognition. This becomes apparent, for example, when a child 
does not differentiate between a common noun and a proper 
noun. In communication it is noted that the child listening to 
unfamiliar speech does not attempt to adapt to it or to acquire 
what it hears but tries to assimilate the unfamiliar speech with its 
point of view and with the answer which it had just given to its 
partner (Piaget 1994: 124). "As imitation becomes differentiated 
and interiorized in images, it also becomes the source of symbols 
and the instrument of communicative exchange which makes 
possible the acquisition of language" (Piaget 1970: 717). 
It is such stages in a child's ontogenesis that Juri Lotman 
associates with the development of speech functions in culture: 
"It could be surmised that the initial function of speech was on 
the one hand associated with magic, but on the other hand with 
the fixing of basic repetitive behavioural gestures" (Lotman 
1992b: 20). This latter — mythological function — has been 
thoroughly investigated in the work by the Tartu-Moscow 
semiotic school. (See for example Pyatigorski 1965; Lotman and 
Uspenski 1973). Juri Lotman claims that 
the world of a child's consciousness — which is primarily 
mythological — does not, and also does not have to, disappear from 
the mind structure of an adult. This continues functioning as a 
generator of associations and as one of the active modelling 
mechanisms [italics mine — P. L.], which, if ignored, make it 
impossible to comprehend adult behaviour". (Lotman 1978: 8) 
There is reason to think that — from the standpoint of culture — 
both myth and magic belong amongst those semiotic systems 
which Vyacheslav Ivanov has called "archaic semiotic systems 
with great modelling capacity" which in the later stages of their 
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development "may change into sign structures without denotata 
(Ivanov 1978b: 201). 
It should be noted that giving up the treatment of myth and 
magic as "outdated", "marginal" and "primitive" mental and 
cultural phenomena have not progressed with equal success for 
either of them. A noticeable boost has been given to the study of 
the general applicability of mythological thinking and the 
mythological worldview, primarily through the research done by 
Claude Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes. After them, other 
authors, including Peeter Tulviste, have also confirmed the 
universality and endurance of mythological thought. P. Tulviste 
writes about the culturally dependent animism present in the 
thinking of children and adults (Tulviste 1984: 105-112). 
Whereas — as a result — the understanding of the universa­
lity of mythological thinking is generally accepted — then, 
regarding the universality of magical cognitive operations, as far 
as I know, no systematic treatments have been published. 
However, reference should be made to Winfried Nöth's article, 
which briefly analyzes the magic function of advertising. The 
magic of advertising is identified with metaphoricalness. But this 
conclusion seems to deserve an explanation, because such an 
identification does not seem to be obligatory in each and every 
case (Nöth 1990: 151-152). 
The proposed hypothesis presumes the implementation of the 
following restrictions. Historical, ethnological, genre and text 
(composition) analysis is excluded, and there is concentration on 
analyzing the semiotic — to be more precise, the semiosic — 
structure of the mythological and magical act, in accordance with 
Charles S. Peirce's cognitive paradigm of semiosis. 
However, as one more restriction, it should be emphasized 
that the following analysis is deductive and theoretical, and is not 
induced from a possible analysis of a large amount of text. At the 
same time the treatment is inter-disciplinary because mytholo­
gical and magical semiosis is treated more broadly in the context 
of: developing the semiosic theory of Charles S. Peirce (Uexküll 
1986; Nöth 1994c, 1997, 1998, 1999) and presumes (farther) 
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semiosic treatment in the context of cognitive linguistics 
(Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1990b); rhetoric (Lotman 1981a; Foucault 
1994 [1966]; Eco 1997a; Tambiah 1999 [1990]); ritual (Erikson 
1966; Lorenz 1966; Eliade 1992 [1957]; Toporov 1973; Tambiah 
1999); and topological argumentation, primarily symmetry 
(Abramyan 1981; Leyton 1992; Ivanov 1998 [1978]; Nöth 1998, 
1999). 
In order to delimit the specifics of myth and magic, and 
before beginning a phenomenological analysis of myth and 
magic, it is appropriate to define both magic and myth as 
behavioural acts. 
The magical behavioural act is the inspiring of the agens 
concealed in the word or spell or act used by the magician to 
change or achieve or declare something. The inspiration of the 
power is associated with a sacral (and rhetoric) precedent, to 
which is ascribed a teleological status. (Cf. the following 
performatives: "I declare war on X!" or "I declare a holy war on 
X!" The latter sentence is magical, the former is not — unless the 
pronoun "I" replaces a sacralized agens.) 
The mythological behavioural act, in the words of Aleksandr 
Pyatigorski, can be defined only negatively: 
There is no such specific behavioural type which we could call 
mythical2. This should be interpreted in such a manner that mythical 
texts (both texts in the direct meaning of the word as well as 
behavioural texts) are born from within cult, artistic or scientific 
behaviour — in other words, from within other kinds of behavioural 
types. (Pyatigorski 1965: 39) 
From this we may conclude that as (behavioural) texts, myth and 
magic may be structurally associated, but, in mythological 
semiosic analysis, one should in this case unavoidably proceed 
from the magical text. 
2 This author (as opposed to A. Pyatigorski) would use the term mythological to 
denote the abstract concept; the term mythical expresses for us the ontological 
items of a specific myth. 
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Semiosis could be briefly described as sign creation and 
comprehension, the nature of the relationship between a signifier 
(which Charles S. Peirce calls a representamen) and the signified 
(in Peirce's terminology — an object3). This relationship is 
cognized in the interprétant as an "idea 'created in the mind of 
the Interpreter'" (CP 8.179; Nöth 1997: 787). Peirce treats 
semiosis as a unified triad. The representamen, resp. feeling4 
represents the firstness of the sign; the object resp. volition 
represents the secondness of the sign; the interprétant resp. 
cognition expresses thirdness, which in turn mediates between 
the secondness and its firstness (CP 5.66; Nöth 1994c: 6-7). 
Within the context of this theoretical schema, Charles S. 
Peirce associates a number of important qualities with the 
semiosic triad. He thus associates the representamen with 
iconicity. Firstness (denoter) is a category expressing immediacy 
and non-differentiated qualities; it is the material quality of a 
mental sign (CP 5.291; Nöth 1994c: 6). The icon(icity) also 
represents an experience belonging to the past. The object 
(signified) represents indexicality in the semiosic triad, and 
expresses the two-way mutual effect between itself and the other, 
the First and the Second. The temporal equivalent of indexicality 
is the present. The interprétant (thirdness) is expressed by 
symbolicity, which is a category of communication, represen­
tation and semiosis. The symbol makes thought and behavior 
rational (Nöth 1994c: 7). Its mode of existence is the future and 
potentiality (CP 4.447; Jakobson 1996b: 169). Cognition is a 
category determining the semiosic process of the triad, to the 
extent that the effect of the sign is cognitive (CP 5.484). But 
J This relationship is conditional and only indicates the fact of the semiosis 
process as such. The possibility of the complementarity of Saussure's and 
Peirce's process of sign-creation is the source of lively debate even today. One 
of the newer examples of the fervour of this discussion was published quite 
recently: Mikhail Lotman 2002. Atomistic versus holistic semiotics. Sign 
Systems Studies 30.2: 513-527. 
4 Ch. S. Peirce's feeling can actually denote both sensation as well as 
perception. 
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semiosis cannot be reduced to cognition only, semiosis presumes 
the entire triad (Nöth 1997: 785). At the same time, Charles S. 
Peirce claims that the most complete signs are those where 
iconic, indexical and symbolical features are as evenly 
represented as possible (CP 4.448). 
Charles S. Peirce's sign concept also presumes that iconicity, 
indexicality and symbolicity may occur in the form of 
independent sign types, which means that the qualities 
consequently dependent on the triad may come to dominate one 
against the other, and therefore be in a dynamic relationship. It 
should, however, be added that symbolicity, in the wider 
meaning of the term, is considered by Charles S. Peirce to be a 
dominant quality of semiosis, but his interpretation of its 
meaning is radically different from Ferdinand de Saussure's 
treatment: Peirce emphasizes the fundamental iconicity of any 
symbol whatsoever. In contrast, Ferdinand de Saussure defends 
the thesis of the arbitrariness of language signs and denies the 
dependence of language on the psycho-physical, figurative, 
experienced or any other non-linguistic perceptive or cognitive 
factors (cf. Saussure 1959 [1916]: 111-112). 
Charles S. Peirce is convinced that "every thought is a sign" 
(CP 5.253). 
Since thinking and hence cognition, according to Peirce (CP 5.283), 
is only possible by means of signs, the interprétant of a sign 
functions itself as a sign. In the endless chain of semiosis, cognition 
is thus a 'thought-sign [—] translated or interpreted in a subsequent 
one' (CP 5.284). The sign created in the mind of the interpreter is 
'an equivalent sign, or perhaps an even more complete sign' (CP 
2.228). (Nöth 1997:787) 
The term schema has been borrowed from Immanuel Kant. This 
has been brought into use in cognitive linguistics (Lakoff 1990b; 
Johnson 1987: 18^10; they used image schema) and semiotics 
(Nöth 1994c: 12-13; Daddesio 1995: 134-141; Nöth 1997: 787-
788), importantly via Jean Piaget's genetic epistemology. Jean 
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Piaget used two terms: schema (pi. schemata) and scheme (pi. 
schemes). 
A schema is a schematized image (e.g. the map of a town), whereas 
a scheme represents what can be repeated and generalized in an 
action (for example, the schema is what is common in the actions of 
'pushing' an object with a stick or any other instrument). (Piaget 
1970: 705,719) 
As regards the content of the concept, scheme would be more 
precise in these circumstances. From the semiosic viewpoint 
these two terms can be combined: both denote an iconic 
replacement relationship (representation) — on the level of 
perceptive similarity, and on the level of reflexive (abstract) 
similarity. (This combination is indeed realized in the Estonian 
term 'skeem'.) 
Schemata as "building blocks of cognition" (Nöth 1997: 787) 
can be treated, in the context of Charles S. Peirce's semiotics, as 
signs, which regarding modelling semiosis function as visual 
icons. Many researchers have also drawn attention to the 
observation that schemata have a use which anticipates and goes 
beyond the cognitive field of natural language (Piaget 1970: 717; 
Daddesio 1995: 137; Nöth 1998: 55). 
Winfried Nöth notes three semiotic implications in the 
account of the role of schemata in cognition (Nöth 1997: 787— 
788): 
• Schemata are networks of interrelations in endless 
semiosis, "according to which the interprétant of the 
sign has always been embedded in a network of 
previous and subsequent acts of cognition or 
knowledge". 
• Schemata are sources stored in memory for the 
formation and interpretation of new cognition 
(semiosis). 
• Schemata are a set of relations, which are valid in the 
mind of the interpreter in the form of habit or 
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generalization, and which are central from the 
standpoint of semiosis as a cognitive process. Such 
habits are "final" and "ultimate" logical interprétants. 
They indicate the final phase of semiotic 
interpretation, where cognition has become a 
"tendency [—] to behave in a similar way under 
similar circumstances in the future". (CP 5.487; CP 
8.332). 
What is important in these conclusions is the significance of 
structural associations in schemata. Following in the footsteps of 
G. Lakoff and M. Johnson (Lakoff 1990; Johnson 1987), we treat 
them as iconic, topological and rhetorical universals. However, 
we do believe that schemata form hierarchies and that the 
metaphor, to which G. Lakoff and M. Johnson reduce all 
schemata, is itself one of the possible second stage schemata. 
Here, a mythological schema, for example, which in principle 
excludes the bilingual ambivalence of the metaphor, could 
compete with metaphoric semiosis. G. Lakoff s and M. 
Johnson's approach should be expanded by also adding a cultural 
viewpoint: schemata form dynamic associations according to the 
culture, where some schemata dominate and others retreat (but 
do not disappear!). A cultural viewpoint also enables the problem 
of the dead and current metaphor to be raised, which G. Lakoff 
and M. Johnson seem to avoid, but which, from the semiosic 
viewpoint, has a structuralizing, and therefore culture typological 
importance. 
The implementation of the cognitive and intellect-based 
paradigm in the analysis of myth and magic therefore presumes 
the description of myth and magic as cognitive structures and 
schemata, which in the semiotic context means the analysis of 
mythological and magical semiosis. This results in the need to 
determine the formal characteristics of mythological and magical 
semiosis. 
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2.2. Mythological semiosis 
Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski, in their reconstruction of 
mythological consciousness — or to be more precise: of the 
formal logical structure of mythological consciousness —, 
analyze the logical relationship between the subject and 
predicate, and from this draw three important conclusions. 
For mythological consciousness: 
• the objects in the world are indivisible into features: each 
object is treated as an integral whole (mythological 
consciousness only divides objects into parts); 
• the world comprises of objects which do not form a 
hierarchy in the form of classes or categories — all 
objects are of the same order. Parts are the same as the 
whole, and the concept of logical hierarchy does not 
belong to this type of consciousness in principle (but 
valuational hierarchies are also very general); 
• all objects in the world are unique (the concept of the 
multiplicity of objects presumes their inclusion in certain 
general groups, and such an occurrence means the 
existence of a meta-descriptive level and would be in 
conflict with the previous feature (Lotman and Uspenski 
1973:283-284). 
As an example, Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski compare two 
sentences: 1) the world is matter, and 2) the world is a horse. 
The predicate in the first sentence is an abstract construct, which 
belongs to a specific meta-language. The subject world in the 
second sentence, however, refers to a predicate which is in the 
logical sense of the same order as itself (Lotman and Uspenski 
1973: 282). Therefore, it could be said that mythological 
consciousness, or, in a broader sense, the mythological mind (as 
opposed to the non-mythological), is basically mono-linguistic. 
Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski also derive a common 
denominator for the formal logical and semiosic features of 
mythological cognition, which is iconic identification and 
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suchness. In the cognitive plan this means that understanding in 
one case indicates translation, but in another case (as in the 
mythological mind) — recognition or identification (cf. Lotman 
and Uspenski 1973: 282-283). The authors, based on Roman 
Jakobson's writings (Jakobson 1972: 96-97), draw an intriguing 
conclusion which summarizes their analysis. They claim that in a 
mythological world there is a quite unusual type of semiosis, 
which can generally be reduced to the naming process: the sign 
in the mythological mind is analogous to a proper noun (Lotman 
and Uspenski 1973: 284). The proper noun becomes an object, 
which is indivisible from the object, and is in this sense unique. 
It could be said that the maximally abstracted general meaning of a 
proper noun retreats to a myth. It is particularly in the area of 
proper nouns where the word and denotatum become one, a feature 
which is so characteristic of mythological imaginings. (Lotman and 
Uspenski 1973: 286) 
If the identification relation between a proper noun and its object 
can actually be considered a model of mythological semiosis, 
then it would be justified to ask: can this model be treated as a 
certain image schema (see Nöth 1994c: 12-13), which in the 
cognitive process would have a wider usage extending beyond 
"primitive" consciousness? 
If the answer to this hypothetical question was "yes", then 
another question could be posed: which formal elements of the 
semiosic process would comprise this schema? 
The universal parallel in semiosis of the proper noun transfer 
relationship is understandably the iconic (signifying) firstness of 
the relationship between the representamen and object. Of 
course, it cannot be concluded from this that all iconic semiosis 
could also be mythological. This would be absurd, because 
according to the cognitive paradigm, iconicity in language is a 
very wide concept, reflecting the various manifestations of the 
perceptive, cognitive and physical activity of a person. 
Yet the answer to the second question seems in fact to be 
concealed in a certain form of the iconic specificity of the sign. 
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And it seems to me that Winfried Nöth was on the path to this 
answer in his articles on recent years research on iconicity and 
symmetry (Nöth 1998; Nöth 1999). 
Winfried Nöth brings out the two vital aspects of iconicity. 
These are: 
1. To begin with — endophoric iconicity, which determines such 
relationships of signans-signans, which are due to a mutual 
iconic mapping of linguistic forms, concealed within the text 
(parole) or language (langue) system itself (Nöth 1999: 614). Let 
us also remember that, according to Charles S. Peirce's 
determination, the icon belongs to the individual's past 
experience, and that the Tartu-Moscow school treats any 
statement as a time-space phenomenon (Lotman 1969a; Ivanov 
1978a: 130; Uspenski 1989a: 66-70; 1989b: 18-30). 
Endophoric iconicity is differentiated from exophoric 
iconicity, which points to "beyond the given expression plane 
either to a different expression form or to the content plane of 
language" (Nöth 1994b: 107). But they are mutually 
complementary in the sense that each iconicity is an internal 
phenomenon of a certain language, which means that it must eo 
ipso also have certain similarities in form, on the basis of 
signification, syntagmas, etc. These two forms of iconicity in 
cognitive schemata accentuate the similarity in some way or 
another in sign-creation (in semiosis). 
2. The second important aspect, which must be considered in the 
description of mythological iconicity as a cognitive schema, is 
the so-called genuine icon phenomenon (Nöth 1999: 616; cf. CP 
2.276). Winfried Nöth writes: 
... a genuine icon fulfils its semiotic function "by virtue of a 
character which it possesses in itself [...and it] does not draw any 
distinction between itself and its object. [—] It is an affair of 
suchness [italics — P. L.] only" (CP 5.73-74). Sign and object 
hence merge in one identity (Santaella 1995: 143). The genuine icon 
is thus an autoreferential or self-representing sign, as Randselle 
(1979: 57) has called it. The icon is its own object, it refers to itself 
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(cf. also CP 2.230). In the words of Peirce, it is a sign "by virtue of 
its being an immediate image, that is to say by virtue of characters 
which belong to it in itself as a sensible object, and which it would 
possess just the same were there no object in nature that it 
resembled" (CP 4.447). (Nöth 1999: 616) 
It is not possible here to delve into details (for the 
implementation of these characteristics, see Table 1 in 5.3.2.) but 
it can be claimed that the previous discussions permit the 
deliberations of Vyacheslav Ivanov to be seen in a new light, as 
regards semiotic systems with great modelling capacity that in 
the passage of time began to circulate as signs that have no 
denotatum (Ivanov 1978b: 201). 
2.3. Magical semiosis 
2.3.1. The epistemological status of magic 
As we know, Jean Piaget believed that in the formation of logical 
thought, logic replaces the mythological, magical and other "pre-
logic" cognitive structures in a child's thinking. It follows then, 
that in the mind of an adult (in a civilized society) magical 
cognition should not exist. It is difficult to agree with such a 
position. 
Formal logical criteria have dominated in the semantic 
analysis of magic. Whichever way one looks at it, these criteria 
assert that the epistemological "shift" and illusion of the magic 
act are the basic characteristics of magic. The described logical 
contradictions between magic and "reality", however, do not 
permit the vigour of magic in various cultures (including in 
contemporary cultures) to be satisfactorily explained. A much 
more fruitful direction of research began with Malinowski, and 
has later been based on the language philosophy of Wittgenstein 
and Austin, on the pragmatism of Peirce, and the rhetoric of 
Burke. This treats magic primarily as a social, language and 
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cognitive (Wittgenstein) act, from which its pragmatic features 
are derived (Tambiah 1999: 82-83). 
This path takes the researcher to the formal structure of 
magical semiosis, and permits the treatment of magic as an act of 
sign creation. 
2.3.2. Magical procedure 
In order to find the required accent to study magical semiosis, let 
us compare magic with a miracle. The effect of magic may 
indeed be a miracle (miraculous), but cultures tend to term as 
miracles, in the direct sense, such phenomena where "there is no 
sign used as a means of this obtaining supernatural effect" (Nöth 
1990: 146). A miracle is indeed a miracle in the sense that it 
explicitly exists, but the details of its creation are concealed. The 
effect of magic, however, is associated with a perceivable 
procedure (act, spell) which is perceivable by the senses (cf. 
Tambiah 1968: 148). 
Procedure in magic is a designating act, and it is isomorphic 
with semiosis. W. Nöth analyzes two features whereby magical 
semiosis differs from "normal" semiosis. In his opinion, 1) in 
magic, there is an attempt to have a practical and immediate 
effect (not via the addressee as in a "normal semiosis") on a non-
semiotic world, and 2) in magical communication, the message is 
directed to the "strange" receptor, the physical or organic object 
which is not in principle able to decipher the sign code of the 
message (Nöth 1990: 147-148). It seems that these criteria are 
too narrow and also imprecise. Magical semiosis can indeed be 
pointed at the non-semiotic world of objects, but magical 
semiosis may also be personal. Winfried Nöth's criteria, for 
example, exclude the diverse forms of autocommunicational 
magic. Various esoteric doctrines (e.g. Sufism) have been 
described as a "path" consisting of stages, where each stage is 
actually, regarding its structure, an isomorphic procedure with a 
magical act pointed at the addressor itself. In this way, the stages 
of magical acts develop, which, all in all, serve to achieve a 
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finalist effect. The object of a magical act may also be another 
individual or group of individuals, directly (i.e. an addressee, as 
the object of magic, who in principle is able to decipher the 
signs). 
Taking this into account, magical procedure should be defined 
as a semiosic act, where the participants believe that the spell 
being used (or act) is capable of guaranteeing the effect that is 
thereby produced, although they usually can never directly 
follow or sense that effect. In other words, the effect of magic 
(resp. believability) is guaranteed by the expressive structure of 
the procedure. (Sesame, which opened before Ali Baba's eyes, is 
an artificial fairytale style (metaphoric) processing of magic, 
which is generally not suitable for describing the relationship 
between magical procedure and effect.) In the case of effect, it is 
important — and this is also emphasized by Winfried Nöth — 
that the line between the naturalness/supernaturalness of the 
effect is very relative and shifting (Nöth 1990: 145-146). This of 
course is so if we remain within the framework of semiotic 
theory in the functional interpretation of magic. 
Now we could ask: what are the formal characteristics of 
magical semiosis, and how do they ensure the high status, 
cultural longevity and universality of the magical procedure? 
The magical procedure is associated with the phenomena of 
agens (= the force that makes things happen) and the magician. 
The sources of agens must be sought from the past; the effect 
caused by the magician is expected as a result of a procedure — 
i.e. in the future. This two-directional orientation of a magic act 
was already noticed by Bronislaw Malinowski — see Tambiah 
1999:74. 
2.3.3. Agens as a mythological structure 
The magic formula (spell, etc.) used by the magician, and the 
non-verbal acts accompanying it, conscientiously repeat that 
which has already been repeated ((innumerably) many times) 
previously. From the viewpoint of semiosis, this is an iconic 
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relation to be more precise, the suchness between the 
representamen of a genuine icon and the object. A repetitive 
archaic formula, as described by Charles Peirce, is an immediate 
object, an object "such as the sign it substitutes for. It is a 
signified object and therefore — an idea ' (CP 4.536). 
In describing the iconic semiosis of the agens as an image 
schema, the text of the spell (+ act) used in procedures should be 
treated as the proper name form of appearance of the patrum 
more. In other words, the magic spell and its object preserved in 
tradition merge into a proper name." As became clear in the 
treatment of mythological semiosis, the proper name semiosis is 
the basic feature of mythological image forms. 
This leads to the conclusion that, in magical procedures, there 
is a clash between two schemata (and texts) which differ in 
structures — the mythological and magical. Such a conclusion 
has interesting cultural-historical and typological connotations, 
which we will not be covering here. But the conclusion is also an 
additional example to the one cited by Aleksandr Pyatigorski, i.e. 
that mythological (behavioural) texts do not occur separately but 
merge into texts of other behavioural types ("texts"). (As 
clarification, we should add that a mythological text cannot carry 
an independent, endophorically generated meaning because it is, 
in its structure, monolingual, but a monolingual system cannot 
create a meaning in itself (Lotman 1978: 5).) 
The agens, as a mythological schema, is characterized by two 
features, both of which raise the status (authority) of the magical 
procedure which occurs in the present, thereby strengthening the 
belief in the effectiveness of the magical effect: 
1. The agens as a power making things happen is valued not 
so much based on the events of the future but of the past. In 
other words: it is not so much a prediction of the future that 
is sought from the present, but more the revelation of 
"initial" (past) times (cf. Uspenski 1989 XXIII: 20). 
5 patrum more — ancestors; in this semiosic process they and the spell also 
become identical. 
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2. The agens as a mythological structure is actually a part of 
an even more fundamental system, and is governed by the 
following logic: only that exists which is sacral, and sacral is 
that which is part of the Cosmos (Uspenski 1989 XXIII: 21). 
Therefore, the creation of the universe by the gods is a 
paradigmatic example of magical creation (Eliade 1992: 57). 
Magic just as traditional ritual in general can be interpreted 
via the micro- and macro-cosmos' irrefutable unity, making 
this unity explicit. 
2.3.4. Agens as a magical structure 
2.3.4.1. Phenomenon of the magician. 
Agens, however, is simultaneously a magical structure as well, 
since it is realized in the present form through the creative act of 
the magician and is generally directly perceived by the senses. 
Historically and typologically the role of the magician can be 
related "to the mythical heroes and ancestors who wielded the 
magical power in question and with whom the magician himself 
becomes identified" (Tambiah 1968: 190). This genealogical 
and/or corporative association is confirmed in various archaic or 
(more) contemporary initiation rites, which are meant to 
celebrate the belonging together of magician and agens, and 
therefore to guarantee a high level of social authority. 
The role of the magician can be fulfilled by persons who have 
dedicated themselves to magic, but also by those who 
(arbitrarily) take the role of the demiurg. Such persons could be 
prophets, priests, witches or miracle workers, whose role could 
be taken over by, for example, a charismatic dictator or a public 
idol. If we proceed from Vladimir Propp's idea, and treat the 
magician as a text function, where the question what? and not the 
questions who? or how? is important (Propp 1969 [1928]: 23-
24), then it could be added that in principle the role of the 
magician could be taken by anyone, if this "who" wishes to take 
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the role of mediator for the agens. (Compare, for example, the 
smashing of a champagne bottle on the bow of a ship, which is a 
genuine magical procedure, and where the person certainly does 
not have to be a "magician".) 
These discussions seem to indicate that the procedural role of 
the magician, as the executor of the procedure in the structure of 
a magical act, becomes second-rate compared to agens as the 
initial power in making things happen. This lower importance, 
however, is superficial and results from the interpretation of the 
causality inappropriate to the causal rationalism of the magical 
structure. In order to explain this thesis, here is a longer quote 
from Boris Uspenski. 
It is true that causal relations in the cosmological consciousness do 
not tie the present and the future: they primarily tie a certain initial 
state (the past, which is the starting point) simultaneously with both 
the present and the future. This indicates that the present and the 
future are indirectly tied — via that initial, integral, all-
encompassing condition. 
According to this understanding, everyday events occurring in 
the present do not call up the future; but these could be perceived as 
omens of the future. Indeed, both that which takes place in the 
present, and also that which will happen in the future — both [italics 
— P. L.] manifest themselves as the reflection or symbolic image of 
the same initial condition, as the sign of this initial condition. 
(Uspenski 1989b: 20) 
It may now be concluded that in the context of the magical 
procedure, the magician is the manifestation of the longevity of 
the agens — therefore, regarding his role, actually equivalent to 
the macro-cosmic functions of the agens, with the latter term 
used in Propp-style. 
The magician is simultaneously a function of both mytholo­
gical and magical structure. On one hand, it is a constant function 
and is the same as a number of cultural precedents stored in the 
genuine icon. On the other hand, it stages a magical rite, as a 
result of which (i.e. in the future!) the desired effect must appear 
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for the recipient of the magic (the recipient can also be the 
magician himself). 
2.3.4.2. Problem of magical effect. 
A magical procedure is a creative act. We are not using the term 
here in an aesthetic, social or emotional meaning. The procedure 
is creative in the sense that it is a signifying act. For this reason, 
let us first look at the linguistic and semiotic form of a magical 
procedure. 
The grammatical equivalent of a spoken spell accompanying 
magic acts is the direct speech of the agens in the form of auto-
referent performatives (conative statements). 
The auto-referent performative (performa (Lt.) — to create) is 
a reflexive message expressed in the first person indicative 
present in direct speech, which must be equivalent to an action 
(cf. Tambiah 1968: 188), for example: "I curse...", i.e. which is 
not limited to describing an action ("He cursed ...") or naming 
the act ("They will be cursed..."). 
The meaning of a conative message (conatus (Lt.) — effort, 
striving) was introduced to the theoretical description of magic 
by Roman Jakobson. Jakobson defines, via a conative reference 
(i.e. a vocative and imperative reference directed to the 
addressee), the magical function of language: "Thus the magical, 
incantatory function [of language — P. L.] is generally changing 
an absent or inanimate 'third person' into an addressee of a 
conative message" (Jakobson 1968 [I960]: 355). (Jakobson's use 
of "generally" is entirely appropriate because the addressee of 
magic does not necessarily have to be "inanimate" and in the 
"third person". And, as already indicated, magical communi­
cation may also occur in the form of auto-referent performative.) 
Regarding semiosis, the performatives and conatives of the 
magical spell are classified as indices. To be more precise, they 
are also signals, because they have either an inspiring, obligating, 
conditional, causal, or some other direct or comissive function. 
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A magical procedure is a joint structure. it is divided into 
mythological and magical semantic fields. In the mythological 
context, the spell fulfils the role of a genuine icon — that which 
it signifies is the direct object stored in (cultural) memory, an 
object "such as the sign it substitutes for". In the magical context, 
the spell is an index regarding the source (i.e. patrum more), 
whose object (signified) is the sacral agens. Regarding the aim of 
the procedure {resp. future) the spell is a signal which, using 
John L. Austin's terms, results in a "perlocutionary effect" 
occurring in the object. (The meaning of perlocutionary effect is 
any kind of deformation of the state of the object (resp. addres­
see).) As a rule, the perlocutionary effect is not explicitly given 
in a magical procedure. The epistemological (philosophical) 
explanations of this have always resulted in the conflict between 
the natural and supernatural, mythological and rational 
worldviews. 
The semiotic treatment of the perlocutionary effect presumes 
the taking into account of a magical act as a structural whole. 
A magical effect, as already noted, is a creative act. Any 
creation at all is in the semiosic meaning a crossing of the border 
of a certain semiotic field (Lotman 1970d: 282). Crossing the 
line means the birth of a new semiotic field and a new language: 
crossing the line is a translation in the semiotic plane and creates 
a semantic and topological distance. The translation in this case 
is done into an unknown language. In the structure of a magical 
procedure this is expressed indirectly (but generally always) in 
the phenomenon of the indétermination of the language of the 
spell, in the fact that the language of magic as a rule differs from 
everyday language, or is even undecipherable. Problems related 
to this issue have been thoroughly researched by Umberto Eco in 
his theoiy on sacral languages (Eco 1997a; 1997b [1993]). For us 
here it is important to refer to his understanding that the level of 
language comprehension does not influence the believability of 
the effect of the magic act; the effect seems to be even more 
believable ("real") when the language is indeterminate. If you are 
a ship's captain, and not an occasional bystander, and you are 
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watching the champagne bottle shattering on the bow of the ship 
which will take you out to the open sea, do you see this act with 
real consequences as a magical act or as an act of polysemantic 
metaphorical pleasure? 
3 
ANTITHESIS IN CULTURE AND SIGN-CREATION 
3.1. Determining the viewpoint 
In its most general form, antithesis (if we proceed from Webster) 
means opposition, contrast, or also the rhetorical contrast of ideas 
by means of parallel arrangements of words or statements; in 
dialectics antithesis marks the second stage of a dialectic process. 
Observing the occurrence of antithesis in culture it becomes 
apparent that setting opposites, contrasts and oppositions appear 
in all spheres of the self-description of a person (and culture). 
Based on results of biosemiotic research it is even indicated that 
the identification of self in relation to other is the most ancient 
and also the first (semiotic) opposition in living organisms in 
general (Sebeok 1989; Bickerton 1990). Based on language-
history data, Boris Porshnev claims this same oppositionality, but 
postulates the opposite primacy of grammatical persons: the they-
(he)lconcept existed before the we-(7^/concept, which means that 
one initially identified oneself according to the other (Porshnev 
1979 [1966]: 81). 
There is a voluminous heritage on antithesis. The manifes­
tations of antitheses have provided enduring interest for linguists 
((binary) oppositions, zero-feature, etc — Bally 1932; Ivanov 
1973; Jakobson 1985f [1975]; Saussure 1959 [1916]; folklore 
scholars (the polar placement and symmetry of persons and 
events — (Abramyan 1983; Meletinski 1976; Olrik 1909); analy­
tical and social psychologists, and psychoanalysts (mirror stage 
of ontogenesis, universal dualism of spiritual experiences, "us"-
"them" phenomenon, negative identity) — Lacan 1977 [1937]; 
Porshnev 1979 [1966]; Jung 1994 [1930]; biosemioticians and 
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cyberneticians (invader; asymmetry of brain hemispheres, 
identification mechanisms of the "foreigner") — Erikson 1966; 
Ivanov 1978a; Jacob 1974), cultural anthropologists and 
semioticians (dual cultural models, anti-behaviour, anticulture) 
— Abramyan 1981; Jakobson 1971b [1967]; Lévi-Strauss 1967 
[1958]; Lotman and Uspenski 1994 [1977]; Nöth 1994a; 
Pyatigorski 1992; Uspenski 1994b [1985]); and — last but not 
least — ideologues, political scientists and sociologists (Marxist 
theory of class struggle, dualism of (political) ideology (in 
totalitarian societies), negative identity) — Lenin 1946c [1902]; 
Lenin 1948b [1913]; Lenin 1950b [1920]; Stalin 1935a [1924]; 
Shils 1958; Sowell 1987; Wodak 1989; Donskis 1995; Russell 
1979. 
Juri Lotman, in his semiotic works (often together with Boris 
Uspenski), has treated antithesis as a universal characteristic of 
cultural models and the structure of sign-creation. Antithesis, as 
we already know, is not the only universal that Lotman has 
studied. Nevertheless, the author of this monograph is of the 
opinion that in order to delve deeper into the problems of 
universals, the examination of antithetic structures is a most 
suitable topic for a number of reasons. 
Of course, the primary reason is that the heritage of the Tartu-
Moscow semiotic school contains quite extensive research on 
antithesis on the basis of cultural subjects (although primarily 
Russian) (Lotman and Uspenski 1971, 1982, 1994 [1977]; 
Uspenski 1994b [1982]); secondly, due to the "flowering" of 
totalitarianism in European culture, this topic has been 
extensively, vividly and quite recently documented, throughout 
the whole of the past century; thirdly, because many of the 
potential readers of this book have personally experienced the 
antithetic flowering of totalitarianism; the fourth reason follows 
on from the first three: the author hopes that the analysis of 
antithesis creates a more usual or "handy" instrument for delving 
into the details of the formal structure of Juri Lotman's 
universals. 
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The way that antithetic sign-creating and text models take 
root in cultures has been documented, particularly vividly and in 
a way familiar to Europeans, in Soviet political ideology. A 
century ago, Lenin declared ideology to be a generic concept in 
"intellectual culture". He adopted the concept 'ideology' from 
Marx, but distorted its content beyond recognition. 
Marx terms, as ideological forms, the legal, political, 
religious, artistic or philosophical forms of the superstructure of 
the antagonistic class society, whereby people are aware of 
breakthroughs in the economic conditions of society, and where 
their class struggle finds expression. It is also no accident that 
Marx does not include science amongst the ideological forms of 
the superstructure, since he emphasizes that "just as it is not 
possible to judge someone by what they think of themselves" it is 
also not possible to judge an historical epoch on the basis of the 
self-awareness of that epoch (Marx 1980 [1859]: 101). In 
examining the substance of ideology, Marx and Engels call 
ideology the "synonym of the idealistic treatment of history", the 
intellectual product of the "ideological estate" that is unavoidably 
created in the course of the distribution of work. In their 
definition, ideology is an "illusionary consciousness" that 
"distorts reality" since the characteristics of the phenomenon 
under study are derived from the "concept" that is accorded to 
this phenomenon. "People and their relationships turn out to be 
upside down just like in the camera obscura" (Marx and Engels 
1965, 10: 83, 87; 11: 113, 135-136). Marx also states the 
functional similarity of ideology and religion: "Criticism of 
religion releases man from illusions, so that he can spin around 
himself and his true sun" [i.e. around the "world of people" and 
society — P. L.] (Marx 1955 [1844]: 414-415). Furthermore, 
religion is considered by Marx to be a "general theory" of the 
"distorted" world in (German) ideology, an "encyclopaedic 
compendium", with a "logic" and a "moral sanction" therein 
(Marx 1955 [1844]: 414; Marx and Engels 1958 [1845]: 19-20). 
It just cannot be concluded for this that Marx treats ideology as a 
sub-concept of religion since religion is one of the ideological 
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forms of the superstructure, as are the political, legal, moral, etc 
forms. In addition, Marx differentiates between the "holy" and 
"non-holy" forms of expression of the bourgeois worldview that 
cause "self-alienation" (Marx 1955 [1844]: 415). However, Marx 
also sees in the self-reflection of bourgeois society the 
dominancy of certain characteristics of religion, which he 
believes are the basic characteristics of all types of ideology.1 
Following on from Marx and Engels, Lenin also sees the 
forms of the socialist superstructure as "ideological", but in quite 
another key. In his infamous article titled "Party organization and 
party writings" he postulates the unavoidable subordination of 
literature (implicitly of the entire "intellectual culture") to the 
criteria of "ideology" (Lenin 1947 [1905]). "Ideology" is 
declared to be a generic concept of intellectual culture. With his 
dichotomy of 'two cultures" — "the culture of the oppressors and 
the oppressed in the one culture", he formulates this concept's 
non plus ultra (Lenin 1948b [1913]: 8-9). Therefore: "either 
bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle way" (Lenin 
1946c [1902]: 355-356). 
It was absolutely logical and "natural" that the 
implementation of ideological antitheses moved from the sphere 
of "intellectual culture" into politics, into political texts: "Our 
basic task is also to set up our truth in order to counterbalance 
bourgeois 'truth', and to force recognition of our truth" (Lenin 
1950c [1920]: 339). This task was formulated as a memorable 
slogan by Vladimir Mayakovski, who had sunk to the level of 
court bard: "И песня /И стих — / это / бомба и знамя, //И 
голос певца / подымает класс //И тот / кто сегодня / поет не с 
нами,//Тот — / против нас" (Mayakovski 1958: 122).2  
1 Considering how consistent Marx was in proceeding from materialistic 
monism, his strict opposition to théogonie or Hegelian monism is neither 
accidental nor unexpected. 
2 Irina Belobrovtseva kindly drew my attention to the existence of these verses 
in the poem "Mister 'Artist of the People"': "And the song / And verse / Are / a 
bomb and a flag // And the bard's voice / shall inspire the class // But he / who 
today sings not with us — // Against us / he is". 
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3.2. Semiosis forms the culture type 
As is known, the Tartu-Moscow school semioticians define 
culture as a semiotic system occurring between a person and the 
world, where the information transmitted by a person is 
processed and organized (Lotman and Uspenski 1984: X). This 
system can be observed as both an abstract model of reality (or as 
a world picture or culture language) as well as its realization in 
sign structures (Lotman 1969a: 463). 
Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski claim that in culture 
semiotics it is not possible to limit oneself to the functional 
analysis of culture as a sign system. Citing Michel Foucault's 
similar approach (Foucault 1994 [1966]) they place importance 
in culture on the nature of the relation of culture to the sign, 
signification and sign-creation, as a basic factor forming culture 
type. In their opinion, it is important to observe how in culture 
the relationship between the level of expression and the level of 
content of a sign is interpreted. On the basis of this relationship 
they differentiate between two culture types. For one of these, the 
symbol is suitable for the illustration of the type of relationship 
of the content and the expression, but for the other, it is a ritual 
(Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 151-152). 
In the first, conventional, arbitrary relations dominate 
between content and expression, as with symbols generally. 
Giving something a name in a culture, as the manner of 
expressing content, is not at all primary — the expressed content 
is important. In the second culture type — we would also include 
Soviet culture here — the relationship between manner of 
expression and content for a sign is generally seen as the only 
option. The form of expression is indivisible from the content as 
in a ritual. Content dictates definite limits on expression, and vice 
versa (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 151-152). Soviet culture 
apparently belongs to just this culture type. Solzhenitsyn has 
written somewhere of a locomotive driver who was executed on 
the spot because he had wrapped his sandwich in a newspaper 
that was decorated by a picture of Stalin. The Soviet culture type 
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is centred on ("correct") naming, on the right "shell". A "wrong" 
name is the same as "foreign" content. Here we need to 
remember the re-naming of streets, squares, institutions, etc 
during the Soviet occupation. At the end of the 1930s, all Soviet 
citizens named Trotsky very quickly changed their name 
(generally it was sufficient to add an "i": Troitsky) ... Jaan 
Undusk writes of Stalin's years in power: 
It was often the case that people were not in love with communism, 
which they had not yet started to believe in, but rather with the word 
'communism', which everyone had acquired, it was on everyone's 
lips and between their teeth: 'Two shining names [Lenin, Stalin]/ in 
the love of the people / have united in one word: communism.' 
(Aleksei Surkov: To the Leader of the Peoples. Liberal translation). 
(Undusk 1994a: 1881) 
Compare this with Stalin's oath on the occasion of the death of 
Lenin: "There is nothing higher than the name of party member 
in this party, whose founder and leader is comrade Lenin" (Stalin 
1947:46). 
Culture as a whole can be interpreted either as a mechanism 
which creates a collection of texts or as texts — as a realization 
of culture. In determining culture type, taking into account the 
self-assessment of culture in this issue, as indicated by Lotman , 
is very important. In the first case, the model is a textbook as a 
collection of rules generating text. Such a culture is aware of 
itself as a system of rules creating texts: one can only speak of 
precedent, if there is a rule which describes it. (European 
classicism can be brought as an example.) In the second case, the 
textbook as chrestomathy or a catechism is the model — texts, 
citations, collection of questions-answers (Lotman 1970g: 36, 47; 
see also Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 152-153; 1994 [1977]: 
245). Such a culture is aware of itself as a culture of norms — a 
collection of "correct" texts; here the rules are reflected as the 
sum of precedents. 
Being oriented to expression (nomination), Soviet culture also 
reflects itself as the Correct Text. The content of culture, looking 
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from the viewpoint of the self-reflection of culture, has been 
served up (pre-determined); for comprehending the text one has 
to learn the corresponding relationship between content and 
expression. (The path to comprehend culture is similar to the 
philological analysis of texts (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 152).) 
It could be added that western political scientists and the Soviet 
intelligentsia (who were able to decipher precedents) could 
unerringly interpret the near future of the state on the basis of 
signs, which had a definite meaning as words do in a dictionary. 
For example, the order of listing of CPSU Politburo members in 
an article or the way they were lined up at the Lenin mausoleum 
during parades unambiguously expressed changes, which had 
occurred (were in the process of occurring) in national politics. 
Soviet culture ritualized behaviour. The dominance of text as a 
precedent and its authoritative expression over the content of the 
text and the rules that generate content is also illustrated quite 
well by the citation convention which developed in the USSR. In 
the case of "the classics of Marxism-Leninism" (i.e. Marx, 
Engels, Lenin and (up to 1953) Stalin) — as opposed to all other 
authors — there was no requirement to tie a citation to specific 
research (article), in which the "classic" expressed the cited 
thought. It was sufficient to refer only to the volume and page of 
the (collected) works. The year of publication for the volume was 
also not mentioned. In the case of Marx and Engels, no 
differentiation was made between them: it was always a case of 
"Works" by K. Marx and F. Engels. The reader had to be 
completely satisfied by the graphical fact of a citation to an 
authoritative content and "container". 
3.2.1. The antithetic dominant of semiosis 
The clash of the two different culture types as sketched here with 
another ("foreign") culture demonstrates an interesting diffe­
rence. The culture which is aware of itself as a collection of 
rules, and is a culture oriented primarily towards content, sees the 
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other culture as a non-culture. But a culture which is aware of 
itself as a collection of normative texts and is oriented towards 
expression treats foreign culture as anticulture (Lotman and 
Uspenski 1971: 154-155). 
Firstly, a few remarks on terms. The concepts and spelling of 
non-culture (or non-text) and nonculture (or nontext) must be 
kept separate. The latter pair of terms refers to 'nature', which eo 
ipso is not culture (text) (Lotman 1970a: 7)3 
The Tartu-Moscow school semioticians have termed as non-
culture the "sphere" which functionally is a culture but which 
does not (currently) fulfil its rules (see Lotman 1970a: 7). It 
"does not seem to exist" and falls outside (is forgotten) or is 
excluded from (due to the low(er) level of authority) the limits of 
a specific culture. Non-culture is subjectively made equivalent to 
chaos, entropy (in the system organized-nonorganized). From 
the viewpoint of a scientific meta-language, this is of course 
another culture (or another culture type). For a person outside the 
culture, as a rule, the non-culture could simply be a different sort 
of culture. Culture does indeed function on the background of 
non-culture and has a complicated relationship with it, through 
the processes of forgetting/remembering and de-semiotiza-
tion/semiotization (Lotman 1970a: 8; 1970b: 78-79; Lotman and 
Pyatigorski 1968: 84-88)4. 
The spelling of the terms 'nonculture' and 'non-culture' has created 
confusion, as regards meaning, in the publication of quite authoritative texts. 
For example, in the English translation of "Theses of Culture Semiotics", 
section 4.0.0.a 'non-text' (не-текст) has been translated as "nontext" ("we 
should distinguish the nontext from the 'antitext' of a given culture"), and this 
mistake has repeated in all the numerous reprints known to me (Lotman, 
Uspenski et al. 1975 [1973]; Ivanov et al. 1998); the basis for the Tartu 
publication was the text published in the collected works: "Structure of Texts 
and Semiotics of Culture" (The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1973). There is also 
inconsistency in the spelling of the term anticulture, but the graphic image here 
(with a hyphen or without) does not denote content differences. 
4 In Theses of Russian Culture Semiotics, compiled by Lotman a year before his 
death, he wrote the sentence: "The concept of 'noncultural manner' 
(некультурность) and 'outside-cultural manner' (внекультурность) should 
be permanently removed from the scientific vocabulary and replaced with 
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Anticulture and non-culture are separated from culture by a 
border, which has a direct association with the orientation of 
culture towards either expression (and text) or content (and 
rules). The border in the system culture-anticulture is inflexible, 
"insuperable". The border between culture and non-culture, 
however, is hazy, gradated, smoothly transitional (Lotman and 
Uspenski 1971: 154, 157). If one uses the concepts from formal 
logic, then it should be permissible to speak in general terms of 
anticulture as contradictory opposition (opposition occurs in a 
form expressing mutual exclusion in a yes/no or and/or type); 
non-culture, however, is represented by contradictory opposition 
(the elements expressed are the extreme type concept of one and 
the same gender concept, for example distant-close).5 
In the opposition pair culture—non-culture, culture is aware of 
itself as a productive source, which in a normal distribution 
process forms culture from the non-culture sphere. It could be 
claimed, becoming historically more specific, that the culture 
type characteristic of the western European scientific era, is 
mostly able to be interpreted by proceeding precisely from a 
semiotic model oriented to content and rules (Lotman and 
Uspenski 1971: 154, 157). 
A most unusual situation develops, however, in the system 
culture-anticulture. The semantics of this can be expressed 
through the opposition pair correct-incorrect, which has to be 
interpreted as coinciding the antithesis true-false. Here the 
culture is not only differentiating itself from 'chaos', 
'other-cultural manner' (инокультурность) (Lotman 1994b: 416). These 
terms, however, have been used here by Lotman in a completely different 
axiological context, i.e. to encourage the valuing of Russian culture policy and 
the modern paradigm of cultural self-awareness, in the context of world cultural 
integration. Emphasizing this aspect does not annul, in my opinion, the heuristic 
meaning and implementation potential in culture theoiy of the concepts of 'non-
culture' and 'nonculture'. 
In interpreting antithesis as an element of culture code, the comment by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein — saying that although contradictory truth is impossible, 
contradiction is still not pointless, in a symbolic (therefore, in a semiotic) plane 
— should be kept in mind (Wittgenstein 1996 [1921]: 92-95). 
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'nonorganized' or 'entropy', but is apposite to a "sphere 
preceded by a negative sign". "A "culture with a negative sign" 
is perceived as a "special kind of mirror reflection" of culture, 
"where the connections remain, but become the opposite" (see 
Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 154-155). Culture separates itself 
from anticulture with a definite border and closes in on itself. If 
the spread of culture to non-culture areas occurs (as already 
indicated) as the expansion of knowledge to areas of non-
knowledge, then the transfer of knowledge to the anticulture 
sphere is from the viewpoint of culture only possible as "victory 
over lies" (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 157). In the Theses on 
the Semiotic Study of Culture it is formulated as follows: "A 
difference must be made between culture non-text and anti-text: 
a statement which is not preserved, and a statement which is 
destroyed" (Ivanov et al. 1998: 4.0.0.a). 
Unfortunately, the relevant theoretical discussions on the 
formal characteristics of anti culture by Lotman and Uspenski are 
restricted to the summary description cited above. In other 
publications, these authors concentrate on the documentation of 
anticulture manifestations on the basis of material on older 
Russian culture. (Lotman and Uspenski 1975: 168-254; 1993 
[1976]; 1994 [1977]; Uspenski 1994b [1985] etc). 
The conception by Lotman and Uspenski of antithesis in 
culture definitely provides a justification for concluding that 
Soviet (or totalitarian) ideology is not the unique domination 
sphere of antithesis and that anticulture has a wider manifestation 
space than Soviet culture. But even more important is the fact 
that antithesis is seen as an attribute of the reflection of culture 
and self-reflection, within the framework of a certain definite 
semiosis type. 
Such an approach permits, in my opinion, postulation of a 
question on the treatment of antithesis as a mechanism of culture 
as intellect, which produces certain types of texts. Antithesis 
should be able to be interpreted as an invariant operational 
"schema" of culture as "intellectually operating entity" (one of 
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many schemata), if proceeding from Immanuel Kant s (1902 
[1790]: 221-223) conceptual and theoretical tradition.6 
My task, within the framework of the present chapter, is to 
describe antithesis as the characteristics of an intellectual 
mechanism, and their appearance in the self-reflection of Soviet 
culture. I will restrict myself to observation of the topological 
and (auto)communicative characteristics of antithesis as an 
intellectual schema, based on the theoretical paradigm of the 
Tartu-Moscow semiotics school. 
3.2.1.1. Complementarity of the antithetic cultural space. 
Every linguistic statement describes a space-time process 
(Ivanov 1978a: 130). The speaking subject (or certain culture 
system) is observable in time-space coordinates8. But "one needs 
to differentiate between the space structures of the worldview 
and the meta-language that describes it. In the first case, the 
space characteristics are attributed to the object being described, 
in the second, to the describing language". In the words of Juri 
Lotman, a clear homeomorphism still dominates between the 
space characteristics of object and meta-languages, because "one 
of the universal peculiarities of human culture, possibly 
connected with the anthropological features of human conscious­
6 The main positions on the aspects of culture as intellect, which are 
emphasized, are reflected in Juri Lotman's works (Lotman 1973a; 1977a: 9, 13, 
16-18; 1992a: 29-30, 32-33). It is also important that Lotman postulates on the 
basis of the four main characteristics (semiotic heterogenity, memory, self-
propagation of meanings and existence of a selection block) of an individual 
text and culture as intellectual objects, as their analogy of structure and 
functioning principles. 
7 I am interested here in typological special characteristics, which means that 
the real variance of the phenomena under analysis has been knowingly set 
aside. 
8 These localization problems of the coordinates have been examined on the 
linguistic lexical and form level by many authors, including Roman Jakobson in 
his shifter theory ( 1972 [1971]), René Thorn on the basis of a topological model 
for natural language (1975) and Juri Lotman in his theory on plot and event 
(Lotman 1970d: 280-289). 
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ness, is the fact that the world view inevitably acquires features 
of spatial characteristics" (Lotman 1969a: 463). Therefore, a 
space can be defined as a collection of possible interpreted 
characteristics (Ivanov 1978a: 41). 
The viewpoint of the bearer of the text, its spatial character-
ristics, provides the culture model with an orientation (Lotman 
1969a: 465). The orientation of the culture subject is understand-
dably dependent on estimation. Lotman differentiates between 
the inner, limited, and external, open space, of a culture world 
picture, and the applicable orientation from the inside out or from 
the outside in (Lotman 1969a: 465-477). Such a classification 
principle may be justified in the case of the self-descriptions of 
various world pictures, including in the system culture-non-
culture (see Figure 1; compare also Ivanov et al. 1998 [1973]: 
1.1.2 and 1.2.0). However, it should not be applicable for the 
system culture-anticulture (see Figure 2). A culture surrounded 
by non-culture is a space with hazy borders: it develops smoothly 
into an amorphous and so-called borderless environment. In the 
system culture-anticulture, the anticulture elements are in one to 
one topological accordance with culture elements, because, as is 
known from logic, the members of binary opposition are in a 
conditional relationship. This means that the existence of one 
member of some opposition notes the actualization of its 
opposite in (culture) consciousness, although this opposite may 
be formally unspecified9. Since the repertoire forming culture is 
in the self-description of the system culture-anticulture dually 
arranged and regulated by strict borders, then the anticulture (or 
"outside" the culture) space is not seen as an open 
This important characteristic of binary oppositions has been repeatedly 
referred to in his analysis of linguistic systems by Roman Jakobson (Jakobson 
1985g [1976]: 70; 1985f [1975]: 144). 
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Figure 2. The system culture-anticulture. 
10 n-c — a culture that is rejected as regards "culture", that is irrelevant, forgot­
ten, etc; nc — the sphere of nature and facts that has not been transformed into 
signs. 
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space". Here we have two closed culture areas, which (ideally!) 
are separated by an uncrossable (impenetrable) border. The 
border blocks — this is repeatedly emphasized — such activity 
by "them" directed at "us" which could deform "us". 
But still — indeed paradoxically — the self-reflection of the 
Soviet system was at the same time inseparable from anticulture. 
Determining the basic values of culture on the level of self-
reflection could not occur without being aware of (or making 
them explicit) the anticulture elements — of course if one did not 
risk varying from the language of the system. Therefore, culture 
and anticulture form a complementary pair, regarding 
functioning — they are in their own way Siamese twins. Anyone 
doubting this should read any official self-description on the first 
and last page in a Soviet culture publication (the exception of 
course confirms the rule). 
The features characterizing complementarity make it 
necessary to take a minor theoretical detour in order to briefly 
examine the principle of symmetry itself since all following 
paradigms are connected, in one way or another, with the 
symmetrical manifestations of semiosis. 
3.2.1.2. Principle of symmetry. 
As an introduction to the following discussions, the place of 
symmetry in the humanities needs to be examined since, as 
noticed by one of the founders of geochemistry and 
biochemistry, Vladimir Vernadski, already about 75 years ago: 
The principle of symmetry has penetrated and will continue to 
penetrate many more realms of study in the 20th century. [—] This 
principle will incontestably and diversely encompass the 
" Semioticians describe the basic analogy of such systems with dual 
phonological codes. Every phonological differential feature (or element ol a 
mythological or other system) is equal and opposite to another differential 
feature (symbol) or a certain series of features (symbols) in the paradigm (or 
syntagma) under observation (Ivanov 1978a: 96). 
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phenomena of life and cosmic universe. (Vernadski 1975 [ 1920— 
1927]: 23) 
The range of forms of symmetry and their manifestations is 
surprisingly wide. The most elementary understanding of 
symmetry can be found in the empirical truth that symmetrical 
things, images and phenomena are mutually invariant, i.e. they 
are similar with respect to certain relations and/or characteristics. 
Restrictions based on congruence (correspondence in size and 
shape) could be added to invariance. The sequence of invariant 
and congruent images on some straight or curved line creates 
translative symmetry (an ornament); the positioning of images 
that correspond to the same criteria on a circle yields in radial 
symmetry. Naturally, the same stands for the translation of the 
spatial equivalents of plane images. 
But some symmetrical phenomena cannot be subordinated to 
the restrictions based on congruence. When looking into a 
mirror, nobody questions the symmetry between him and his 
image. Yet there is no congruence here: if we fit the mirror 
image to the original image, it does not correspond with it — the 
right side has changed into the left side and vice versa (compare 
this also with the reflection of the letters b/d or p/q). Such a type 
of symmetry is called inverted or enantiomorphic or mirror 
symmetry. Mirror is not the only means of achieving mirror 
symmetry. For instance, a butterfly's wings are enantiomorphic, 
too. Vernadski has emphasised that there exists a deep 
dissimilarity between the frozen symmetry of crystalline 
polyhedrons of inanimate nature and the complex (largely 
unexplained so far) dynamic symmetry of living organisms, one 
manifestation of which is just the phenomenon of left and right, 
meaning the very persistent dominance of enantiomorphic 
symmetry in the organic environment (Vernadski 1975: 56-57). 
Whereas the reflection of a human face can never be 
congruent with its original, Winfred Nöth points out that 
enantiomorphic congruent symmetiy can still exist. For instance, 
the right and left sides of capital letters 'A' and 'O' are — 
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naturally, in case of some certain fonts — both enantiomorphic 
and congruent. Such reflective symmetry is called bilateral 
symmetry (Nöth 1994c: 48). 
Still another type of symmetry — antisymmetry — can be 
found besides translative, radial and mirror symmetry. We should 
distinguish between the reflective and translative forms of this 
type (Nöth 1994c: 98). Figurally symmetrical things (translation) 
can have (accentuable) contrasting additional characteristics, 
such as the case of black and white chessmen. But the 
phenomenon of the colour of human skin has caused 
antisymmetrical psychological and social collisions. The contrary 
scale of values — the contradictory oppositions yes/no or and/or, 
which can symbolically be expressed by plus-minus valuations 
— is also of an antisymmetrical nature. 
Hermann Weyl has correctly written, "the idea of symmetry 
can by no means be exhausted with spatial objects." Its 
"synonym is harmony." Harmony becomes apparent in 
correlation, congruousness, proportionality, correspondence or 
accordance and measure. All these words can be brought back to 
a German word, Ebenmass. Weyl conceives this as "what, 
according to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, a virtous man has 
to strive for in his actions, and what is described by Galen in his 
treatise De temperamentis as a state of spirit, which has equally 
been removed from both extremes" (Weyl 1968 [1951]: 35, 36). 
In the most general sense, symmetry, as explained in 
commonly used reference works, denotes "the quality of an 
object formed of elements of some set (e.g. an algebraic equation 
formed of variables X/ x2, ..., xj to transform into itself in case of 
a number of transformations different from the identity 
transformation of the set" (EE IX, 1996: 90). Or as defined by M. 
A. Melvin: symmetry is a quality to remain unchanged in the 
course of one or several different operations (Melvin 1960: 481). 
The essence of symmetry is repetition in a very broad sense of 
the word: physical, including topological (also gravitational) or 
rhythmical, tonal, mathematical, psychological (e.g. emotional), 
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evaluational, phonological and semantical repetition a very 
wide range of repetitive variations. 
We are now interested in the question as to whether and how 
the sign-creation process of symmetry manifests itself. 
Semiosis or sign-creation can be defined as "several types of 
relations between signans and signatum" (Jakobson 1985d 
[1970]: 323). Below, we shall examine only the iconic forms of 
manifestation of these relations. But besides the iconic relations 
between signans (signifier) and signatum (signified object of the 
ontological reality), which are of exophoric or referential 
character, it is possible to describe the relations between signans 
and signatum within the discourse as a paradigmatic iconicity (cf 
Nöth 1994b: 107). Here lies the possibility for the so-called 
endophoric iconicity in the form of phrases, repetition of 
lexemes, anaphors, parallelisms, references within texts, etc. 
Charles S. Peirce has defined the iconic relation between 
signans and signatum as an "elementary coincidence based on a 
certain characteristic" (cited from Jakobson 1985d: 322). The 
repetitiveness of coinciding elements both at exophoric and 
endophoric levels creates either a symmetrical or an 
antisymmetrical relation. Since this is a signifying relationship, at 
least one of the repetitive elements, or their relationship, is 
directly, or imaginarily as, a sensual phenomenon. This aspect 
lends semiosis its spatial dimensions. (We already indicated that 
in a wider context every linguistic utterance can be conceived as 
a spatial-temporal act (Ivanov 1978a: 130), and that man's 
worldview that is marked with signs "unavoidably has the 
characteristics of space" (Lotman 1969a: 463).) The spatiality of 
semiosis is structural for at least two important reasons. First, 
semiosis is an intentional act, which is unavoidably related to the 
existence of a point of view; the space-designing character of the 
point of view becomes actual especially in case of 
communicational (including autocommunicational) semiosis. 
Second, semiosis has some certain forms, where signans and 
signatum or signans and signans are positioned reflexively (e.g. 
in a palindrome) and have semantical polarity. 
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Analysing symmetrical forms of semiosis we should keep 
apart two levels of analysis, which are, on the one hand, the 
spatial-symmetrical structure of semiosis and, on the other hand, 
metalanguage-models, describing these structures. 
The iconic relations between the signifier and the signified 
can be revealed in the suchness of the so-called "genuine icon," 
where the sign and its object merge into a single identity, 
creating the so-called O-symmetry (Nöth 1999: 616). Roman 
Jakobson pointed out that iconic symmetry can be expressed by 
"conditional suchness" {условное сходство) which characterises 
the relations between signans and signatum in music and, for 
example, also in abstract art (Jakobson 1985d: 327). Mirror 
projective relations between signans and signatum create 
antithetical iconicity; and finally: the metaphor, in which the 
signans creates a simultaneous parallel connection with two 
signatums, provokes a topologically and semantically symmetric 
positioning (Jakobson 1983 [1965]: 113). ("In reality" the two 
signatums can be totally different from each other.) 
Following the symmetrical repetition schemes of semiosis at 
the level of metalanguage-models, we can state that the forms of 
symmetry expressing O-symmetry, "conditional similarity", and 
other forms expressing identity (congruence), are characteristic 
to a mythological worldview (cf. Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 
282-293; Lotman and Mints 1981: 35-41). Antithetical symmet­
ry has been dominant in Russian (Lotman and Uspenski 1994 
[1977]) and Soviet Russian culture. Baroque, symbolist and 
aestheticised worldviews mostly are based on metaphorical 
semiosis. 
3.2.1.3. Symmetrical reduction. 
On the dual field of the system culture-anticulture, with a closed 
binary structure, the mutually reserved places of the opposition 
pairs change the bilaterally symmetrical places on the topological 
plane of the system to be bilaterally symmetrical and 
semantically antisymmetrical. The language of this system does 
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not recognize a non-culture, which is neutral and ruins the 
symmetry. Non-culture is reduced to either culture or 
anticulture12. Such a black-white reduction in Soviet culture 
presumed the "vigilance" of the (self)consciousness, regarding 
both "us" and "them". Foreign cultural figures were classified as 
(potential) enemies or "friends" (ours — наши); in the USSR all 
letters from foreigners were checked as a rule; all foreigners 
visiting "us" were restricted in where they could go etc, etc. 
Within the culture, those young people who did not belong to 
communist youth organizations were called "nonorganized 
youth" (Soviet functionaries' slang!) and they had difficulties in 
being admitted to higher education institutions, and in getting 
certain jobs. These same official understandings were used to 
assess people who did not attend parades or go to vote: "If you're 
not for us, you're against us" ... Those against (real and 
fabricated) were marked as "(bourgeois) nationalists", 
"opportunists", "revisionists", "liquidators", "traitors", etc. And 
these were in essence treated as a part of "them" — the 
anticulture: 
It cannot be an accident that the Trotskists, Bukharinists and 
nationalist saboteurs, in fighting against Lenin, against the Party, 
reached the same point as the Menshevik and Social revolutionary 
parties — they became agents of fascist spy organizations, became 
spies, saboteurs, murderers, wreckers, traitors of the fatherland. 
(Lühikursus 1951 [1938]: 326) 
In addition, the polarizing elements of anticulture, on both sides, 
are subject to yet another symmetrical reduction principle: all 
anticulture elements become synonymous with each other and so 
do culture elements. Two translatively symmetrical sequences 
(which understandably are mutually semantically anti-
symmetrical) are created. The opposite pairs forming this 
sequence are in a certain context semantically interchangeable: 
12 As a parallel example, reference could be made to the 16th century old-
Ukrainian grammar, where all "orthodox" languages were referred to as the one 
language (Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 156). 
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"each opposite pair can be treated as the translation of the basic 
opposition beneficial-non-beneftciaF (Ivanov 1978a: 96). Vya-
cheslav Ivanov associates this semzos/s-mechanism with the 
mythology of "elementary" societies13. But the recently analyzed 
understandings of Lotman and Uspenski regarding signs in 
culture types oriented to rituals allow the interpretation of 
Ivanov's conclusion in a much wider context. For example, in the 
consciousness of Russian Old Believers, 'paganism', 'heresy', 
'Catholicism', and even everything 'new' was reduced to a 
semantically translative ornament, with the secondary axiological 
common term 'Satanism' (Lotman and Uspenski 1994 [1977]: 
232). In an analogous way, Peter the Great was called the Anti-
Christ because he adopted the title of emperor; but for the Old 
Believers, 'emperor', 'Rome' and 'Anti-Christ' formed a seman­
tically levelled ornament, where 'satanic' (sinful) became the 
content value dominant (Lotman and Uspenski 1993 [1976]: 
203). In the self-descriptions of the Soviet system antithesis: 
lawfully progressive (good)—lawfully reactionary (bad) begins to 
replace (suffocate) all other conceivable terms of the two 
paradigms. In the self-consciousness of Soviet culture definite 
assessment clichés are created on the level of the noted main 
opposition (and its secondary opposite pairs flourishing-
deterioration, luxuriance-languishing, etc) (cf. Yakimovich 
1998: 342-343), which results in the primary semantics of 
culture reality being reduced or becoming secondary, e.g. "It is 
time to end the decaying view [of capitalists — P. L.] that there 
is no need to interfere in production" (Stalin 1935d [1931]: 446). 
The issue of whether there is a need or not, that is not offered to 
the reader as the primary issue: the primary issue is to put an 
"end" — to the "decay" (capitalism)! 
13 Within the context of this conclusion, it is important to denote that also on the 
level of an intellectual procedure, we still have a semiosis that is mytho logi zed 
(produces identity). This phenomenon occurs as is noted by A. Olrik — in the 
form of stage duality and of twins in the "epic laws" of magic tales (Olrik 1909: 
5-7). 
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3.2.1.4. Mirror projection. 
The appearance of antithetic semiosis in the topology of culture 
space would not be complete without looking at the reflexive or 
mirror projection. As we know, Sigmund Freud formulated 
projection as the transfer of the individual's sub-conscious 
aggression to the outside world, i.e. to other people(s) (Freud 
1938 [1906]: 854-856). A mirror projection, in our opinion, is a 
"me" ("us") described by defining a negative (often also 
reflected as aggressive) "other" ("others") as an antithesis — i.e. 
via the "others". Hedrick Smith, in his book "The Russians", 
refers to the fact that after an aviation accident in the Soviet 
Union, there always followed a month of reports in the official 
press about air accidents in America, West Germany, Taiwan and 
wherever — but somewhere else. The same logic applies to 
health epidemics, price increases, crime, harvests, setbacks, 
water shortage, jailing of political prisoners (Smith 1976: 368). 
This example is particularly interesting because a projection 
precedes the mirror projection. Firstly, "our" problems are 
transferred to "them" and then a mirror projection antithesis is 
created: for "their" drought we have the 0-feature — "no 
drought". 
A chrestomatic example of mirror projection is provided by 
Marx, who dreamt thus: 
Socialism is man's positive self-consciousness, which is no longer 
mediated by the negation of religion [Sic! — P. L.\, just as real life 
is man's positive reality, which is no longer mediated by the 
negation of private property via Communism. (Marx 1977 [1844]: 
127) 
A mirror projection cannot possibly be confined only to being a 
tool of ideological propaganda, as initially may be assumed 
(although it is that as well!). There is reason to believe that 
mirror projection has in the self-regulation of culture a universal 
role. It is also apparent that the mirror projection begins to 
dominate just in dual semantically antisymmetrical culture 
systems. These claims are supported on the one hand, as we 
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already know, by Porshnev's research results, which indicate that 
historically the them-concept was created much earlier than the 
self-reflecting oar-concept (Porshnev 1979: 81). This is 
supported by Cassirer's claim that pointing at one's body 
occurred before the use of pronouns, (cf. Ivanov 1978a: 137). On 
the other hand, in contrast to many other cultures, mirror 
projection has been recurrently characteristic of Russian culture, 
in particular. It could even be said that this comprises the 
formative axis of Russian culture. 'New' has never been seen in 
Russia as the continuation of the 'old' or as an innovation, 
dependent on the 'old', but still and always as the negation of the 
'old', as its radical abandonment (iотталкивание), even as the 
justification of its destruction or as its destruction. See Lotman 
and Uspenski 1994 [1977], 1993 [1976]; Uspenski 1994b 
[1985]). Such an antibehaviour refers back to its sacramental 
forms in pagan rituals: it was presumed that in the world beyond 
the grave, all connections are opposite — right is left, truth is the 
opposite, if there is night, then here it is day, etc (Uspenski 
1994b [1985]: 321). 
In another context and with less strict limitations, the same 
phenomenon is observed by Toomas Gross (1996: 1723-1735). 
He describes the positive reinforcement of this 'me' as occurring 
due to the depiction of the 'other' (foreigner) as negative, and in 
the role of this 'other' can be the individual, culture, and also "an 
even wider formation". Gross mentions as examples the 
apposition of barbarians to Romans, and setting opposite 
America or Western Europe to communist regimes. The 'other' 
is defined merely by placing it outside one's own system. Gross, 
however, does not differentiate between the 'not-me' and the 
'anti-me' as the 'other'. I should stress that, in Soviet culture, the 
'anti-me' as the 'other' (together with the mirror projection 
procedure) is explicitly represented in the infamous "self-
criticism" ritual, which is "one of the most dynamic forces in the 
development of society, as a special form of uncovering 
dissension.[—] Party members are obligated to implement this 
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and to apply for the removal of the deficiencies" — i.e. creating 
antithesis from one's own negative side! (ENE IV, 1972: 189). 
Examples of the described antithetic schema variation can be 
found without difficulty in Soviet ideological self-descriptions. 
The hackneyed display of capitalist countries' social situation via 
unemployment, non-free medical services, "rampant" prostitu­
tion, or the exploitation of workers, was of course directed 
primarily (and implicitly) to the antithesis born from a mirror 
projection: in the USSR we of course did not have 
unemployment or prostitution, and free medical services were of 
course also guaranteed... In regard to exploitation or other 
matters, then the semantics of both this and other analogous signs 
ends up in the realm of translative symmetry and reducing 
primary semantics. Meanings are determined by the basic oppo­
sition regressive-progressive (see 3.2.1.3). Reflexive projection 
was extensively used in art. As a classical example, V. 
Mayakovski's "Verses about the Soviet passport" deserve 
quoting. The situation imagined by the poet occurs on the border 
of the US. The Soviet passport, described as the "duplicate" of 
the "priceless ship ballast" for the Soviet person, is described 
through the attitude of the official in a mirror projection manner. 
The attitude is expressed cumulatively on the level of four 
antitheses, of which the last has even the form of a mythologized 
hyperbole: "Берет — / как бомбу, / берет — / как ежа, // как 
бритву/ обоюдоострую, / берет, / как гремучую, / в 20 жал // 
змею / двухметроворостую". And then, right at the end, the 
our-side of the antithesis is exhibited — together with the content 
of the "duplicate" "Читайте, / завидуйте, /я — гражданин // 
Советского Союза" (Mayakovski 1956: 242).14  
14 "Takes it — as if it were a bomb, /takes it / as if it were a hedgehog, // as if it 
is a dual blade. // Takes it / as if it were a rattlesnake / with 20 fangs, // a snake / 
twenty meters long; Read, / be envious /1 am a citizen // of the Soviet Union". 
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3.2.1.5. Enantiomorphic symmetry. 
Mirror projection, as we have seen, indicates the index aspect of 
the semiosis of the negative 'other' and the positive 'me' ('us'). 
Using the concept of the mirror, however, is simultaneously 
associated with the iconic similarity relationship of the poles of 
antithesis15. This interplay between the similarity and difference 
relationship has been called the equivalence paradox (A = A and 
А Ф A) (Levin 1988: 9), which is indeed the content of 
enantiomorphic symmetry. In such a paradox the fact emerges 
that anticulture is not nonculture or non-culture; it is also not 
culture, yet — as became apparent in the earlier discussion 
regarding the complementarity of the culture-anticulture system 
(see 3.2.1.1 ) — it is still also, as anticulture, simultaneously 
culture! In other words, it could also be stated: every affirmation 
has a concealed negation, (cf. Ivanov 1978a: 42.) Expressing this 
statement in topological terms, it could be claimed that if we 
describe two objects separately that are mirror-symmetrical, 
looking at both of them from the outside, we could then affirm 
that when placed on top of each other they would coincide. 
However, if we look in a mirror (in other words, describe both 
objects from the position of one object), then if the objects are 
placed on top of each other, the right side of one object becomes 
the left side of the other object, and vice versa. This 
"understanding and observation paradox" has been thoroughly 
described by Kant (1982 [1783]: 43-46; 1964 [1768]: 369-379). 
The reversal of right/left in enantiomorphic symmetry implies 
also the reversal of other base positions affecting the physical 
and ethical world (Levin 1988: 11). Jacques Lacan has even 
claimed that already in the so-called mirror stage (between the 5th 
and 18th month of life), the child recognizes its body in a mirror 
15 The universality of the mirror mechanism in culture, space and on the 
molecular level is emphasized by J. Lotman (1984: 20-21). In the Tartu-
Moscow semiotics school the mirror is termed "a semiotic machine for 
describing a foreign structure" (Redkollegiya 1988: 5). 
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as being inverted and opposite to itself, an external (foreign) 
'other' (Lacan 1977 [1937]: 1-4). 
Mirror symmetry is explicitly apparent in, for example, the 
Christ-Anti-Christ pair or in the medieval carnival antitheses. In 
Russia, the old pagan culture was the unavoidable prerequisite of 
culture as such. According to this schema, such a "new culture", 
which always saw itself as the negation and complete destruction 
of the "old" actually became a powerful impetus for preserving 
the "old", covering the inherited texts and preserved behavioural 
forms, but turning these functions upside down, mirror 
symmetrically (Lotman and Uspenski 1994 [1977]: 226). The 
same can be seen in Soviet culture, for example in turning upside 
down the semantics of the red corners {красный угол) (in the 
"old" culture — icon corner, in the "new" — an intimate room 
decorated with the picture of the Party leader and meant for 
carrying out ideological (including anti-religious) events. The 
symbolic substitution of religious passages of the cross on Red 
Square with demonstrations by the workers carrying portrates of 
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin is also mirror symmetrical, as 
well as the symbolic replacement of the nobility with "the 
conscience, wisdom and honour of the working class" — the 
communist party. The pair of opposites formed by the czar's 
autocracy and "democratic centralism" (Leader's autocracy) is of 
course also enantiomorphically symmetrical. And so 
enantiomorphic symmetry rises to organize the culture on supra­
segmental levels of texts (cf. Nöth 1994b: 101). 
Attention, however, has been directed towards the 
disappearance of asymmetrical culture systems, these becoming 
transformed into symmetrical ones, and vice versa — i.e. towards 
the internal dynamics of culture systems. Generally, a person 
tries to avoid mirror symmetry to the benefit of symmetry 
(Abramyan 1981: 77, 85-86). The model for this tendency is the 
handshake — right hand with right hand! If we bring an example 
from Soviet culture, then we notice a strange but constant 
regularity in the political sympathies of Soviet dictators. Stalin, 
Khrushchev, Brezhnev, etc for some reason generally managed 
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to get on remarkably well with (from a Soviet viewpoint) right-
wing leaders: in the US with the Republicans, in the UK with the 
Conservatives and in Germany with the Christian Democrats. 
But with left wing and "weak" leaders there were continual 
conflicts. 
3.2.2. Autocommunication of culture: antithetic self-reflection 
A viewpoint causing mirror symmetry has two important 
features: an individual looking into a mirror is relating to 
himself; and he sees that of himself, which, without looking in 
the mirror, he does not see. During self-observation (self-
admiration or self-hatred), the "me" is transformed into the 
"other" for oneself. This feature of a mirror is expressed of 
course in enantiomorphic symmetry. In Renaissance period art, 
the female figure denoting pride was often supplied with a 
mirror, in which Satan was reflected (Hall 1997: 169-170). The 
allegory for triviality could be a naked woman, who looks into a 
mirror whilst combing her hair, in the presence of the figure of 
Death (Hall 1887: 545). Initially, it may seem that autocommu­
nication in the worldview of an individual has a facultative 
meaning. But proceeding from the presumption of the analogy 
with the individual and collective intellect, Lotman brushes this 
understanding aside with a simple argument. If, instead of the 
concept 'individual' we use the concepts of the addresser and the 
addressee, it could be claimed that in describing the 
communication, within the borders of some national culture, for 
example, the area covered by the concept of addresser is just 
about the same as covered by the addressee. But if we observe 
human culture, then — "remaining within the limits of the 
experience which is at least historically real" — the concepts of 
addresser and addressee coincide, and communication must be 
interpreted, within the limits of human culture, as 
autocommunication (Lotman 1970a: 15). 
In the system culture-anticulture, autocommunication is 
central, the function forming the structure. This claim is 
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supported by the domination of the complementarity of self-
reflection (see 3.2.1.1), mirror projection (3.2.1.4) and mirror 
symmetry (3.2.1.5) in the system culture-anticulture. 
As regards content, autocommunication is a paradoxical 
phenomenon (Lotman 1973b: 228): the subject passes on a 
message to someone who already knows it anyway. Therefore, 
there is no mnemonic purpose in the message transfer. This 
means that autocommunication must have another important role, 
regarding culture. In claiming that a person uses words in order 
to organize his individuality16, Lotman emphasizes that in 
transferring a message to oneself, the 'me' itself is transformed: 
"the 'me' reorganizes its individuality" (Lotman 1973b: 228). 
Here it should be added that also a collective individual could 
feel the need to look itself in the face, in order to become aware 
of what it is, for itself and for others. In Soviet culture, such 
autocommunication became a genre of its own, in the form of 
party programs, report speeches, slogan issues created for the 
May and October celebrations, etc. The gems of this genre are 
understandably the canonic "Short Course of the History of the 
CPSU" and the "Stalinist" constitution (Konstitutsiya 1937). 
Readers who are familiar with these understand that in this genre 
a clear enantiomorphic symmetry dominates. But in contrast to 
the classical us-them model, here the plus and minus sides have 
reversed. Phenomena that exclude, conceal or condemn, 
subconsciously or consciously, the 'me' ('us') become the 
enantiomorphic projection of oneself, which we indeed recognize 
in the all possible publications of commands etc in the culture-
anticulture type systems. 
In the self-reflection of Russian culture, where observing 
oneself has always been of primary importance, and the most 
fundamental, regarding the observation of the outside world 
(Lotman 1994b: 407), anticulture is indeed mostly sought from 
within culture. Russian culture has not seen itself as an 
16 A person's behaviour is dependent on how he names himself. A person for 
example could announce: "I am not yet a scoundrel" (see Appendix, Lecture I). 
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evolutionary process but as a duel between the 'old' and the 
'new'. Together with Marxist world revolution theory, an 
"external" antithetic area was indeed born alongside the internal 
enemy, as a "capitalist system", but Soviet Russian culture's 
autocommunication contaminated and levelled out both of them 
in imagining a common enemy (in the spirit of Figure 2): "За все 
— // за войну // за после // за раньше // со всеми // с ихними // 
и со своими // мы рассчитаемся в Красном реванше..." 
(Mayakovski 1956: 78).17  
3.2.2.1. Antithesis as a secondary code of autocommunication. 
Culture, as is claimed by J. Lotman, has a tendency, in the 
typological plane, to be either a communicative or an 
autocommunicative system (Lotman 1973b: 242-243). In the 
system culture-anticulture, as became clear above, autocommu­
nication is the fashionable method of information exchange. 
Autocommunication encourages the transformation of texts 
into metatexts. In the internal speech system "words and pictures 
become indices" (Lotman 1970c: 165). This important observa­
tion was developed by Lotman into the autocommunication 
secondary code idea, which in summary is as follows (see 
Lotman 1973b: 232-240). Text, which in autocommunication, 
does not provide us with new information, but transforms a self-
picture of 'me', restricted to simply translating the existing 
information into a new system of expression, circulating in a 
functional way as a code, not as a message18. For example, if a 
reader of "Anna Karenina" cries out (or thinks): "Anna — that's 
17 
"For everything — // for the war // for that which will come // for that which 
was before, // with all them (enemies), // with theirs // and with ours // we will 
settle the scores in a Red revenge ...". 
18 A code is "a presentation of information in such a form which is suitable for 
the transmission of the message on a certain information channel" (Ivanov 
1978a: 130). 
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me"19, then this makes the text of Tolstoy's novel a model for the 
reconsideration of the life of the reader. The me-me system is 
different from the me-you system due to word reduction: the 
words become the signs of the words, the indices of the signs. 
Tolstoy's text thus acquires a new (i.e. additional) role — this 
becomes the index and code of 'my' worldview. "Reading" an 
initial notification in the key of another code creates a situation 
where the elements of the initial text are interpreted as belonging 
to a further, syntagmatic construction that has been entered from 
the "outside". J. Lotman limits himself in differentiating the 
alternate code, by noting repeated, ornamental, rhythmic 
constructions: it is — in his opinion — these that begin to govern 
the associations of the addressee. Asemantic texts, which have 
thoroughly organized syntagmatically, become the initiators of 
our associations: the more emphatic the syntagmatics, the more 
associative it is! The reader understands such a text only if he 
knows it in advance. Of course, information exchange oriented to 
autocommunication cannot avoid clichés. On the contrary: 
autocommunication has inclined to change texts into syntagmatic 
clichés. 
I would add that such a system is familiar to everyone due to 
magic tales. On the level of natural language the magic tale of 
course has semantics; as a culture phenomenon the magic tale, 
however, is pure syntagmatics — i.e. a secondary code. A magic 
tale does not contain any new information for anyone — 
everything is known in advance. This was understood superbly 
by A. Olrik, who at the beginning of the century claimed to be 
researching the "biology" of fairytales (Olrik 1909: 1). 
As can be concluded from the analysis of translative reduction 
(З.2.1.З.), complementarity (3.2.1.1.) and projection and mirror 
projection (3.2.1.4, 3.2.1.5.), antithesis acquires in the structure 
of enantiomorphic autocommunication a secondary semantic and 
19 It is said that G. Flaubert commented on Madame Bovary: "Emma — that's 
me". Even Tolstoy is said to have identified himself with Natasha from "War 
and Peace". 
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syntagmatic role. And it reorganizes the primary semantics of the 
message that is reflected. In a mirror projection text, the primary 
content of a message retreats in face of the logic of antithesis. 
Antithesis, dominant in the system culture-anticulture, starts to 
produce, as a semantic and syntagmatic superstructure, a certain 
type of text. Therefore, antithesis is not merely a rhetorical trick, 
the emotional reaction of an individual, a logical operation or a 
manifestation of subconscious aggression. Antithesis is a 
constructive element of culture, Lotman would say: 
порождающий механизм. The autocommunication model of 
culture contains both the self-reflection as well as the base 
algorithms to comprehend the mirror reflection. Antithesis also 
belongs to these universal algorithms, retreating in some and 
rising to dominate in other culture systems, including Soviet 
culture. 
An approach, which examines in depth the autocommu­
nication of culture and the different forms of symmetry, offers an 
intriguing aspect in the future treatment of antithesis in 
(meta)rhetoric. The analogy with the many manifestations of 
culture enantiomorphics and the asymmetric functionality of the 
brain hemispheres is very intriguing in this relationship. 
4 
THE UNIQUENESS AND UNIVERSALITY OF MAGIC IN 
CULTURE 
4.1 Viewpoint and tasks 
The understanding of the mutual inversely proportional logic of 
development for magical and scientific discourse in the modern 
world has been an illusion. As is seen below, this fact has been 
tentatively explored, to a certain degree, by psychologists, cultu-
rologists, philosophers and linguists. Juri Lotman has analyzed 
magic as a communication algorithm, which has a universal 
cultural source and a specific semiotic structure. In the fourth 
chapter, magic is placed into a wider interpretational and 
methodological context, in order to create a basis for the 
description of the algorithms of the intellect as a complete 
system. The author attempts to reconstruct important 
structuralistic points of departure that have been inspired by 
phenomenology, on which rest the semiotic views of Lotman 
regarding magic (and also other universals). 
4.2. Paradox of magic in culture 
On Planet Earth, there have surely lived no peoples who had not 
carried out special (verbal) acts that had become fixed in 
tradition, and which were believed to possess esoteric power, 
thus producing change in the environment or in a person (people) 
(including in the person carrying out the act). James George 
I razer categorized such acts into two groups, according to the 
nature of the mediation of the power: contagious magic — where 
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the magical effect is achieved on condition that the things (and/or 
beings) that have been in contact at some time preserve their 
mutual connection and influence regardless of distance, and 
homoeopathic magic — where the effect of the magical act is 
constructed on the cause-effect association or imitation, or on the 
unavoidable (predetermined) oneness relationship of the two 
processes (Frazer 2001 [1994]: 35-36).1 Frazer was interested 
from which operations, defective according to formal logic, a 
magical effect was derived. Thus, J. G. Frazer (as also did many 
researchers after him) sought to analyze magic within the 
framework of the "scientific" paradigm (i.e. the science of 
positivistic interpretation). The author of this monograph, 
proceeding from the ideas of the Tartu-Moscow school of 
semiotics, has attempted to determine magic in quite a wider 
context. 
The place of magic in modern culture has been provocatively 
paradoxical when considering two facts that are obvious, but 
mutually contradictory. 
Educated persons — in Europe, at least continuously for the 
last two hundred years — have been accustomed to consider 
magic as "superstition", "a phenomenon of the past" that is out of 
place in a scientific world, a "product of primitive thought" that 
no longer has a place in civilized societies. This standpoint is 
absolutely universal. Yet, despite this, and even in spite of this, 
all more or less educated persons could quite easily be convinced 
that magical acts are an inseparable part of their everyday lives, 
often without themselves actually being aware of this, or without 
them necessarily turning to a magician (sorcerer ~ shaman ~ 
healer ~ witch ~ wise authority) to acquire such a service. In 
certain circumstances every person himself acts as a magician — 
and does so as a matter of course! 
Examples can be found close at hand. The realm of homoeo­
pathic magic includes the casting of molten lead into water to 
find out one's luck for the coming year, seeking fortune by 
For an attempt at a systematic analysis of magical semiosis, see Chapter 2. 
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counting the petals on lilac flowers (and a whole series of other 
acts/taboos associated with numbers (e.g. "13")). These include 
cursing and swearing2, spitting over the left shoulder (to ensure 
that the words just spoken do not come to nothing), misfortune 
brought about by encountering a spider in the morning (avoiding 
this by killing the spider), the taboo regarding shaking hands 
across the threshold, the ritualized presentation of political 
slogans (in Stalin's state, for example, every commemorative 
speech had to end with the obligatory magic formula "Long Live 
Comrade Stalin!"). Forms of address such as "Jätku leiba!" 
(coming across someone eating — "May your bread not run 
out") or "Kivi kotti!" (wishing someone luck with a difficult task 
— "Put a rock in your bag") are also magical acts. Memories of 
autosuggestion, for example: "If I get across the road before the 
train whistles, I'll get good questions in the exam" ~ "he/she" 
will not leave me" etc, can be recalled by almost every person. 
And then there are the astrological calendars... Following the 
example of rulers from ancient eastern lands and Europe, there 
are not a few modern leaders who make their plans based on such 
calendars — not to mention the numbers of ordinary citizens. 
The notable everyday manifestations of contagious magic are 
acquiring and carrying around talismans, or affixing a horseshoe 
to the wall of the (farm) house. As J. Frazer in his "Golden 
Bough" indicated, it is also quite usual to find characteristics of 
homoeopathic magic in contagious magic (Frazer 2001: 34). 
Examples of such a symbiosis are various acts to exorcise evil 
spirits, carrying a dead person out of the house — feet first, 
burning a national flag, the bridal wreath game, the taboo on 
breaking a mirror, the cult of mascots or throwing a milk tooth 
on top of the oven for the cricket (in Germany, it is thrown 
behind the oven for the mouse (Frazer 2001: 47). 
A separate issue to be examined is the magical repertoire 
associated with religious liturgy. The procedures therein with 
For more details on the magical and religious roots of swearing, see Uspenski 
1994a [1983, 1987]. 
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magical roots are all in accordance with the formal laws on 
similarity and/or contact, as described by J. Frazer. Bronislaw 
Malinowski has compared a magical act and a sacramental 
transformation of substance: 
take certain utterances in the Holy Mass, those which within the 
appropriate context transform bread and wine into the Body and 
Blood of Our Saviour. Take again the verbal act of repentance in the 
Roman Catholic confession of sins, or again the sacramental act of 
Absolution administered verbally by the Father Confessor: here 
words produce an actual change in a universe, which, though 
mystical and imaginary to us agnostics, is none the less real to the 
believer. (Malinowski 1965 [1935]: 55) 
The above list can naturally be extended with the act of baptism, 
tying marriage partners with rings, all kinds of consecration 
ceremonies, etc. The major religions have taken over contagious 
and homoeopathic magic from pagan customs. For example, 
there is still a contagious magic function in the baptism ritual, 
since water in mythology marks the beginning of everything, and 
symbolizes the mother's lap (Averintsev 1991: 62). The ring, as 
well as yarn, have since ancient times been symbols of ties. The 
association of marriage with circles and rings is an ancient 
phenomenon. During the marriage ceremony the members of the 
clan stood in a circle: those who married did not form separate 
families but were members of the "greater family". An oath of 
loyalty was sworn whilst standing in the circle (Hoffmann-
Krayer 1987 [1935/1936]: 703, 713). In the early versions of epic 
folklore examples can also be found of rings that bring about 
love (Geissler 1955: 29, 180). 
In disputing the seriousness of this list — that is far from 
complete — the "rationalists" could claim that: 
1) the initial, resp. pagan meaning of a original magical act 
has very often become dimmed, changed, been meta-
morphized or has disappeared completely, and 
2) the old meaning may indeed be known but the truthfulness 
of the magical effect is no longer believed, and the magical 
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formula are spoken, and the magical procedures are carried 
out, as a mere formality, or automatically. 
Therefore, from the standpoint of those disputing the viability of 
magic, the abundance of magical elements in memory, thought 
and behaviour, should not be accorded any culturally generative 
significance. 
In cultural analysis there is indeed a dominating tendency to 
euphemize/metamorphize and/or marginalize magic. Since the 
enlightenment era, the realization of this trend has been 
particularly powerfully assisted by two "engines" — science and 
religion. For example, even Frazer declared that magic was 
"science's blood relation", adding however that magic was 
"inevitably fallible and barren, and if it should ever become true 
and fertile, then magic would be magic no longer, but science" 
(Frazer 2001: 55). In the positivism paradigm, the understanding 
that the truthfulness quality is reserved only for science and 
"scientific" became a viable and accepted fact. 
The mass of religious texts also sets itself against magic. On 
the one hand, as is known, procedures borrowed from magic 
have been extensively entered into the dogmatics of Christianity 
(as illustrated by the above examples); on the other hand, 
however, there is a dominating tendency to ignore magic as a 
"superstition", or to marginalize magic as a cultural relict.3 
Considering the struggle between science and religion, 
magic's days should have been numbered long ago. This, 
however, has not happened. Magic has turned out to be a unique 
phenomenon in culture because it has strangely managed to 
3 During the Middle Ages, the opposition between religion and magic was even 
described using iconic means of expression that emphasized contradiction. For 
example, a prayer that was called satanic was considered to be a Christian 
prayer, read backwards, and speaking backwards was called "witches' talk". 
The Hebrew-language texts of Jews, and the Arabian-language texts of 
moslems, (that are indeed read from right to left) could be viewed as texts from 
Hell, holding magic power. (Lotman 1998: 69). (It could be appropriate to note 
that the logic of thought of the medieval clerics is in exact accordance with the 
characteristics that J. Frazer accorded, in particular, to homoeopathic magic.) 
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survive in varied forms, without it being supported in the modern 
era by any substantial institutional factor.4 And that is not all. In 
the cultural processes that have occurred during the last half-
century, it is even possible to note a certain renaissance for 
magic, since — particularly in the European cultural area — a 
sudden increase of interest can be noted regarding magical texts 
and acts (for example, astrology, or fantasies and esotery in the 
style of the Potter phenomenon) in all possible forms. Lotman, 
too, had already indicated 20 years ago that we "have been 
witnesses in the 20th century to the forceful advance into 
European civilization by archaic and primitive cultural texts" 
(Lotman 1981b: 11). 
Much more intriguing, however, is the accordance of magic to 
such texts, such communication, which by its genre and/or its 
function, does not permit itself to be identified in any way with 
genuine magic. This heuristically interesting fact appears in Ernst 
Cassirer's discussion, when in analyzing the features of the 
creation of modern political myths, he dares claim the following: 
But if all ordinary technical means have failed, there still remains 
the ultima ratio, the final argument, which consists in a negation 
and reversal of all our usual modes of ratiocination and 
argumentation. We cannot solve the Gordian knot, but we can cut it. 
The magical word has not lost its power. But it must be used in the 
right way, at the right moment, and by the right man. All our efforts 
would be in vain if it were not possible to concentrate them to one 
point — in the same way in which in primitive society the collective 
power of the tribe is condensed and embodied in the person of the 
sorcerer, who commands the powers of nature, and who, as a 
medical man, knows the remedies for all evils. (Cassirer 1979 
[1945]: 250) 
Here Cassirer interprets magic as the rhetoric instrument of 
political propaganda. But he has not been the only author who 
4 The continued vitality of magic interests already astounded Edward Tylor, the 
anthropology professor from Oxford who was the first to scientifically examine 
magic (cit. Gross 1997: 2519). 
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has examined the semantics and pragmatics of magic in a much 
wider context, compared to the folklore tradition. 
4.3. Magic outside "folklore" (Selection of critical glances) 
This section has two basic interdependent goals: 
Firstly, to provide a selective overview of the substance that, 
in science, has been connected with magic, but that lies 
outside folklore5, and 
Secondly, to seek the reasons that have fed the vitality of the 
magical "substance" in culture. 
The overview of the non-folklore interpretations of magic 
does not pretend to completeness. The author has merely sought 
here to mark the areas of transition of magic. The primary task of 
this chapter is the analysis of the culture semiotic interpretation 
of magic in Juri Lotman's "Lectures". In other words, according 
to the task at hand, the author will attempt to reconstruct those 
theoretical points of departure that have made it possible (or that 
have turned out to be insufficient) to interpret magic as a 
systematic and universal intellectual phenomenon. 
Analyses that claim to be systematic, and that argue in 
substance against the (folkloristic) cliché of magic regarding its 
"genreness", history and intellectual marginalization, are not 
great in number. In general, the forms of manifestation of magic, 
outside chrestomatic magical spells, etc, have been observed in 
four areas — the psyche of children, the everyday behaviour of 
people, natural language and cultural language.6 
5 Here it should be emphasized that it is indeed difficult if not unproductive to 
precisely set the boundaries for folklore itself. These "boundaries" are created 
by a non-folklore determination of the research topic. 
6 Semiotics deals with sign systems, which the Tartu-Moscow School of 
Semiotics treats as languages. The most basic elements of a language are an 
alphabet and rules, which permit the subsequent formation of meaning-bearing 
units (words, sentences, texts) for saving, organizing and mediating 
information. With some simplification it can be said that two types of languages 
are able to be differentiated: natural languages and second level languages 
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4.3.1. Characteristics of "magical" behaviour in a child's 
ontogeny 
The folkloristic, traditionally "genristic", sovereignty of magic 
(and also mythology) was seriously undermined for the first time 
by Jean Piaget's developmental psychology experiments (see 
Piaget 1951 [1927]). Piaget divides a child's development into 
four stages, of which the first are, according to his terminology, 
the "magic" stage (ends at the age of 5-6) and the 
"mythological" stage (ends at the age of 7-9). The magic in a 
child's psyche is said to be characterized as "animistic" (sensing 
everything as being alive) and "artificiality" (subordinating the 
environment or environment being subordinate to human 
manipulation). Self and non-self are merged in a child of that age, 
which permits the things (they have the characteristics of being 
alive) of the surrounding world to be controlled, directed and 
commanded according to one's will and selected distance. In a 
later work, Piaget has further said that the child creates an 
indexical sensory dependency connection between itself and the 
thing in praesentia (Piaget 1970: 717). The child does not yet 
feel itself in relation to things as an independent subject: it has 
not yet learnt to use conventional signs to operate with things 
outside its field of vision. Roman Jakobson agrees with Piaget, 
claiming that the initial stage of a child's linguistic development 
(which, in the first place, using the means of a natural language also form 
complicated hierarchical systems beyond the natural language). These 
languages have also been termed by the Tartu-Moscow school as "secondary 
modelling systems" or cultural languages. Proceeding from everyday 
understanding, a natural language is the mother tongue of a person (of a certain 
people). But a "pure" mother tongue is an abstraction since language used in 
each specific situation unavoidably ends up in contexts that are subordinate to 
the rules (codes) of another/other language(s). Secondary languages can be 
classified in different ways and/or they can be examined from various aspects. 
It is possible to differentiate between legal, ideological, artistic, etc languages, 
and naturally to analyze the specific features of communication in these other 
languages — as is done, for example, by Juri Lotman through his interest in 
magic and religion. 
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is of a "deictic nature" (Jakobson 1985b [1969]: 94-95). The 
topics of magical perception in a child's development, and the 
according of words with magical power in ontogeny, are also 
covered by Bronislaw Malinowski (Malinowski 1936: 318-325, 
see below) and Weston LaBarre (LaBarrel979: 61); the topic of 
"egocentric objects" in the early stage of a child's psychic 
development is discussed, proceeding from Piaget's experiments, 
by Thure von Uexküll (Uexküll 1986: 127). 
However, Jean Piaget formulated a restriction (too hastily, 
apparently), according to which the features characteristic of the 
early stages of thought were meant to disappear after the 
formation of logical thought in the child. 
4.3.2. Magic as everyday spontaneous behavioural practice 
Bronislaw Malinowski's examination of "spontaneous magic" is 
fundamentally important in the analysis of the "non-genre" 
manifestation of magic. Having studied this issue in a traditional 
Melanesian community, B. Malinowski registers an "astounding 
similarity" between a magical ritual (spell) and a "spontaneous 
ritual". He considers the latter as the "true source of magical 
belief'. A spontaneous ritual takes place, in Malinowski's 
opinion, in a situation where a person's fear or other similar 
emotional (illusionary) experiences or stress find a behavioural 
output, which, for this person, has a function in the ad hoc 
resolution of a certain (crisis) situation. (However, the border 
between spontaneous and magical rituals has not been 
unambiguously determined by him.) (Malinowski 1998 [1925]: 
80-81). 
In a work that was completed about ten years after the 
indicated study, B. Malinowski provides a more detailed 
theoretical interpretation of this general explanation, connecting 
the creation of a spontaneous ritual (spontaneous magic) with the 
specific features of the formation of verbal communication in 
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hominoids (phylogenetic aspect) and children (ontogenetic 
aspect). 
Malinowski proceeds from the position that there is no point 
explaining the objectives and causes of verbal speech in 
traditional societies using logic or philosophical speculations. It 
would be just as pointless to proceed from the immanent 
grammatical structure of a language. The fundamental basic form 
of grammar, and language as a whole, have themselves 
developed from the "use of language" (Malinowski 1936: 327). 
The usage situations during the most plastic developmental 
stages of the language have left particularly noticeable traces in 
the language. But language is also the instrument for 
commanding such situations. This produced Malinowski's very 
general and very expansive determination of magic (that covers 
both spontaneous and ritualized magic): "The word acts on the 
thing and the thing releases the word in the human mind. This 
indeed is nothing more or less than the essence of the theory 
which underlies the use of verbal magic" (Malinowski 1936: 323, 
328). This is a functional interpretation, which proceeds from the 
role of language (magic) that is interpreted in a socio-
psychological way. Words (sounds) that for a hominoid and/or in 
a child's early life initially express only joy or dissatisfaction, 
regarding the lack or presence of someone/something, begin to 
be connected with the result — for a child due to the obligated 
presence of a carer (carers) — which may be achieved via the 
carer(s) with the help of sounds/words. "A name has the power 
over the person or thing which it signifies", words become 
"active power" that can be used so that persons and things 
materialize (and they do appear!), and to produce changes in the 
surrounding environment (and they do occur!) (Malinowski 
1936: 320-321). This discussion also claims to clarify the logic 
of the evolutionary formation of magic rituals, on the basis of 
spontaneous magic, as understood by Bronislaw Malinowski. 
The observations made on the Trobriand Islands encouraged 
Malinowski to state that the child, having grown to adulthood, 
continues to believe in the power of the word. (Malinowski 1965 
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[1935]: 64-65]. The analysis logic of Malinowski permits him to 
subsequently draw a heuristically important conclusion that the 
forms of linguistic communication that are born in primitive 
language usage situations, regardless of their surface multiplicity, 
are one and the same in all human languages (Malinowski 1936: 
328). 
With his studies, Bronislaw Malinowski takes an important 
step in the dismantling of the genristic limitation of magic. He 
accords magic an ordinary, "everyday" status, deriving magic 
from the universal characteristics of social communication that 
arise ad hoc and from the language that "forms" them. 
4.3.3. Connecting magic with the characteristics of natural 
language 
4.3.3.1. Defining magical function using terms from the act of 
linguistic communication. 
Roman Jakobson finds a correlation, to the psycho-semiotic 
interpretation of magic in the works of Jean Piaget, in the form of 
the magical function of language. Magical function is defined, in 
addition to the six functions of language (expressive (emotive), 
conative (appellative), cognitive (referential), phatic, meta­
linguistic and poetic functions), as the systematic element of 
language7 (see Figure 3). 
According to Roman Jakobson, the magical function of 
language is changing the "missing or inanimate 'third person' to 
the addressee of the conative (appellative) message" (Jakobson 
1968 [I960]: 355-357) This latter standpoint could be illustrated, 
for example, by the formula: "Pain to the crow [= to it], illness to 
the magpie [= to it], and you [or: X] will get well!" 8 
7 Jakobson does not mention the issue of the pragmatic criteria for the presence 
of the magic function in speech. 
8 To be precise, it should be added that in the summarized list of communicative 
functions, Jakobson indeed no longer mentions the magic function (the author is 
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Oriented to the referent 
and context: cognitive F 
Oriented to the addresser: Oriented to the message: Oriented to the addressee: 
expressive F * poetic F * conative F 
Oriented to contact: 
phatic F 
Oriented to code: 
meta-language F 
Figure 3. Functions of linguistic events (F) and their orientation. 
Jakobson's schema proceeds from the tradition constructed with 
structuralism, where the relationships between the elements, and 
the system to which the elements belong, are considered to be 
more important than the language elements themselves 
(Jakobson 1996a [1974]: 181). In his description of inter-element 
relationships, however, it can be observed how R. Jakobson exits 
from the system of the formal characteristics of natural language 
and enters the field of phenomenological analysis. For example, 
in the case of conative function, there is emphasis on the 
fundamental insubordination of transmitted imperative sentences 
to true/false control (Jakobson 1968 [I960]: 355). R. Jakobson 
does not mention the fact, however, that in the assessment of 
magical effect this criteria is particularly important. In the 
determination of poetic function, R. Jakobson also uses the 
external characteristics of the grammar of natural language.9 
silent as to whether this is because it is a sub-variant, with limited validity, of 
the conative function, or whether there is some other reason). 
9 R. Jakobson defines poetic function as a linguistic behaviour act that 
comprises of "projecting the equivalence principle [with which the elements of 
language are united into a paradigm — P. L.] from the selectional axis to the 
combinational axis" (Jakobson 1968: 358). In other words, the selectional axis 
should be understood as a paradigm comprised of equivalent language elements 
(e.g. adjectives), of which the language user, in a certain position of the 
(speech) text, at a certain time, can use only one element (e.g. an adjective), 
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Nevertheless, the communication schema of Roman Jakobson 
contains important deficiencies (see also Chapter 2). 
It should first be noted that not recognizing the magical effect 
in defining the magical speech act is not coincidental as regards 
this author. Mikhail Lotman has justifiably indicated that R. 
Jakobson's linguistic communication act is in itself transmitting a 
completed text: "According to R. Jakobson, the addresser, taking 
into account the context, formulates a message with the help of 
language, which he transmits via a contact to the addressee." 
Actually, as claimed by M. Lotman, the communication act is 
an act of translation, in the course of which the 
text transforms the language, the addressee [in this context, the 
object of the magical act — P. L.\, determines [the character of — 
P. L.] the contact of the addresser and addressee, transforms the 
addresser himself [—] and ceases to be identical with itself. 
(Lotman, Mikhail 1994: 595) 
Algirdas Greimas and Joseph Courtés also emphasize that R. 
Jakobson's functions examine "only" the informative aspects of 
communication (Greimas and Courtés 1982 [1979]: 37). 
To continue, the addresser and addressee of the magical 
communication in Roman Jakobson's schema are not precisely 
determined. For example, the addressee of Kalev's wise advice 
"may the winds guide your way /... may the gentle breezes teach 
[you] / may the heavenly stars give [you] wisdom" in the 
Estonian epic is still Kalevipoeg (Kalev's son)10. The "breezes" 
and "heavenly stars" — the so-called "missing third person" — 
are still also addressees (for Kalev), but in the functional sense 
(for Kalevipoeg), i.e. in the context of magical effect they are still 
which in a sentence or verse — i.e. on the poetic text combination axis, 
however, in contrast to an element of a non-poetic text, begins to "behave" as 
associative with some other language element located in its surroundings (as for 
example words behave with each other in rhyming or rhythm schemes or in 
parallel verses); at the same time, the mutual associativity of words (sentences) 
in a non-poetic text is "zero" or close to zero. 
10 
"Tuuled juhtigu sul teeda, / Õhud õrnad õpetagu, / Taevatähed andku tarkust" 
(Kreutzwald 1961 [1857-1861]: 64). 
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addressers (= mediators), whose role is to amplify the power 
contained in the spell by Kalev (= sorcerer). On the semiotic 
plane, to Kalevipoeg they are indices mediating/expressing/am­
plifying old Kalev. It should be noted that a spell as a whole, 
together with "third persons", is indeed easily available as a 
ready instrument, as a patrum more (cultural memory) formula 
for the sorcerer (= in Kalev's memory), and Kalev (actually 
Kalev's spirit) is its commander, embodier and forwarder (in the 
eyes of Kalevipoeg!). 
It is also not possible to agree with Roman Jakobson's 
opinion that in the role of an addressee being presented in the 
"third person" there can only be "missing" or "inanimate" 
actants. For example, in the formula "May God have mercy upon 
you", it is not essentially correct to treat God as "missing" or 
"inanimate". In the formula "Curse you!" the addressee can, as a 
rule, be actually within the communication field. 
Jakobson has also left unaddressed (except in the case of 
expressive function) the phenomenon of autocommunication, 
whereby the addressor is changed into the addressee as well, 
together with all the resultant functional peculiarities. 
An intriguing question that unavoidably arises in the case of 
Jakobson's language functions pertains to the common founda­
tion of the functions under observation. In the message, the 
contact-creating or meta-linguistic function has a clear lexical 
expression. But the expressive function of a message may not 
have a direct analogy that can be grammatically or lexically 
determined, and the emotional load becomes clear indirectly, via 
analysis on the basis of the context. Of the two verbally and 
grammatically analogous formulae, one lacks a magical function 
merely because in the cultural memory {patrum more) there are 
no traces of this formula being used in such a function. And this 
is not a linguistic or even a communicative fact, but a cultural 
fact that does not fit the system of linguistic concepts. Although 
Jakobson's famous (and very valuable) definition of poetic 
function (that has been cited above) does open up the basic inter-
textual mechanism for the creation of metaphoricality (= 
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semantic ambivalence), it is still too narrow because it does not 
cover the referentive (cognitive and contextual) and emotive 
aspects of the message that connect the actants. These aspects do 
not need to be connected to intratextual associativism and 
combinationality, but they nevertheless may enrich the semantic 
ambivalence (metaphoricality) of the message. 
This leads us to a new question (which Roman Jakobson has 
also left unanswered): do magical and poetic functions exhaust 
the repertoire of communicative functions that are definable on 
the basis of the formal characteristics of language? 
Despite all this criticism, it is necessary to emphasize that the 
idea by Roman Jakobson to treat magic as a linguistic 
behavioural act, and to associate poetic function with the transfer 
of the paradigmatic characteristics of natural language to the 
syntactic axis of language, has a high scientific value. 
4.3.3.2. Magicality of verbal representation. 
Whereas to Roman Jakobson magical function was one of the 
many functions of language, the Japanese writer Toshihiko 
Izutsu published a concept some years before Jakobson 
(Jakobson apparently had not read this), where a magical origin 
was accorded to language as a whole: 
all speech may, in a certain sense, be regarded as a magical act, 
though, of course, this magical nature is embodied in actual uses of 
speech in many degrees of intensity, varying from genuine verbal 
magic through many grades of half-conscious, half-unconscious [— 
] in every bit of speech [—] and almost in every one of the words 
we use. (Izutsu 1956: 48) 
In contrast to Jakobson, for whom language was above all a 
communicational system, Izutsu claims (following on from 
Susan Langer and Ernst Cassirer) that the most important and 
original function of human language is actually representation. 
Magic is said to have its beginnings in the deep, inalienable and 
dynamic quality of language, and also of the human mind, of 
presenting/replacing reality by using symbols (Izutsu 1956: 105-
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107). Magic is said to have seeped into every phase of linguistic 
behaviour even before the professional sorcerer began to 
implement these behavioural forms in magical acts (Izutsu 1956: 
49, 103). 
In verbal magic, Izutsu differentiates three levels: (1) the 
fundamental magic of meaning, (2) the practice of magic, (3) 
spontaneous magic (Izutsu 1956: 49). 
The fundamental magic of meaning is said to be concealed in 
the semantic constitution of words, and is expressed in the very 
nature of symbols to conjure up something in our minds (Izutsu 
1956: 60). This "something" of fundamental magic, or the power 
to create a "connotative meaning" for symbols can be seen, in 
turn, as four components in Izutsu's theoretical schema. The first 
of these is "referential" (i.e. cognitive or conceptual), and the 
second is the "intuitive" component. This second is something 
between the referential and the third component — the so-called 
"emotional" component. Izutsu writes about the intuitive 
component as follows: 
besides the well-known functions of directly referring to the 'things 
meant' and of arousing feelings and emotions [= third component 
— P. L.\, [language] has a certain power of making the 'things 
meant' real and alive once again at the level of linguistic expression. 
(Izutsu 1956: 64, 76) 
The fourth component with connotative meaning is the structural 
component. This operates as patterns of speech and patterns of 
thought, and connects non-language elements of reality, thereby 
determining "traditional habits of thought" (Izutsu 1956: 90). 
The multiplicity of planes in magical connotations inevitably 
leads Izutsu to the conviction that, for example, in modern times, 
"the language of law and the language of ethics cannot 
satisfactorily be explained if we leave out of account the magical 
contexts out of which they arose, and with which they remain 
most closely connected" (Izutsu 1956: 38). 
Considering the particular interest by Toshihiko Izutsu in the 
proto- and supra-linguistic manifestations of magic, "the practice 
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of magic", as "standardized magic", in other words — the 
traditional repertoire of magic (as it is expressed, for example, in 
the chrestomatic acts and formulae noted at the beginning of the 
monograph) remains emphatically secondary for this author 
(Izutsu 1956: 108). 
Izutsu considers the locus classicus of his concept to be the 
third level of verbal magic — that he, following Bronislaw 
Malinowski, calls "spontaneous magic". In his opinion, the 
kernel of spontaneous magic is the so-called "mental evocation" 
— the most fundamental act of verbal magic, 
which may modify even the most colourless words and particles in a 
very peculiar way and transform them in a moment into something 
charged with mysterious power. [—] It seems [—] true that all 
words [—] are capable as symbols of 'evoking' in the mental 
system of the hearer the picture, the image, the concept (simple or 
complex), the emotion, the reasoning, or whatever else it may be, 
which is occupying the mind of the speaker. (Izutsu 1956: 49-50, 
60, 124) 
Izutsu also uses another term — "structural evocation" as a 
synonym for the former. Spontaneous reactions are considered 
by T. Izutsu to be the key to open the hidden mechanism of our 
linguistic behaviour in general. 
Toshihiko Izutsu emphasizes that he has borrowed the idea of 
spontaneous magic from Bronislaw Malinowski (Izutsu 1956: 
109). (He does not, however, comment further in his monograph 
on Malinowski's relevant standpoints). The standpoints of Izutsu, 
which on the philosophical plane depict a symbiosis of neo-
Kantianism and phenomenology, are still completely different 
from the views of Malinowski. For Izutsu, metaphysics is 
entirely concealed in the "structured" "pure schemata" of natural 
language and thinking, which hold a substantive and 
"tremendous power" as regards the behavioural and semantic 
reactions of people (Izutsu 1956: 90). In the empirical 
functionalism of Malinowski, spontaneous magic is presented as 
a psycho-physical reaction provoked by the environment, which 
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ensures the stability of the relationship between the individual 
and the environment. 
Nevertheless, there are also clear common features between 
the concepts of Izutsu and Malinowski. In both, the every day-
ness, universality and durability of magic are postulated, which 
for T. Izutsu are guaranteed by the immanent semantic structure 
of language, and for Malinowski by the universal social functions 
of language usage, which even the "omnipotent purification of 
the scientific use of language" has not managed to destroy 
(Malinowski 1936: 328). 
4.3.3.3. Magicality of the substance of language. 
The notions of Toshihiko Izutsu, whereby magic is understood as 
the substantive manifestation of language and mind, have found 
certain parallels in Jaan Undusk's theoretic schema of language 
substance (Undusk 1994b). 
Language substance, according to this analysis, is the 
"fading", "falling silent" of the spoken voice in language itself 
(resp. "voiced, worded silence") or, from another aspect, the 
negation of the sign system in language itself: for example, "the 
person praying from his heart is not reciting the prayer to 
himself, but is receiving it. Thus does falling silent occur — with 
the words still continuing". By equivalencing language substance 
with the concept of silence in language, Undusk claims that 
substance is concealed "at the base of every language element" 
(Undusk 1994b, 3: 473^75, 480). 
Magic is said to be the expression of language substance: "It 
is as if the whole world of a person's perceptions, senses and 
mental pictures is weighed down by magical pressure." The word 
(= magical word), in the opinion of J. Undusk, is a connecting 
bridge between linguistic and non-linguistic existence — a 
magical word has "both a linguistic (one end of the bridge) as 
well as a [conditionally] non-linguistic aspect (the other end of 
the bridge)". Conditionally, because this other end as well — and 
11 о Universals in the context of Juri Lotman's semiotics 
that is the substance — "is inevitably worded" (Undusk 1994b, 
4: 693-694). 
As previously said, there are common elements in the analysis 
of magic by T. Izutsu and J. Undusk, and it is important, from the 
viewpoint of the semiotic treatment of magic, to examine these 
critically." Both authors: 
• treat as magical (potentially) all language as a whole, 
which is questionable from the viewpoint of both magic 
and language; 
• classify magic, as regarding its substance, as belonging 
to the representational, non-communicative phenomena; 
the manifestation of magic in a communicative act (in 
dialogue) is, in their opinion, of secondary importance; 
• proceeding from the above, they also consider the 
pragmatic, practical side of magic to be secondary. 
For Izutsu, the magical act in language is concealed in the 
substance of language itself (resp. in the internal power) and he 
does not generally analyze this via communication or 
autocommunication, or even via the causal concepts connected to 
these (Izutsu 1956: 48-50, 60, 124). Jaan Undusk does claim in 
passing that "the words 'effect' and 'to affect', in their more 
general functions, cannot be completely [? P. L.] ignored when 
talking about magic" (Undusk 1994b, 4: 704). Nevertheless, T. 
Izutsu and J. Undusk deviate conceptually from the analysis 
tradition in the treatment of magic that was practised by James 
George Frazer, Bronislaw Malinowski, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah and many other scholars, for whom 
natural language is a communicative instrument for 
pragmatically interpreted magical acts.12 In negating the 
A more detailed analysis of the differences in the notions of T. Izutsu and J. 
Undusk falls outside the framework of this analysis. For more information on 
the semiotic analysis of the magical act, see Chapter 2. 
12 Using the terms of John Langshaw Austin's speech acts, magic can be 
described as a perlocutive speech act — a verbal act that has an objective with 
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"rationalistic causality" of magic in favour of magical 
"identification" (Undusk 1994b, 4: 704), J. Undusk has also 
ignored the teleological interpretation of causality that in 
accordance with the analysis by Austin. Boris Uspenski has 
worded it thus: 
It is true that causal relationships in cosmological consciousness do 
not connect the present and the future: they primarily connect a 
certain original state (the past, which is the point of departure) 
simultaneously with both the present and the future. Therefore, it is 
indicated that the present is connected with the future, not directly 
but through a mediary — via this original integral, all-encompassing 
state. 
According to such a notion, constantly occurring present events 
do not give rise to the future; but they can be perceived as omens of 
the future. Indeed, both that which takes place in the present, as well 
as that which happens in the future, manifest themselves as a 
reflection, or symbolic image, of one and the same original state — 
as a sign of the original state. (Uspenski 1989: 20) 
To continue, both authors: 
• are not interested in analyzing the mutual typological 
relationship between the magical and mythological 
speech act in language. In the light of how tightly magic 
and mythology are interwoven (both have their own texts 
in culture that have distinct structural characteristics, but 
with mutually diffused boundaries13), such an approach 
is analytically incomplete; 
• interpret magic via characteristics that the Tartu-
Moscow School of Semiotics scholars, amongst others, 
have considered — and in the opinion of this author, 
justifiably — to be either characteristics of mythological 
semiosis (this refers to J. Undusk's approach) or 
characteristics that can be applied also to other 
certain consequences in view, but at the same time also a linguistic form that 
anticipates them, (cf Austin 1962: 101-107, 117-118). 
13 For more detail, also see Chapters 2 and 5. 
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manifestations of semiosis (this can be seen in T. 
Izutsu's schemata). Indeed, the capability concealed in 
the semantic construction of symbols "of conjuring up 
something in our minds" (Izutsu 1956: 60) can be both 
magical and mythological, but not only! As regards the 
specifics of the mythological sign creation process, Juri 
Lotman and Boris Uspenski have described this using 
intellectual operations. According to these operations, as 
already said previously, objects in the mythological 
context are treated: firstly, as being on the same level 
(they are not placed in a hierarchy, in the logical sense 
(incl. according to the extent of the concept)); secondly, 
as not being divided according to characteristics (the 
objects are wholes) and thirdly, as single objects (a large 
number of the objects would presume meta-description, 
which would operate with characteristics and would 
therefore be hierarchical). Lotman and Uspenski 
illustrate the mythological object (sign) with the pheno­
menon of the proper noun. All Marys (as names) are 
single, single-characteristic and single-level phenomena, 
identified with their bearer. If we claim that Mr X is a 
person, we include him in the class of living beings 
bearing certain characteristics; but if we say that he is 
Person, then Person functions as a proper noun and is 
identified with X to be a unique integral whole (Lotman 
and Uspenski 1973: 282-285). 
Without commenting on these standpoints, Jaan 
Undusk has presented an analysis where mythological 
identification is called a "magical oneness bridge". 
According to this, the identification of the word with the 
object, according to Undusk, is the "magical fading" of 
the word in the object (for example, in the case of a 
proper noun and the person or object bearing it). He 
proceeds from the fact that "in a magical act, one thing 
becomes identical with another, and acts identically with 
it" (Undusk 1994b, 4: 701). Identification, however, 
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proceeds from substantiality as the "common part of all 
things" (Undusk 1994b, 3: 467)14; 
• the question is not posed as to whether and under what 
conditions the "connection" between linguistic and non-
linguistic being (substance) (J. Undusk), or the 
connotative meaning of symbols or "mental evocation" 
(T. Izutsu), may be non-magic, i.e. possess some other 
linguistic or semiosic quality. The lack of an answer to 
this question annuls in principle the possibility of 
differentiating the culture-typological specifics of magic 
(resp. mythology) in the two texts under observation. 
Something on its own has no meaning in the semiotic 
sense. 
4.3.4. Cultural-semiotic interpretation of magic: Juri Lotman's 
points of departure 
4.3.4.1. Structure-typological viewpoint. 
Juri Lotman, too, has interpreted magic using characteristics, 
which can in no way be placed within the framework of the 
ethnographic or narrowly scientific treatment of magic. In the 
lecture cycle titled "Semiotics of the Personality and Society" 
that was carried out in 1967 at Tartu University, he sketches a 
scheme of communicative relationships, which on the one hand 
is fragmentary, unexpected and even questionable, but on the 
other hand is fundamentally novel. This scheme also turns out to 
be the point of departure for the later analysis of numerous 
semiotic problems; here can also be found "beginnings" that 
were never further developed (see Appendix, Lecture IV). 
In the "Lectures", J. Lotman describes magic as a communi­
cative function, which has a structural, organic status of a 
personality in social relationships as a whole. The magical 
14 It should be added that, as regards the depiction of mythology as magic, there 
are others who think as does J. Undusk (e.g. see Heusden 1997: 123). 
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function, according to his scheme, is one of the components 
amongst many other social functions. 
The social relationships presented by J. Lotman have been 
depicted in the lecture in the form of the following scheme (the 
style of the note-taker has been preserved, but the scheme has 
been extended with the elements in the square brackets that could 
be added since they are explicitly mentioned in the non-scheme 
part of the text, or are contained implicitly; the fifth 
communicative function "Play and art" does not exist in the 
scheme in the notes; this is added in the later part of the lecture): 
[Function and texts of the 
speaker] 
I Practice 
I do [.something] 
[No signification, 
consequently no text] 
III Science 
I seek the truth (Procedure!) 
[Function and texts of the 
listener] 
II Magic 
Something is done to me 
IV Religion, belief1^ 
I am given the truth 
[V Play and art. Two behaviours = two 
signified meanings, and also the functions 
of speaker and listener, simultaneously.] 
The fact that here J. Lotman analyzes text and function (which is 
an element of the code) on the one row, so to speak, is not 
surprising. In a joint article, published some years after the 
"Lectures", J. Lotman and B. Uspenski clarify that "in certain 
cases the one and the same cultural elements may circulate [—] 
15 Here attention should be paid to the circumstance that it would perhaps have 
been more precise to call this "religious" sign type and its relevant function 
something else, for example, a submissive function (submissus (Lt) — 
submissive, subservient, mild), but the author abandoned this due to the desire 
to preserve the terminology used by Juri Lotman. 
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as both text and rules" (as a language), and they bring taboo as an 
example — which in one situation is a text reflecting the moral 
experience of a collective, but in another, a functional collection 
of magical rules that are used to dictate a certain way of behaving 
(Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 153). 
All social functions are described in J. Lotman's scheme on 
the level of text (speech) as the mutual positioning between 
speaker and listener or listener and speaker — and are registered 
from the me-position.16 In addition to the magical function, the 
religious and scientific (epistemological) communicative 
functions also belong to this integral system, and the fourth one, 
the non-signified practice of me, which contrasts, as a non-
signified positioning, with signified activity-acts. It is, however, 
astonishing that in Lotman's scheme there is no analysis of the 
mythological function (and text), in addition to the magical 
function. This is strange, in particular because already in 1964 
Lotman had started to use the concept of the aesthetics of 
sameness (Lotman 1994 [1964]: 223-226), which in substance 
rests upon these formal criteria that are formulated in the 1973 
article (together with B. Uspenski) in the analysis of 
mythological semiosis (Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 282-288). 
Compared to the refined analysis in 1973, J. Lotman describes in 
1964 the mythological nature of the aesthetics of sameness 
merely in passing (describing extra-textual connections in artistic 
creation), and indirectly — he does not even use the concept 
'mythological' (although the phenomena that J. Lotman 
characterizes belong to the medieval mythological cultural 
space). Nevertheless, as can easily be concluded, the features that 
are used by Lotman to determine the aesthetics of sameness 
coincide in substance with just those features of mythological 
16 The term 'positioning' is used here actualize the formal semiotic features of 
signification, as formulated by A. Pyatigorski. As is known, Pyatigorski 
considers signification to be a 'characteristic' of a thing acting as a sign, which 
is expressed as "being dual", "having a position" (spatial determination) and 
"being able to be projected" (from the past/present) to the future (Pyatigorski 
1973: 187-189). 
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semiosis that Lotman, together with Boris Uspenski, began to 
analyze thoroughly six years later.17 
Juri Lotman treats function as a social role of text, which 
serves certain specific needs of the collective that has created the 
text. Using such an approach it is possible to describe culture as a 
collection of certain functions. Function here is a "pure con­
struct", in the sense of which a given text may be interpreted, or 
"in relation to which some features of a text can be examined as 
features of the function".18 In addition, as Lotman indicates in the 
"Lectures", the connection between function, and the text that is 
serving it, is a weak one, in the context that a scientific text, for 
example, may acquire a religious function, and a religious text 
may in turn begin to circulate as a scientific text, etc.19 
Nevertheless, as J. Lotman emphasizes in the "Lectures", the 
social functions of texts in culture may be independent and 
17 Juri Lotman indicates that, for art that is subordinated to the aesthetics of 
sameness, identification with certain stereotypes of consciousness is 
characteristic, whereas these stereotypes are treated as "essences"; the versions 
that is identified with these essences only exists to the extent that they are 
identical to the stereotype — to be "one and the same", one. For example, it 
could be claimed that the representations of the Virgin Maiy, John the Baptist, 
and other figures in the Bible, are not the creation of the artist but of God 
Himself, and that later images, as copies, could be treated as repeat appearances 
of godly creation. (The medieval artist, before he could start painting a holy 
picture, had to even undergo a ritual cleansing act.) Therefore, all the Marys, 
just as all the Johns, are in both cases identifiable as One. They are, as regards 
the original image, of the same level, integral wholes (their characteristics are 
not sovereign as regards the whole — the concept of originality was in principle 
condemnable — and a part is perceived as something that is the same as the 
whole). All copies can only be differentiated from the original stereotype as 
regards the modality of the stage of sameness. (These characteristics (although 
not using the the term 'aesthetics of sameness') have been analyzed by Juri 
Lotman in Part II of his Lecture II (see Appendix), and also in numerous later 
writings, of which the closest to the "Lectures" is Lotman 1970e: 17, 18. 21-
22). 
18 Function is defined in this way in the joint article published a year after the 
lectures (Lotman and Pyatigorski 1968: 75). 
19 The circulation of scientific truths as having a religious function had already 
been previously described by Marcel Mauss (Mauss 2000 [1904]: 180). 
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constant — compared to the variety and short life spans of texts. 
However, as believed by Lotman, a single text, in any one 
situation, can have only one function at a time. 
In addition to his four-fold system, Juri Lotman also derives a 
fifth type of function, which finds expression through play and 
artistic texts. The common basis for both (compared to the 
explicit four-fold system of the scheme) is the two-plane feature 
(having multiple meanings) of the communicative relationship, 
which is expressed in a play situation — analogous to art. For 
example, if a child does not relate to the striped fabric draped 
across a chair as a tiger (because he recognizes it as his mother's 
dressing gown) or, vice versa, if he thinks the chair is a tiger and 
breaks out in tears, then no play communication takes place at 
all. Play and art presume that the observer (participant) 
simultaneously considers the occurrence both real — this is the 
role of the listener (the chair is in reality a tiger) and unreal — 
this is the role of the speaker (the chair is conditionally imitating 
a tiger). But both these meanings must actualize together. The 
peculiarity of this two-meaning relationship "reveals itself in 
metaphor"; 20 "but this [peculiarity — P. L.] has a much more 
general character," explains J. Lotman in an article published in 
the same year as the "Lectures" took place (Lotman 1967c: 133— 
134, 139-140).21 
"J. Lotman also says in the "Lectures" that allegorical circumlocution does not 
carry two meanings — "it means only one thing for all readers" (Appendix, 
Lecture IV). This apparently should be understood to mean that no reader, for 
example, would perceive the bear in Krylov's fable, who uses a rock to attack 
the fly sitting on his master's brow, as being a wild animal, but merely as a 
criminally stupid person — and only as such. 
21 Juri Lotman is probably thinking of those manifestations of metaphorism that 
extend beyond art (in its narrow meaning). In addition to the standpoint of 
Lotman that a text can have only one function at a time in any specific situation, 
it should be said that it is in particular an artistic text that can turn out to be an 
exception, since it is already polyfunctional by its nature. It is said that Lope de 
Vega fainted during a mass in church whilst listening to the organ music, at the 
very point that depicted the crucifixion of Christ. Lotman claims in the 
"Lectures" that this is a case where the artistic function of the text is substituted 
by another — by the religious function. But in the opinion of this author this is 
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The epistemological togetherness of magic with science and 
religion in the scheme in the "Lectures" is not actually original, 
because already Edward Ту lor, closely followed by James 
George Frazer, had believed that the world could be explained 
with the help of magical, religious and scientific "ways of 
thinking".22  In addition, it seems that the understandings of Juri 
Lotman regarding the communicative structure have been 
directly influenced by Aleksei Lossev, who in his well-known 
tract "The Philosophy of the Name" describes the relationship of 
the subject with the "thing in the mind" {вещью в разуме) as an 
"energetic" relationship, and claims that every meaning of a 
thing has an energy that is inseparable from it, and that the 
subject of the relationship, "having been energetically loaded" 
(будучи знергийно-оформлен), "begins independently to use 
this energy itself, in realizing (воплощая) it actively in itself and 
in other things". This also means that the subject of the 
relationship (according to Lotman's scheme, he is then the 
listener in relation to the "thing in the mind") knows the name of 
the object of the relationship (this should then be a spell, for 
example) and "the nature of this name is magical (Lossev 1993a 
[1927]: 763).23  
only one of the possible interpretations; according to another interpretation — 
and this is permitted by the polyfunctional postulate of art — an artistic text 
may metaphorically carry, simultaneously with an artistic function, some other 
function as well — in this case, a religious function. 
22 For more detail on the critical analysis of Edward Tylor's and James George 
Frazer's positions, see (Gross 1997: 2519, 2522). Tylor and Frazer base their 
arguments on the positivistic criteria of truth for magic and religion. Juri 
Lotman departs from their field of influence, claiming in the conceptualistic 
spirit that faith is also truth, "but it is presumed that someone [has] it, who is to 
provide it" (Appendix, Lecture IV). 
23 It should be added that Aleksei Lossev — in his work from the 20s that did 
not get beyond manuscript form, and which Juri Lotman was not able to use in 
printed form — already treated the name as both a magical and a mythological 
phenomenon, and the same also has been essentially done by Lotman (together 
with Boris Uspenski), independently (?) from A. Lossev. For example, Lotman 
has described somewhere the burning down of Zimoveiski stanitsa. and its 
complete "relocation" from one bank of the Don to the other, and its subsequent 
4. The uniqueness and universality of magic in culture 119 
The five-fold functional integral system of Juri Lotman 
nevertheless raises a legitimate and fundamental question, and 
this is: on the basis of which epistemological, cultural, structural 
and sign-creating criteria do these five (three) (textual) functions 
in particular form a typological whole that exhausts the speaker ~ 
listener ways of relating (resp. ways of interpreting the world) 
(and do they actually form it)?; what is the common basis for 
these functions? 
In addition to the above, one, completely unexpected, feature 
of the structure in Juri Lotman's scheme should be emphasized: 
the me (= subject) of the magical relationship is given the role of 
listener. According to Lotman, the listener in a magical act is not 
"in principle [—] capable of actually influencing anything", he 
"just receives", whereby he "does not know the grounds on 
which it is given". It seems, however, that the listener is also 
carrying out some speaking-related cautious acts as regards the 
speaker: the listener (as the "dependent" party) "creates a 
connection between himself and this situation [= speaker — P. 
L.] with some kind of an act in order to deserve the arrival of this 
unexplained gift" and to "demonstrate his trust regarding this 
unknown force" (Appendix, Lecture IV). As a result of the 
changing (exchanging) of the speaker-listener roles, the content 
of the concepts of the sorcerer and of the recipient (object) of the 
magical act in Lotman's scheme becomes less clear. Actually, 
the magical act acquires a dialogical expression. This (here it is 
still secondary) line is developed by Lotman in his contractual 
interpretation of magic, which has already been discussed in 
Chapter 1 (see also Lotman 1993a [1981]: 345). In this, the 
functions of speaker and listener are even equivalenced, since the 
magical relationship is a "mutual", "contractual" relationship, 
where the parties are "equivalent" (Lotman 1993a: 345). 
renaming — this is indeed a thoroughly magical manipulation! Thus, Catherine 
II, in destroying the birthplace of Pugachov, had attempted to also destroy 
Pugachov's name, (cf A. Lossev 1993 [manuscript from the 1920s]: 877-880). 
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Addressing the listener as the subject of magic differentiates 
the magic-concept of Lotman not only from E. Tylor, J. Frazer 
and B. Malinowski, but also from the results of the research of 
M. Mauss, E. Tambiah, and many other distinguished scholars.24 
Juri Lotman holds the surprising opinion that the subject of a 
magical relationship coincides functionally with the subject of a 
religious relationship (both are listenersl), and the magical 
listener is contrasted with the speaker of a scientific 
(epistemological) relationship — all this cannot help but remind 
one of Oswald Spengler's interpretation of religion and magic. In 
the words of Spengler, the cornerstone of "all the religions of 
magical culture" (i.e. world religions) — therefore the source of 
Europeans' world view — is the central thesis of the teachings of 
St Augustus about the spirit and flesh of men, the frailty of all 
earthly things before God. In the opinion of Spengler, German-
Catholic spirituality differs sharply from "magical cultural" 
spirituality; and primarily because this contrasts the submission 
strivings of an individual with the attitude to life of the Faustian 
individual, which is self-knowing and guided by individual will. 
(According to Juri Lotman's terminology, the Faustian person is 
a speaker.) For the eager-to-submit magic-person, magic-
mankind and magical religiosity, the "will" and "purpose" of a 
person, in the interpretation of Spengler, is merely the "action of 
Godness" that flows into a person (Spengler 1991 [1922]: 39-
40). 
As the reader can confirm, based on the numerous examples 
described above, the character of an authentic magical repertoire 
does not generally support the classification of the subject of a 
magical act as the listener. The exceptions to this rule are only 
those cases where the magical act is a contract (= me for you, you 
for me relationship) — but such cases do not predominate", or if 
the magical act is autocommunicative (for example, magical 
formulae and acts used for (re)attuning oneself), or where the 
24 Mauss 2000: 114, 116-118; Tambiah 1999: 69. 
25 This is also illustrated by the examples. 
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formula is elliptic — for example, in a relationship with 
astrological calendars, where the procedure generally is reduced 
to the mediation/finding of information (in various ways) on the 
transfer of power concealed in the mutual relationship between 
objects in the micro- and macro-cosmos — on conditions 
determined by calendars.26 This is essentially an identification 
process guided by a hidden power. The situation here can 
certainly be described by: object of the act = recipient = listener, 
to whom — as Lotman says — "is given", be it as a newspaper 
snippet or reported by a radio announcer.27 Incidentally, it is also 
disputable whether the circumstance described by Lotman in the 
"Lectures", where the taxi driver who is running late and tries to 
increase his speed by pressing hard with his feet against the body 
of the vehicle, can be considered, from the viewpoint of a 
magical procedure, to be a listener text (Appendix, Lecture IV). 
At the same time, one must completely agree with the 
standpoint of J. Lotman (and also with O. Spengler) in that, 
typologically, the subject of religious communication is indeed in 
a submissive role, and is a devoted listener}% 
As regards the method, Oswald Spengler and Juri Lotman 
both treat the magical and religious submission-relationship of 
the listener with the speaker in different ways — the former in a 
historical-philosophical (and diachronic) manner, and the latter in 
26 Such an indexical scmiosis is categorized by Roman Jakobson into the class 
of "involuntary indices" (непреднамеренные индексы): the source of this 
information cannot be considered to be the addresser of the transmitted message 
(Jakobson 1985d [1970]: 325). 
27 In principle, the addressees of magic (magical act or formula) could be me (in 
the case of an autocommunicative relationship), you (for example, "Damn 
you!") or him +you, e.g. "Pain to the crow, to the magpie [—] — our child will 
(-you will) get better!" Whereas the role of him, delegated by the sorcerer, can 
be played by a third (person) who commands/amplifies/mediates the power, e.g. 
"May God grant you~him~me health!" The third person (God) here is 
simultaneously in the role of the listener as well as the speaker. (And is not 
only the addressee, as would R. Jakobson have believed!) 
That to which the listener submits in the framework of a religious relationship 
is a separate — and very important — semiotic topic, which is outside the 
framework of this chapter. 
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a semiotic (and structural-typological) manner. It is important to 
state that the listener and/or speaker of Lotman cannot be derived 
from the ethnic or cultural-historic context (as with Spengler), 
but they also cannot be seen inductively as development-
psychological or social empirics (as with Jean Piaget and 
Bronislaw Malinowski). They are also not reduced to 
representations of natural language, as with Toshihiko Izutsu and 
Jaan Undusk. J. Lotman has called the listener-speaker or 
speaker-listener relationships social (i.e. cultural) functions, and 
has treated them in his scheme, as a whole, in the spirit of the 
structuralism proceeding from Ferdinand de Saussure, of 
semiotics and the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund 
Husserl. 
It is indeed from this synthesis in particular that the heuristic 
value of Lotman's scheme, including magic, springs forth. 
4.3.4.2. Phenomenological viewpoint. 
4.3.4.2.1. Phenomenological correlates of Edmund Husserl. 
Roman Jakobson has productively synthesized the structuralistic 
method of Ferdinand de Saussure and the phenomenology that 
proceeds from Edmund Husserl; the results of this synthesis are 
also reflected in the work of the Tartu-Moscow semiotics 
school.29 The task of this examination is indeed to indicate the 
importance of phenomenological influences in the foundations of 
the scientific ways of thinking of Juri Lotman, and also in the 
29 Whether the influence of phenomenology on the school proceeds directly 
from Husserl, or from Husserl via the interpretations of Jakobson, or from both 
authors in turn, the analysis of this question is outside the framework of this 
monograph. 1 he influences of Edmund Husserl, as the founder of 
transcendental-phenomenological epistemology, on R. Jakobson, has been 
thoroughly studied by Elmar Holenstein (see Holenstein 1976a [1974]: 2-5, 
47—51; 1975 (in particular!); 1977). The school must also be aware of another 
mediator of phenomenology — Gustav Shpet, whose Russian-language 
interpretation "Phenomenon and Thought", which was remarkably competent as 
regards Husserl, was published already in 1914 (Shpet 1996). 
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interpretation of magical communication in the scheme of the 
"Lectures". 
As an introduction, Ernst Cassirer should be quoted, since in 
giving a general assessment of Husserl's phenomenological 
method, he has accented some of his basic ideas, which are also 
important in the context of this examination. Cassirer writes: 
It is one of the fundamental achievements of Edmund Husserl's 
phenomenology to have sharpened once again our perception of the 
diversity of cultural 'structural forms' and pointed out a new 
approach to them, departing from the psychological method. [—] 
Husserl's own development makes it increasingly clear that the task 
of phenomenology, as Husserl sees it, is not exhausted in the 
analysis of cognition but calls for an investigation of the structures 
of entirely different objective spheres, according to what they 
'signify' and without concern for the 'reality' of their objects. [—] 
Such an investigation should include the mythical 'world', not in 
order to derive its specific actuality by induction from the manifold 
of ethnological and ethnic-psychological experience, but in order to 
comprehend it in a purely ideational analysis. (Cassirer 1966 [1925]: 
12; emphasis — P. L.) 
For Husserl, the study of "different objective spheres" is not 
possible outside of the ego through which they are manifested.30 
For Husserl, "departing from the psychological method" 
therefore presumes phenomenological reduction, or epoche, 
which should be interpreted as the avoidance of the natural and 
inductive interpretation of experience to the benefit of the 
immediate beholding of things31. 
30 
"Besides the world, which has acquired in me, and through me, a purpose and 
force of validity, in no other world is it possible for me to live and think, no 
other world can I experience, value or make my own" (Husserl 1987: 22). 
31 
"epochë [Gr. 'avoidance' — P. L.] is a radical and universal method whereby 
I understand myself as purely me together with the pure life of my 
consciousness,in which and thanks to which the whole objective world is for 
me, and in a way that is particularly for me." (Husserl 1987: 22). The "pure 
life" of consciousness presumes that the pure ego does not pose questions to 
itself regarding the existence or non-existence of things in the onthological 
sense. 
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Howerver, the object of consciousness, remaining identical with 
itself throughout the flow of the experience, does not enter the 
consciousness from the outside, but is concealed in the subjective 
process as an intentional [directed to something or someone — P. 
L.] effect produced by the synthesis of consciousness. (Husserl 1987 
[1931]: 44) 
As with intentional ity for Husserl, the phenomenon of 
communication (dialogicality) also becomes a central problem 
for the Tartu-Moscow semiotics school. 
Naturally the systematic nature and clear boundaries of the 
"subject of consciousness" is not innovative as regards language-
theoretical structuralism. What is indeed new is the Husserlian 
concentration on the observation of reduced subjectivity, placing 
emphasis on the fact that the "object [—] exists only as a 
correlative to consciousness [—] [and that — P. L.\ an object is 
only brought to a philosophically adequate degree of evidence 
when not only its context — the system in which it is embedded, 
but also the subject in which both are constituted, is included in 
the elucidation". Holenstein has emphasized that Husserl 
contrasts with the scholars of gestalt (who, by excluding the 
subject, restrict themselves to the analysis of image-background-
dualism), and that his method is also not in concordance with 
those structuralists who do not move outside the framework of 
the phoneme-morpheme-context of oppositions (Holenstein 
1975: 71). 
It should be added that in concentrating on the subject, 
Husserl was not just keeping in mind the individual subject but 
also the collective subject (see Husserl 1987: 87). For the Prague 
structuralism school (and through this, for the Tartu-Moscow 
semiotics school), the inclusion of the collective subject was also 
not novel. Pyotr Bogatyiyov and Roman Jakobson pointed out 
already in the 1920s that folklore can be compared to the mother 
tongue, where the system is automatically learned, and which, as 
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a phenomenon of social memory, acts as a strict collective 
"censor" (Bogatyryov and Jakobson 1971 [1929]: 374-375).32 
The "intentional work" of consciousness is seen by Husserl as 
two spheres. The first of these he calls phenomenological 
reduction. Through this a "world view" (Weltvorstellung) is 
formed, which means that the phenomenal objects of the 
"existing" world are constituted, described and examined catego­
rically, in accordance with its phenomenologically provided 
structure. In this position, the phenomenologically-meditating me 
(iindividual) is treated as a "non-participating observer 
[unbeteiligter Zuschauer], who contemplates himself and 
everything that is objective, which has been closed within him, 
and which is there for him in the manner that it is there for him" 
(Husserl 1987: 38-39, 69, 148]. This is a noematic world33. A 
noema is not a "thing in itself', but a thing that is thought, 
towards which intention is directed. A thing that is thought is 
brought into consciousness either via its "certainty", 
"possibility", or other modes of being (Seinsmodis), or as a mode 
of being of temporal subjectivity (present, past, future) (Husserl 
1987:38). 
When this system of epistemological concepts is transferred 
to the language of the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics, it 
could be claimed that the world of text and culture as signified 
objects is generally equivalent to a phenomenologically reduced 
object. In accordance with this conclusion, the scheme of Juri 
Lotman in his "Lectures" can also be treated as the worldview of 
me, which for the "observer" is the spectrum of cultural 
relationship types. This spectrum has been presented in the 
scheme as an integral (?) paradigm, which is formed by five 
communicative syntagma — potential texts (including magical 
text). 
In parallel with this we have the discussions by E. Husserl about the 
"universe of concordance" (kompossibles Universum) as the collective world of 
the "others",which the me can only "discover", not "create" (schaffen) (Husserl 
1987: 144). 
11 
поёта (Gr) — (item of) thought. 
126 Universals in the context of Juri Lotman 's semiotics 
But, as already mentioned, Edmund Husserl looks at 
intentionality on two levels. In addition to phenomenological 
reduction (the validity of which he does not question), a new 
aspect is introduced in the later writings of the philosopher. The 
world as the "natural being" (natürliches Sein) of the other is 
preceded by the "being of the pure ego in the form of the more 
original being", which is therefore the point of departure for the 
intentional work (of the consciousness), and "which are 
accompanied by its cogitationes". These cover the modes of 
cogito (thought) itself — "for example, the ways of perception, 
remembering, bringing into consciousness (Bewußtseinsweisen)", 
"together with their modal special features". The acts in this 
sphere are described by Husserl in the terms of consciousness 
itself— noetically34 (Husserl 1978: 38, 147). The natural sphere 
of being is secondary as regards its "validity of being" 
(Seinsgeltung), and always presumes a transcendental being in 
the form of pure ego:' A pure ego is the "substratum of habitual 
peculiarities" (Substrat von Habitualitäten) of the ego: 
If I place myself completely outside this life and avoid the 
presumption that the world exists in any form whatsoever, if I direct 
my glance solely at this life as cognition of the world, then I become 
my own master as a pure ego, together with the pure flow of my 
cogitatione. (Husserl 1987: 22-23, 69)"'0 
These intellectual acts were termed transcendental reduction by 
Husserl. 
noesis (Gr) — comprehension, thought. 
35 The concept of 'transcendental' content has been taken over by E. Husserl 
from Immanuel Kant. Kant terms as transcendental "any cognition that does not 
deal insomuch with objects as with our way of cognizing objects, insofar as this 
must be a priori possible" (Kant 1960 [1781]: 83 — emphasis by P. L.). This a 
priori means that the way of cognizing must precede the experience (in order 
for the congition of experience to be made at all possible. 
36 In the context of this analysis, we are not only interested in those spheres of 
pure ego that are "absolutely unique" (Husserl 1987: 100), but also in those 
which can be treated as analogues of the other in the pure ego (see Husserl 
1987: 118, 123-131). 
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The pure intentional flow of such "ways of cognition" is also 
described by Husserl as a communicative act "constituting" the 
'other' and "sympathizing" (Einfühlung) with the 'other' 
(Husserl 1987: 96-97). 
In the system of concepts of the Tartu-Moscow semiotics 
school, the approximate equivalent of the pure ego of Husserl is 
the intellect, resp. mind, as the concept of the "thinking object". 
And just as with Husserl's concept of pure ego, Juri Lotman's 
concept of the intellect is also inseparable from the 
communicative nature of the relationship between me and the 
other. 
The systematic treatment of the intellect, which is for Juri 
Lotman a central category, is actually accomplished by the Tartu 
professor ten years after the "Lectures" (Lotman 1977a; 1978) 
and later in summary form (Lotman 1992a). But the beginnings 
of the relevant search, as demonstrated here, already reach back 
to the 1960s. Although Lotman does not use the term 'intention', 
and initially also not the term 'intellect', the communicative 
relationship in the scheme in the "Lectures" has been presented 
using characteristics which — using Husserl's terminology — 
can be treated as "pure" "habitual" "intentions" of the thinking 
object. Juri Lotman accords three basic features to the intellect as 
a "thinking object". These are the capabilities of the intellect: 
firstly, to collect and mediate information (the intellect possesses 
communicative and memory mechanisms). It has language skills 
and is able to form correct sentences; secondly, to carry out 
algorithmic operations for the regular transformation of these 
messages; thirdly, to form new messages. (Lotman 1978: 3) 
The thinking modes of the noetical thinking object are explicated 
in the scheme in the "Lectures" by four types of communicative 
relationships — algorithmic operations. These are the magical or 
religious reciprocal placement of the listener-speaker (II-IV), 
and the "scientific" or play ("artistic") placement of the speaker-
listener (III—V). These placements are depicted by certain formal 
characteristics of the relationship, which for Lotman proceed 
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from the motivational objectives of communication, and 
characterize the categories of communication — in contrast to 
Roman Jakobson, who in his communication scheme 
concentrates on the analysis of the components of communi­
cation37. But both authors have in common the claim to treat the 
features of communication as universally valid. Inspiration for 
this could also derive from phenomenology. 
Edmund Husserl attempted in the study of the pure ego to 
describe the "universal connections of the mental constitution" 
(universale Zusammenhängen der seelischen Konstitution) 
(Husserl 1987: 147). This meant the analysis of eidos 38 on the 
level of the ego — the analysis of the universal laws of essence 
{universale Wesengesetzlichkeiten). Husserl wrote that eidos 
comprises all possibility-variants [alle reinen Möglichkeits­
abwandlungen] of my actual ego, and the ego itself as a possibility. 
Eidetic phenomenology, therefore, studies the universal a priori, 
without which the me and the transcendental Me is not even 
"imaginable" [erdenklich]. (Husserl 1987: 73-74) 
These ideas have continuously inspired Juri Lotman. In the 
second half of the 1960s (at the same time as the "Lectures"), he 
formulates the tasks for the study of the "common system of the 
universal characteristics" of the culture of mankind — the 
"grammar of culture". Lotman expresses the attempt to analyze 
the "universal semiotic constants", which would characterize all 
cultures (culture as a whole), and further — on a less general 
level — the various types of culture (Lotman 1966; 1967a: 5-6; 
37 It is true that Roman Jakobson also thoroughly characterizes the "poetic" 
category of communication (and also the magical, but in passing), but he 
derives both of these from the linguistic form of communication, and sees the 
problems of motivation as secondary. The differences of this approach are 
demonstrated by the terminology: instead of speaker and listener, R. Jakobson 
uses the terms of addresser and addressee. The first pair of opposites primarily 
accentuates speech, and the second - language (using information theory 
terms). 
eidos (Gr.) — form, appearance. Generality, which is provided through 
contemplation, and only available through contemplation. (Husserl 1987: 73). 
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1967b: 31, 34). Lotman differentiates similar constants of 
"essence" in his aesthetics of sameness (Lotman 1994a [1964]: 
223-226)39. In linguistics, Roman Jakobson had already raised 
and also solved similar exercises, proceeding from the same 
methodological source (1985a [1938]: 102-104; 1985c [1970]: 
390-393, 414; 1985e [1972]: 312—314)40. But it should be added 
that R. Jakobson has also relied substantially on one other source. 
And these are the semiotic studies of Charles Sanders Peirce, 
which had been completed already half a century previously and 
where their most influential interpreter for a long period was 
indeed R. Jakobson. He refers to the "idea of invariantness that is 
of key importance" in the semiotics of Peirce: 
The rational need to discover an invariant concealed amongst 
numerous variables, the issue of connecting variables with relevant 
constants, which would not be influenced by any changes — this 
idea is the foundation of Peirce's entire sign theory. (Jakobson 
1996b [1977]: 167) 
Roman Jakobson (see Holenstein 1976b: 232), but later also Juri 
Lotman, have to a certain degree "rearranged" Husserl's 
accentuations: both semioticians, instead of studying the 
"absolute" transcendental invariants, concentrate on the 
description of sign-creation types (semiosis types), of their 
dynamics and constancy criteria that are revealed in speech 
reality (Jakobson in language and Lotman in culture; the latter 
often together with Boris Uspenski). The analysis of single 
elements is replaced with the analysis of the invariance of the 
communicative relationship between the elements (see Jakobson 
1968 [I960]; Lotman 1994a [1964]: 223-230; 1967c; Lotman 
and Uspenski 1971: 154-158; 1973; 1975: 173). The definition 
of magicality, religiousness and other relationships in the 
,9 See also Footnote 54. 
Elmar Holenstein indicates that Jakobson is one of those linguists for whom 
the "problem of universals has taken over the central position" (Holenstein 
1975: 75). 
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"Lectures" via the social functions of the listener and speaker 
illustrates the importance of such aspirations. 
There is another important concept that connects the semiotics 
of Juri Lotman with the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, in which 
the dual-layered nature of the me-contained reduced world is 
clearly reflected. This is the concept of the monad. The monad 
has been used by Lotman and Husserl as a phenomenologically 
reduced worldview (as text), on the one hand, but on the other 
hand the monad can also be observed as a transcendentally 
reduced mode(s) of thought (as intellect). 
The concept of the monad was borrowed by Husserl from the 
philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.41 The monad for G. W. 
Leibniz is a simple substance, entelechy42, which finds 
expression as autarky43 — as an independent targeted force, 
which is the source of activity within the monad. All changes in 
this self-centred monad are due to its "internal principle" — 
external reasons do not manage to influence the monad: it 
develops without entering into relationships with other monads — it 
lacks "windows". The ability for perception is characteristic of 
every monad, but this is directed at the monad itself. 
Monads form hierarchies. A monad that has united with a 
body creates a compound substance or live substance. The 
monad is the soul of the latter and it possesses memory. All the 
monads differ from each other and undergo internal change. 
Nevertheless, if by God's will, monads have been "correctly 
constructed", they have common characteristics. Every monad is 
the "living mirror of the world" and copies the structure of the 
entire universe. Souls act in accord with the laws of final reasons, 
aims and means that have a universal validity. When the soul 
41 
"Monad [monas] is a Greek word, which denotes a unit or that which is 
integral" (Leibniz 1982: 404). The term itself is derived from the vitalistic tract 
by Lady Conway (1692), with which Leibniz was familiar. Edmund Husserl has 
himself admitted acquiring the concept of the monad from Leibniz (Husserl 
1987: 69). 
42 entelecheia (Gr) — accomplishment. 
43 autarkeia (Gr) — being satisfied with oneself 
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rises to the level of the intellect, then the monad acquires the 
quality of the spirit. The spirit has the ability of self-cognizance 
— apperception44 (Leibniz 1982a [1718]: 404—406; 1982b 
[1721]: 414, 416, 422, 424, 427). 
Edmund Husserl calls the worldview of the ego a monad, in 
other words that noematic "item of thought" (in J. Lotman's 
terminology — the text), which the ego beholds — in itself! And, 
understandably, the worldview thereby covers the "entire real 
and potential life of the consciousness" — therefore, also the 
aims and means of the ego, with which, and in the name of 
which, the (textual) worldview is constructed and/or interpreted, 
therefore, also pure ego — the constructive beginning of memory 
(Husserl 1987: 69-70). 
The act of interpreting the world is also the autocommu-
nicative self-interpreting process of the ego. E. Husserl postulates 
that self-interpretation is 
created, firstly as self-interpretation [Selbstauslegung] in the direct 
sense, which demonstrates systematically how the ego constitutes 
itself as possessing a self-essence [Eigenwesen], an ego, existing in 
itself and for itself, and, secondly, as self-interpretation in the 
broader sense, which further demonstrates how the ego, due to its 
own nature, constitutes in itself something "other", "objective" and 
consequently generally everything that ever has for him, in the Ego, 
existential status as non-Ego. (Husserl 1987: 88) 
Lotman starts to explicitly use the 'monad' concept himself only 
in the 1980s. It receives a developed form in the concept of the 
semiosphere as an interactive world of monads (see Lotman 
1984, 1993b; cf the parallels of Husserl 1987: 109-11045) Juri 
Lotman's concept of monads had probably also been influenced 
14 cid (to) + perceptio (perception) — apperception (< Lat). G. W. Leibniz's 
term regarding how the spirit perceives its internal states. 
Elsewhere, Edmund Husserl writes: "The first being in itself [an sich erste 
Sein\, which forestalls any kind of objectivity in the world, and indeed on which 
this objectivity stands, is transcendental intersubjectivity, the world of monads 
that unite into various forms" (Husserl 1987: 160; see also 109-111). 
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by the works of Pavel Florenski, of which Lotman undoubtedly 
was aware. It is particularly pertinent to refer to the extensive 
analysis by Florenski of the magi cal ity of the word, where the 
concept of "targeted", resp. "creative force", is discussed. In 
connecting magicality with the influence effect of the word, 
Florenski claims that on the one hand the word is closed with "no 
exit" (cf Leibniz's window metaphor of the monad!) becoming a 
"powerless and unreal subjectivity"; but on the other hand, the 
word is a "signal", a certain "energy". As soon as the word enters 
a "living speech stream", it "comes to life" and is filled with 
internal strength and meaning46 (Florenski 1999 [1920?]: 231, 
233, 239). The claim by Florenski that a work of art is 
simultaneously both ergon (text) as well as energeia (language 
resp. creative intellectual force) (cf Lotman, M. 1994: 596) 
directly reflects the phenomenological ideas of Husserl. Juri 
Lotman also treated the relationship between "creative force" and 
"final product" analogously — in the spirit of constant 
dynamicity (the mutual and hierarchical exchanging of the roles 
of ergon and energeia) and dialogicality. When Mikhail Lotman 
writes that for Juri Lotman "energeia is primarily a characteristic 
of text and not of language" (Lotman, M. 1994: 596), then M. 
Lotman, it seems to me, surely does not wish to claim with this 
sentence that language resp. code in the semiotics of J. Lotman 
cannot fulfil the energeia function, or fulfils it always in a 
"secondary" manner. 
The concept of 'monad' is already implicitly concealed in the 
scheme in Juri Lotman's "Lectures". The relationship between 
magicality and religiosity has been inspired by the "targeted 
force" that is accorded to the speaker, and the opposing 
placement of listener and speaker can be reduced to an 
autocommunicative worldview of me. The "construction" of the 
46 It could be mentioned in passing that, in accordance with structuralism and of 
course the semiotics of Juri Lotman, Florenski also proceeds from the 
communicativeness of the word: a word has a "dual [двухсторонняя] direction: 
firstly, away from the speaker [—] and secondly, from the outside world to the 
speaker, into him as the perception of the speaker" (Florenski 1999: 230). 
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worldview or the intellectual algorithm is, in one case 
'magicality', and in the other case 'religiosity' — if these 
concepts are interpreted as semiosic analogues of 'signification' 
(знаковость) in the spirit of Aleksandr Pyatigorski. In both 
cases the listener (= me) is the autocommunicative partner of the 
imagined "unknown force", or God. In either case the speakers 
are "targeted forces" that determine the mutual semiotic 
placement of the actants — "the thought-generating structures" 
(смыслопорождающие структуры) (cf Lotman 1993b: 369) . 
Juri Lotman's discussion about the meaning and extent of 
autocommunication in culture also seems to have grown directly 
from the spirit of the monadology of Leibniz and the epoche of 
Husserl. Autocommunication, as he claims, depends on the 
character of the definition of the actants. If the addresser is a 
single individual A, then the number of his relationships with 
another single individual or individuals, the addressee B, is on 
average greater than the number of the individual's 
autocommunication A A\. Therefore, A *-> В > A <-> Aj. But 
if, for example, a collective national culture (C) is placed in the 
role of addresser, then its number of relationships with another 
national culture (D) or cultures is apparently approximately equal 
to the number of culture-internal autocommunicative us-
relationships: С *-+ D = С C ] t  However, in imagining mankind 
as a whole E as the addresser, J. Lotman came to an unexpected, 
but inevitable, conclusion: the role of the other (them) F that is 
located outside us disappears; all communication (while 
extraterrestial civilizations have not been discovered) in this case 
7 As to whether the religious or magical relationship of the listener is autocom­
municative is understandably dependent on the signifying character of the 
semiosis. If the targeted force representing the speaker can be perceived 
through the senses, then this is naturally a "usual" act of communication; if it 
appear in the imagination of the listener, then it can be said that the listener is 
communicating with his memory, so the relationship becomes autocommu­
nication. Therefore, for Juri Lotman the me can be both the speaker as well as 
the listener — within the boundaries of the same monad, at the same time. 
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is reduced without exception to autocommunication — E E! 
(Lotman 1970d: 15). 
Understandably such autocommunicative relationships in the 
transcendental me and us vividly illustrate the deviation from 
Kantian dualism by Edmund Husserl, also followed by Juri 
Lotman and Roman Jakobson. Edmund Husserl has worded his 
"breakthrough" into the transcendental world with memorable 
expressiveness: 
Every conceivable thought, every conceivable being, be it called 
immanent or transcendental, falls into the sphere of transcendental 
subjectivity, in which the thought and being are constituted. It is 
pointless to strive towards a universe of true being [wahren Seins] 
as something that is located outside the universe of possible 
consciousness, possible understanding [Erkenntnis], possible self-
evidence [Evidenz], and unite these two universes with each other 
but only externally, via strict laws. Both of them are interconnected 
as regards their essence [wesenmäßig], and that which is 
interconnected as regards its essence that is also concretely one 
[konkret eins], one in the absolute concreteness (Konkretion) of 
transcendental subjectivity. [—] For this reason the genuine theory 
of cognition is substantial only as a transcendental-phenome-
nological theory, which instead of operating with inconsistent 
inferences about some so-called fundamentally non-cognizable 
"things in themselves" [Dinge an sich], ranging from their apparent 
immanence to apparent transcendentality, deals solely with the 
systematic clarification [Aufklärung] of the knowledge performance, 
in which this must become thoroughly comprehensible as an 
intentional performance. (Husserl 1987: 86-87) 
Juri Lotman provided a meaningful title to his relevant article: 
"Culture as the subject, and as the object of itself' (Lotman 
1993b [1989]). 
4.3.4.2.2. Universality and uniqueness of the reproductive 
communication of the intellect (using magicality as an example). 
All the characteristics of intellect as known in the works of Juri 
Lotman are either directly or indirectly communicative. The 
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relationships between listener-speaker/'speaker-listener in the 
scheme in the "Lectures" are also communicative. Autocom­
munication is one type of communication, and, as was seen in the 
previous section, it is directly connected to the magical and 
religious semiotic placement of the listener-speaker. Therefore, 
it is expected that on the one hand we find out which general 
formal characteristics can be seen as the root of the specifics of 
magical communication, and, on the other hand, ascertain the 
formal criteria based on which Lotman differentiates 
autocommunicative (me-me) relationships from inter-subjective 
communication that are both characteristic of the intellect. 
The posed questions presume some introductory restrictions 
and/or details, and these now follow. 
Since Lotman has not analyzed in detail the formal 
characteristics of magical semiosis in the "Lectures", all that 
follows must be seen as a reconstruction. Furthermore, this 
reconstruction is forward-looking, because the works on which 
the argumentation can be based have mostly been written after 
the "Lectures". It must also be admitted that the area of modes of 
thought, towards the semiotic analysis of which Lotman has 
always shown interest, was not developed by him into a complete 
concept, and also remained theoretically fragmented. In addition 
to the extensive analyses of the mythological, poetic and 
antithetic operations of the intellect (Lotman 1967c, 1970d; 
Lotman and Uspenski 1973, 1971, etc) there were no other 
monographic analyses of algorithms of the intellect.48 
Communication acts — which, considering the aforementi­
oned could also be treated as intellectual acts — are divided by 
Juri Lotman into two basic classes. One class includes those in 
the process of which new information is created (new texts). 
Lotman has postulated that every truly new text is born due to 
'
k In the article that was published in the same year as the "Lectures" on the 
isomorphism of the reduced structures of play and art, there is a description of 
the ambivalence of practical but also intellectual behaviour as an algorithm with 
which the simultaneous "flickering together" of at least two meanings is 
generated (Lotman 1967c: 132-133). 
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"faulty" communication — a new text can be created in contact 
with semiotically foreign cultural languages. The text created in 
such a collision is unpredictable since it is the result of an 
inadequate translation: the listener just does not have the code 
(rules) for carrying out the translation. Great inventions, 
however, adds Lotman, have indeed mostly been born according 
to just this kind of logic. This is why Lotman has called "new" 
texts (potentially) "purposefully faulty" (1977a: 6-8, 13, 16; 
1978: 3-6; 1992a [1990]: 26-27). 
Juri Lotman classifies, as the second class of intellectual 
operations, those communicative acts whose sole or unique 
function and/or output is reproduction (see 1977a: 4, 10, 14-15, 
18; 1978: 3-6; 1992a: 25-26). The addresser and addressee of 
the text share to a great degree one and the same language in the 
coding and decoding of the message.49 This class of operations 
logically, and perhaps also historically, belongs to the primary 
class of operations (just consider, for example, natural language 
(mother tongue) as an instrument of communication!). (The 
creation of new information in every communicative situation 
(and communication on every level) cannot be presumed or even 
be possible.) 
And it is particularly on this second class of operations that 
the following analysis is concentrated. 
Juri Lotman's scheme of (auto)communicative relationships 
in his "Lectures" is undoubtedly a description of acts of 
reproducive communication: a religious, magical, artistic or play 
relationship with the other or with oneself is not conceivable 
without sharing a common mode of thought50. 
4) The complete adequacy of information exchange is naturally an illusion. 
Reproducing and innovative communication are actually in a complex and 
intertwined mutual relationship. Reproducing does not necessarily mean total 
and mechanical copying. Reproducing communication can also be a 
communication that merely mediates a (automated) common code, or a 
common code which conceals a content that is in conflict with it. 
Let us illustrate this with an example that Juri Lotman himself brings from L. 
I olstoy's "Childhood". The narrator complains that he can't play with his 
friend because the latter refuses to accept the rules of the game: "I know too 
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The magical act is a vivid and extreme example of 
reproducive communication (essentially autocommunication, in 
Juri Lotman's "Lectures"), since here the linguistic "privacy" of 
the listener and speaker, and the inadequate decoding of the 
message, is excluded. Otherwise, the fatalness of the magical 
act's "targeted force" would be unimaginable, and there could be 
no question of magical communication. In general, magic is a 
motivationally and grammatically imperative (directly or 
indirectly) act, and as regards time and space, a single and final 
(beyond truth or untruth) act.51 This act presumes that the 
addressee (real or imaginary) is forced in the decoding of the 
message to use, word for word (resp. use automatically) the code 
offered by the addresser.52 Juri Lotman does not actually speak of 
imperativeness directly, but he too emphasizes the "trust" of the 
listener towards the speaker, i.e. putting himself on the same 
"wave length" as the speaker (Lotman 1973b: 229). The 
imperativeness of magic is directly emphasized by Lotman's 
close colleague Boris Uspenski and also by Edmund Leach 
(Leach 1991 [1971]: 30). Uspenski (similarly to Leach) has 
compared the magic effect to the involuntary reflex that follows a 
hammer tap to the knee.53 Therefore, the autocommunicative 
magical act for Lotman is a priori reproductive: the listener 
that you can't get a bang out of a stick, let alone shoot birds with it. It's just a 
game. If we think like that then there's no way we can play at all" (Lotman 
1967c: 134). 
According to the rules of logic, a sentence in the imperative cannot be 
questioned as to whether what has been said is true or untrue. 
" It is inconceivable that, for example, in the magic formula "Varesele valu, 
harakale haigust (pain to the crow, illness to the magpie) [---] — meie (our) 
Mari saab terveks (will get well)!" the words "varesele" and "harakale" could 
be interchanged, or arbitrarily replaced by the words "varblasele (sparrow)" and 
"hanele (goose)", although here even assonance would be preserved. Although 
there can be variations to the formulae these too are fixed in irrefutable 
tradition, indisputable unanimity, memory cliches. And the latter can even have 
sacral force. 
' 
rhis standpoint was expressed by Boris Uspenski in a conversation with the 
author of this monograph in Tallinn on 10.09.2002. 
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reacts to something that he knows in advance (Lotman 1973b: 
228). 
Now we could ask (seeking theoretical arguments that justify 
the scheme in the "Lectures"), in addition to the aforementioned, 
whether Juri Lotman has analyzed in reproducing communi­
cation such characteristics or elements which could characterize 
in more detail intellectual algorithms, including primarily the 
location of actants in magical communication? An answer to 
this question was touched upon by Lotman in his article on 
"primariness" and "secondariness" in modelling communication 
systems.34 
Juri Lotman has postulated that in the communication period 
prior to mankind's verbal language there probably was an 
unusual system of exchanging equivalent meanings: certain 
"spontaneous", "non-organized" signals could be exchanged, 
which could have been symptoms of some psycho-physiological 
situations. Such means of expression carried in communication 
the function of an elemental code. Or to be more precise, it was 
merely a common mechanism of communicating that could not 
yet mediate information, because only such a message can be 
informative that does not repeat that which the addressee already 
knows. Lotman concludes from this that 
from the very beginning there have been two semiotic situations: in 
the first there is originally a communication mechanism, but there is 
basically no communication content; in the second there is 
originally content, but the communication mechanism [i.e. a 
common understanding ensured by algorithms — P. L.] is basically 
missing. Actual speech [ ] should apparently be considered to be 
a compromise between these systems, and an oscillation. [—] Later 
on, something that is individual in a communication system, and 
something that is general, can develop from these two systems. 
(Lotman 1974: 224-225) 
54 The term modelling expresses the iconicity of signified analogues of certain 
objects in the semiotic context. A model is an analogue that expresses 
similarity. 
4. The uniqueness and universality of magic in culture 139 
The spice in the previous discussion is the added by Lotman fact 
that ethnographic and archaeological studies have discovered not 
one social group where in addition to the natural language there 
has not already existed "secondary" ones as well — "religious, 
aesthetic and other" modelling systems. Implementing the logic 
of Lotman, it should thus be possible to conclude (resp. presume) 
that magical, religious or artistic communication — each one of 
them must have had "from the beginning" its own specific 
elemental "communication mechanism", all of which can be 
treated as "original" invariant algorithms of the intellect. 
Therefore, a magical algorithm, as an autocommunicative 
mechanism, can be treated as a monad that has a memory, and 
where the listener-speaker relationship is regulated by a definite 
text-regulating internal principle. 
It must be admitted that a magical monad with such 
characteristics is also related to another "monadological" concept 
of Lotman's — i.e. code text. According to his determination, 
code text [текст-код] is a "syntagmatically organized whole", 
where the code competes with, or even dominates, to the 
detriment of semantic content — of "textuality". Code text is the 
"ideal example" of the construction principles of a certain text 
type, but it is in the form of text. Lotman categorizes, for 
example, magic tales (волшебная сказка) and detective novels 
as texts with this kind of rigid structure that in real 
communication tend to asemanticism (Lotman 1981b: 6). True, 
in the case of a magical act, it would be better to use, instead of 
'code text', the term 'code scheme' or 'code signal' since in the 
case of a magical formula it is a matter of very brief, one-time act 
directed to a certain addressee, a text which in some cases may 
have completely lost its original content53. For example, in the 
expressive Russian phraseology — in the so-called Russian 
"mat", the Russian "triples" (as code signals) have long since lost 
55 A certain code text may contain many various code schemes {resp. code 
signals) — e.g. a magic tale. This is why the concept of code text should be 
differentiated from code signal. 
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their archaic magical meaning and function, (see Uspenski 
1994a: 56-84). Also, a contemporary native Russian does not as 
a rule interpret these formulae word for word, i.e. according to 
the dictionary.'6 This cursing can result in an effect that 
astonishes strangers: the play effect of the imperative subjugation 
of a partner = strange "fraternization", which is nothing less than 
the intuitive sharing of the common metaphorized magical code. 
The example of Russian expressive phraseology also confirms 
the fact that in changing the semantics of a text, the syntagmatic 
mechanism that connects the actants may be preserved as an 
intellect-based algorithm. It has a high level of modelling 
ability.' 
Of course, there remains the fundamental question: which 
formal mechanisms in the code text with a high level of 
modelling ability are intellect-based (noetic) and which 
mechanisms are text-based (noematic)? Lotman did not presume 
to begin to resolve this issue. 
As indicated earlier, in his "LecturesLotman treats magical 
communication as autocommunication: the listener communica­
tes in his imagination with the imaginary speaker, and his 
placement as regards that speaker expresses trust. This is why it 
is interesting to ask, whether and how these characteristics find 
expression in the magical intellectual mechanism — i.e. on a 
noetical level. 
The characteristics of autocommunication have been analyzed 
by Juri Lotman in two monographic articles (Lotman 1970c; 
1973b). There Lotman restricts himself to the analysis of the 
functional categories of autocommunication. He analyzes 
mnemonic (that which is saved in memory) and inventive 
autocommunication. In the case of the latter communication 
category, the me enters into the communication channel the 
additional code for the transformation of the information already 
6 In certain circles in Russia, the "expressive phraseology" may, as is known, 
form in certain situations an amazingly large share of interaction. 
The high modelling ability of poetiy is also associated by Juri Lotman with 
the transformation of text into code (Lotman 1973b: 241). 
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known to him, or for raising its status (Lotman 1973b: 228-
229). 
An additional code, therefore, can be used to change a 
message, which is in the memory of the me. And an additional 
code itself is also obtainable from the memory. This fact is 
fundamentally important in the analysis of magical 
(auto)communication, but this is mentioned nowhere in the 
discussions by J. Lotman on magic. Yet it is clear that in magical 
acts, the formula circulates in a ritualized, even sacralized, form, 
and that these are accorded irrevocable power. 
The intellect-based structure of a magical act as a code signal 
can indeed be described on the basis of these characteristics. The 
ritualization and sacralization of communication can be 
considered additional code because semiotically both include 
indexical factors: at the moment of (auto)communication, a 
targeted force is unleashed as an impulse via the cultural 
memory. 
The examination of the other formal characteristics of 
autocommunication in Juri Lotman's articles is identical, in the 
vital aspects, with the analysis of the asemantic communication 
mechanism of the intellect (looked at earlier). Here too Lotman 
draws attention to the syntagmatic nature of autocommunicative 
text. He draws parallels with the phenomenon of internal 
language [внутренняя речь] formulated by Lev Vygotski 
(Lotman 1973b: 232-233). Internal language, as he indicates, is 
according to the studies by Vygotski a mute, silent language, 
which is characterized by the lack of vocalization. Lotman claims 
that the main difference between the autocommunicative me-me 
system and the inter-subjective me-him system is indeed the fact 
that in the first case the words tend to become signs of words, 
and indices of signs — to be reduced to certain formal ways of 
connection. The autocommunicativity of the magical and 
religious he-me relationship emphasizes the indexical 
syntagmaticity of the speaker and listener relationship. 
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4.4. In conclusion on the analysis of magic in the "Lectures" 
To summarize the above analysis the following should be 
emphasized. 
• It is apparent from the 1967 "Lectures" that Juri Lotman 
had shaken himself loose from the tradition of 
interpreting magic where magic was reduced to an 
element of ethnographic, psychological, sociological or 
linguistic paradigm58. Lotman has interpreted magic as a 
cultural-semiotic phenomenon. 
• The cultural-semiotic viewpoint is for him purposely 
systematic. In the contekst of structuralism, magic is an 
autocommunicative function between the listener and the 
speaker, which can be observed from the position of me 
= listener and in a series of other communicative 
functions between listener-speaker or speaker-listener. 
• The magical function in the communication scheme in 
Lotman's "Lectures" can be treated as a type of 
designating relatedness, but it also has a phenomeno-
logical characteristic of relatedness — 'magicality'. 
Magicality as a characteristic of relatedness (according to 
Edmund Husserl's terminology). Via a 'worldview' it 
can be made explicit in a signified manner in a text 
between listener-speaker. The motivational (intentional) 
placement between listener-speaker (according to 
Husserl's terminology — mode of thought of the pure 
ego) also finds an outlet in this. Similarly to the specifics 
of mythological thought, in which case the 
"identification of isomorphic elements takes place on the 
level of the objects themselves, not of the names" 
(Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 302), Lotman also treats 
?8 The universal metaphorie structure, and mutual kinship, of play and artistic 
semiosis also cannot possibly be satisfactorily explained via traditional 
inductive analytical models of evolutional or social experience. 
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the magical act "ontologically": according to him, 
neither magical nor mythological semiosis are merely 
methodical acts of semiotic description — they are also 
intellect-based algorithms. 
• Magicality as an algorithm seems to belong, according to 
Lotman's analysis, amongst those intellectual 
"mechanisms", which have a characteristic that is a 
priori pre-verbal and sovereign as regards the language. 
• Although Juri Lotman set full objectives in the mid 
1960s for the study of cultural universals, his relevant 
attempts (including in the area of magic) still remained 
episodic and superficial, even incidental (except for 
everything that refers to the multiple-meaning of the play 
and artistic behaviour of the intellect, or the 
mythologicality that was analyzed by Juri Lotman 
together with Boris Uspenski). But this does not reduce 
the heuristic value of these attempts. The improvising 
scheme of the "Lectures" also turned out to be a rather 
important point of departure (preliminary sketch) for 
many central concepts in Lotman's semiotics that were 
later further developed (for example, 'intellect', 'auto-
communication', 'algorithm', 'monad', isomorphism of 
intellect, text and culture). 
• The main deficiencies in the interpretation of magic by 
Juri Lotman could be the following. 
1) Lotman has two interpretations of magic, which are 
substantially mutually contradictory, but their author has not 
commented on this fact, therefore it remained unresolved. 
2) The content criteria of magicality (magical semiosis) have 
been indistinctly formulated in the 1967 scheme as opposed to 
the 1981 article, (which can hardly be considered the fault of the 
note-taking of the lecture). Lotman does associate the magical 
communication with the phenomenon of "influence", but the 
"rules" of the influence are not clarified in the text of the 
"Lectures" (be the influencer either the speaker or listener) nor 
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the difference between magical influence and religious influence. 
All this remains incomplete and vague. Lotman also does not 
analyze the entire problem of the level of expression of magical 
semiosis. 
3) The question is not posed in the "Lectures" as to why, and 
with which contextual or meta-linguistic additional criteria 
should the communicative relationship be in accordance, in order 
for the "inexplicable" act to acquire a magical function, where 
the listener does not know the "rules" under which it is to take 
place. 
4) Essential questions remain unanswered in "Lectures": why the 
described system of algorithms is formed by those communica­
tive functions in particular; are there more functions? 
5) The a priori status of magical or religious semiosis in the 
"Lectures" would have presumed relevant justifications. 
Unfortunately they are missing from the notes of the "Lectures", 
and they did not come later either. 
6) Hopefully, it has also become clear here that relinquishing his 
initial magic-idea was premature. 
The further interests of J. Lotman split into two basic 
directions. On the one hand, from the universal algorithmized 
constants to the dynamic processes created in the collision of 
various languages — the study of the so-called "purposeful 
defectiveness". On the other hand, Lotman moved from this 
communicative act, viewed in isolation "as an original element of 
semiotics", to text and semiosphere as stating the primariness of 
dynamic wholes. In the study of magic this was manifested as 
"descending" from the level of the intellect — the a priori and 
universal pure ego — to the level of text (Lotman 1993a [1981]: 
345, 347-348). The conditions of the magical "contract", as we 
have seen, already began to be determined here solely by social 
conventionalities, not the formal structure of the intellect. 
5 
UNIVERSAL FORMS OF THE REPRODUCTIVITY OF 
INTELLECT 
5.1. Terminological classification of reproductivity 
The analysis of the forms of reproductivity proceeds from the 
tradition of the culture-typological analysis of the Juri Lotman 
and Tartu-Moscow semiotic school, and attempts to reconstruct, 
and also to augment the ideas sketched, but not fully developed, 
by Lotman in his "Lectures" on the system of semiotic 
algorithms of the intellect. 
Many concepts that Lotman used implicitly in his "Lectures" 
did not receive an explicit form until much later. This pertains 
primarily to the concept of the intellect. Let us look again at the 
three universal basic operations of the intellect, which are the 
ability: 
firstly, to collect and mediate information (the intellect possesses 
communicative and memory mechanisms). It has language skills 
and is able to form correct sentences; secondly, to carry out 
algorithmic operations for the regular transformation of these 
messages; thirdly, to form new messages. (Lotman 1978: 3) 
The term 'algorithm' was introduced by Juri Lotman into his 
discussions eleven years after 1967. The determination of 
intellect permits the derivation of a definition, according to 
which algorithms are semiotic constants that regulate the 
reproductive processes of the intellect — the constitutive, 
analytical and generative signifying operations of the intellect.1 
1 At such a level, the algorithms of the intellect must be differentiated from the 
linguistic algorithms that the intellect commands: indeed, natural language, as a 
whole, can be treated as a hierarchy of "massive" algorithms (as a system), 
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The a priori vertical isomorphism of the intellect, text and 
culture is treated below as a constitutive reproductivity. The 
nature of the signified mnemonics of (auto)communication is 
differentiated as the analyticality of reproduction. The semiotics 
of the text-construction of the addressor is seen as the 
generativeness of reproduction.2 
It needs to be remembered that the term 'signification' 
(знаковостъ) for the Tartu-Moscow semiotics school means the 
capacity of some (also abstract) thing to be a sign. As we know, 
signification can be described via three basic characteristics, 
which are the duality (двоичностъ), positionality and projectio-
nality of the sign. Duality means that the sign substitutes for 
something else, or indicates something else; positionality 
expresses the space characteristics of the thing as a sign and the 
possibility of any change to the locus of the sign, and 
projectionality characterizes the capacity of a designated thing to 
precede in time the situation in which it is being used and/or be 
projected into a future situation or situations (Pyatigorski 1973: 
188-189). 
The classification of semiotic reproduction is conditional in 
the sense that the classes of the various algorithmized signifying 
operations are not mutually exclusive, but partially overlap. For 
example, it should not be forgotten that any communicative act 
whatsoever cannot be imagined without mnemonic and 
generative operations. 
The system of algorithms that Lotman offered in the 
"Lectures" was made intriguing and heuristically weighty by the 
fact that the Tartu professor treated algorithms as intellect-based 
whose complex paradigmatic and syntagmatic constants altogether can be 
sourced back to elementary rules, which are reproduced by those with a 
command of the language, but which lack the motivational quality that is 
external to natural language. 
2 In compiling this classification, we have been inspired by the work of 
Aleksandr Pyatigorski and Boris Uspenski, in which the "analytical model" and 
"generative model" of "signifying behaviour" (and communication is 
undoubtedly this) is constructed (Pyatigorski and Uspenski 1967: 11). 
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universals, which are realized in the magical, religious, artistic 
and even "scientific" act of communication between the speaker-
listener or listener-speaker. 
In the course of the following discussion, the author will 
attempt to justify and defend the hypothesis, whereby the 
intellect-based communicative algorithms that are mediated via 
historical memory are a reproductive system. The thesis is also 
defended as to why this system contains, in addition to the named 
algorithms, also a mythological and antithetic communicative 
algorithm (some of these have been analyzed above in more 
detail). The following analysis permits all these to be treated as 
code signals, which a priori have a ritualizing (and sacralizing) 
function. 
5.2. Constituitive reproductivity 
All these cultural (intellectual) phenomena, the common 
foundation of algorithms and the issue of systematicness (not to 
mention the methodological background of this system), as well 
as the conditions which produce all such communication clichés 
— all this has not been systematically analyzed (or to be more 
precise: it has not been the primary objective of the semioticians 
in Tartu-Moscow school); nevertheless, in the scientific heritage 
of the Tartu-Moscow semiotic school (also that of Lotman), we 
can point out numerous heuristically weighty ideas as "starting 
points" for setting the direction for such issues (some will be 
covered below). 
It is indeed unexpected that Lotman did not consider or comment (neither in 
the "Lectures" nor in his later works) this obvious fact that magic and science 
are related concepts as regards their development history (this was noted 
already by Edward B. Tylor and James G. Frazer), and they are also isomorphic 
as regards their semiotic structure. It is indeed for this latter reason that the 
examination of the scientific function of communication has been left out of 
this analysis. 
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5.2.1. Phenomenon of vertical isomorphism 
One of the central methodological postulates of Juri Lotman's 
culture-semiotic system is the thesis of the so-called "vertical 
isomorphism" of the signifying structures of intellect, text and 
culture" (Lotman 1984: 14).4 The analysis of this topic is a 
common thread in Lotman's creative works from its beginning to 
its end (Lotman 1970a: 8-11; 1977a: 9-11, 13, 14; 1978: 16; 
1984: 16; 1992a [1990]: 27-30; 1993b [1989]: 369). He also 
looks at isomorphism occurring in the mutual transformation of 
these phenomena (Lotman 1977b: 55-58; 1981c: 5-7; 1992a: 
26), as well as in communicative (and in the same way in 
autocommunicative) operations, which are used to define the 
mutual isomorphic semiotic characteristics of intellect, text, as 
well as culture. This isomorphism proceeds from the four 
matching basic characteristics of three phenomena, which are 
their semiotic heterogeneity, the self-reproduction of meanings, 
as well as memory and the existence of a selection block 
(Lotman 1992 [1990]: 28-29).5 
Intellectual operations can generally be divided into two 
opposing basic groups according to the nature of the 
(auto)communication taking place between, or in, these 
phenomena. On the one hand, the intellect(s), text(s) and 
culture(s) — all these three! — that have been placed (have 
positioned themselves) into the (auto)communication chain 
4 Some explanations: 'verticality' is a metaphoric term; the 'container' 
metaphor could have been used just as easily — and Mark Johnson and George 
Lakoff have indeed implemented this in the classification of the metaphoricality 
of verbal image schemata (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 29-31; Johnson 1987: 
126): intellect and text are culturally "internal" phenomena. That which 
Lotman calls 'verticality' could be perhaps expressed more precisely as 
pyramidality, where culture is the 'base' and intellect is the 'apex'. 
5 (Auto)communicativity is characteristic to the intellect, text as well as culture, 
and it possesses both a "horizontal" and a "vertical" signified function — that 
guarantees the mutual reproductivity of all three. Lotman has described this in 
numerous studies (Lotman 1970c: 163-164; 1973b; 1977a: 13-15; 1977b: 55. 
57-58; 1981b: 5-7; 1992a: 32). 
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produce innovative messages, i.e. "new" information. This new 
information is received when the addressee, who could also be 
the addressor itself, does not use (does not reproduce), in 
deciphering this message, the language (algorithms) that was 
used to code the message mediated by the addressor. On the 
other hand, every intellect, text and culture does hold memory 
mechanisms (it remembers), and commands languages in order 
to preserve in (auto)communication the adequacy (structural 
characteristics) of the message and to carry out possible 
transformation operations on the message on the basis of the 
conventional repertoire of the algorithms saved in the (cultural) 
memory, which are reproduced by both the addressee and the 
addressor (Lotman 1978: 3-6; 1992a: 25-26). 
Therefore, on the one hand, the constitutive and 
communicative processes of intellect, text and culture have a 
dynamic and unpredictable, even "revolutionary" role, which 
produces "expedient faultiness" and "explosions" (Lotman 1978: 
5; 1992c: 17). On the other hand, the functioning of intellect, text 
and culture is conservative, and can be reduced to the common 
part of the collective memory, and is oriented to preservation.6 In 
real (auto)communication these two halves of intellectual 
operations understandably complement each other and merge in 
complex hierarchical associations (Lotman 1977a, 1978, 1970c, 
1973b). 
It is important to note that during the various periods of 
Lotman's semiotic work both of these intellect-based 
(auto)communication functions and operations are accented to a 
varying degree and in varying keys. In the second half of the 
1960s, as we know, Lotman's interest is concentrated on the 
reproductive processes of (auto)communication, which is 
primarily expressed in the attempt to determine the "universals of 
human culture" and the basic types of cultural codes to be used 
It is indeed in such a context that Juri Lotman (together with Aleksandr 
Pyatigorski) also treats culture as a whole as One Text, which has all the 
characteristics of a designating explicit text (Lotman and Pyatigorski 1968: 80). 
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for the description of these languages (Lotman 1966: 83; 1967b: 
31). By the second half of the 1970s, however, the innovative 
features and unpredictability of the (auto)communication 
processes had moved to the fore. The variability and dynamicity, 
which is characteristic of the person (resp. intellect), becomes the 
focus of debate (Lotman 1978: 13-14). In accordance with this, 
the understanding begins to dominate in Lotman's work that the 
addressee does not decipher the message with the aid of a code 
provided as a "package", but selects "freely" the language 
necessary for understanding. This freedom is of course supported 
by the abundance of the contextual conditions of the text and of 
the situational conditions of the communication, but also by the 
natural multilinguisticity of the text itself. From this proceeds the 
presumption of the unpredictability of (auto)communication as a 
translation process for a text. The text, in an inter-text or intra-
text communication, is thus accorded the role of a generative 
factor, and the text becomes primary as regards the language. In 
a radical formation, this meant to Lotman that "language is not 
possible before text and outside text", as was summarized by 
Mikhail Lotman in his relevant analysis (Lotman, M. 1994: 595). 
However, it should be noted that this standpoint of Juri 
Lotman should not be taken as absolute. The important thesis 
noted by Mikhail Lotman does indeed bring forth the originality 
of Juri Lotman's text semiotics (as Mikhail Lotman rightly 
emphasizes), but according to the characteristics of the intellect 
described by Juri Lotman, the innovativeness of communication 
must always be in a certain balance (in a complementary 
contrast) with the conservative, or conserving and reproductive 
(incl. cyclic) mechanisms of communication: real processes are 
"multi-planed and polyfunctional" (see, for example, Lotman 
7 The interest in uni versais held by the Tartu-Moscow semioticians is also 
marked by the works of Lotman's closest colleague Boris Uspenski in the area 
of the typologization and classification of language universals (Uspenski 1965; 
1970: 5-30) and the studies by Vyatsheslav Ivanov and Vladimir Toporov 
(Ivanov 1967: 37-39; 1968a: 276-287; 1968b: 10-12; Ivanov and Toporov 
1974: 259-305). 
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1992b: 8, 21-22). Otherwise, culture and dialogue would 
collapse into an "effectively faulty" myriad of original and 
isolated monologues: "... setting language and speech [resp. text 
— P. L.] as opposites is absolute only in the conditional 
processing of description. In reality, however, they constantly 
exchange places with each other" (Lotman 1992b: 22). 
The intellect is a phenomenologically reduced subjectivity, 
and is a wider concept than the psychological subjectivity of an 
individual (and of course also wider than language). According 
to the inverse relationship between language (code) and speech 
(text), both text and culture may also fulfil the mnemonic and 
generative role of the intellect. In producing vertical isomor­
phism, they may change places, and the intellect can be treated 
sometimes as the text of the speaker, then as the text of the 
listener (Lotman 1977a; 1978). Text and culture reproduce a 
priori the structural characteristics of the intellect. And vice 
versa! (see Lotman 1977b: 55-58; 1981c: 5-7). 
Understandably, the algorithms that will be the topic of this 
analysis also submit to the logic of vertical reproduction. 
5.2.2. Phenomenological criticism of Aleksandr Pyatigorski's 
viewpoint 
The phenomenon of reproductive isomorphism, according to 
which text, culture and intellect can "behave" as "thinking" and 
mutually isomorphic phenomena, the functions of which in the 
communication chain are mutually exchangeable — this 
standpoint has resulted in interpretational misunderstandings. 
Aleksandr Pyatigorski's critique post factum regarding his and 
Juri Lotman's semiotics can undoubtedly be considered a marked 
manifestation of such misunderstandings (Pyatigorski 1994: 324-
329).8 
h Aleksandr Pyatigorski can undoubtedly be considered one of the main figures 
in the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics. His critique was published in the 
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Pyatigorski accuses the joint concept at the time of: 
1) "ontologizing" the research method ("for example, the method 
of binary oppositions changed from being a workable method of 
description to almost the object being described as a law of 
nature"); 
2) "naturalizing" the research object. The ontologizing of the 
research method "was to take us unerringly" to a situation where 
"it became possible to speak of, for example, not only how I 
understand culture [—], but also of how a specific culture 
understands others or itself [—], where Lotman's idea of the 
semiosphere formed an utmost manifestation of this (already in 
the 1980s)"; 
3) declaring signification, as a characteristic of things, as being 
"almost philosophy", which then "definitely is no longer 
semiotics" (Pyatigorski 1994: 325-327; 1973: 187- 188). 
In this author's opinion, this criticism is superficial in the 
interpretation of the writings of Juri Lotman on semiotics. It 
seems as though the change in Pyatigorski's viewpoints had been 
influenced by the fact that he had in the interim moved to another 
philosophical space: perhaps his statements could be interpreted 
as a kind of (belated) goodbye signal to the traditions of 
continental philosophy, which had very substantially formed the 
views of the Tartu-Moscow school's semioticians, and his own 
views at the time. 
The topics that Pyatigorski covered in his critical analysis of 
(himself) and Lotman are important topics, both on the semiotic 
and the philosophic plane. They concern the constructive basic 
fundamentals of Lotman's method. That is why these comments 
deserve a separate examination of the original sources, from 
which the vertical reproductive analysis of the intellect - text -
culture system has been to a great extent derived in the semiotics 
of Juri Lotman. 
collection dedicated to Juri Lotman soon after the death of the Tartu professor. 
The author of the critique emigrated to the United Kingdom already in 1974. 
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5.2.2.1. "Ontologization" of the research method. 
Juri Lotman and the Tartu-Moscow sign school as a whole have 
definitely been methodologically influenced in the interpretation 
of reproductive processes by new-Kantianism, and particularly 
by Husserlian phenomenology. Mikhail Lotman has written that 
Juri Lotman was a Kantian (Lotman, M. 1994: 594). This is quite 
correct, and in particular to the extent that the roots of the new-
Kantians and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl also must 
be sought in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant's dualism, 
however, is unacceptable to the new-Kantians and Husserl. 
The influence of Husserl is not initially obvious in Juri 
Lotman's semiotics, since they compete with the new-Kantian 
philosophical views. The crux of the matter is that the standpoint 
of the new-Kantians in certain fundamental basic questions are 
close to Husserl's ideas or are indeed the same. Therefore, 
Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp and other new-Kantians could 
have influenced Lotman in a certain sense to the same degree as 
did the phenomenology of Husserl.9 
In this context it is initially important to emphasize that both 
the new-Kantians and the phenomenologists disconnect the 
factual level of reality (incl. Kant's "things in themselves") from 
the philosophic discourse. The Husserlians, as indicated 
previously, take world existence in brackets (einklammern), 
declare the validity of being (Seinsgeltung) as "secondary", and 
thereby persistently reduce the world to a phenomenon that is 
internal to consciousness (phenomenological epoche) (Husserl 
1987 [1931]: 22-23, 31). The world is reduced to transcendental 
intellectual structures (for Husserlians) or to transcendental 
It is quite feasible that the philosophical viewpoints of Husserl could have also 
reached Lotman indirectly — primarily via Gustav Shpet, whom Husserl called 
one of his best students, but also via the works of Aleksei Lossev and Roman 
Jakobson. The latter invited Husserl to give a talk in Prague in 1935, and 
defended, already in 1916, Husserl's concept of "pure" universal forms and 
relationships, setting these in opposition to the empiricism of new grammarians 
(Holenstein 1975: 61-63, 80). 
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"principles" (for Kantians).10 The idea of transcendentality has 
been directly taken over by the new-Kantians and Husserlians 
from Kant, who has claimed that "for me, transcendental has 
never denoted the relationship of our cognition with things ["in 
themselves" — P. L.], but only with the capacity for cognizance 
[—]. I call transcendental every cognition that deals less with 
objects than with our way of perceiving objects, insofar as this 
must be possible a priori" (Kant 1982 [1783]: 55, 83; emphasis 
by P. L.). Husserl defines transcendentality — although in a 
much wider manner — as "a character of immanent existence" 
that is constructed in the ego (Husserl 1993 [1950]: 1418). 
But in addition to this, the Kantians and Husserlians release 
these intellectual structures, resp. the principles of the 
cognizance of objects, from all kinds of subjectivity, in the 
psychological meaning of this term. For them, subjectivity is 
"transcendental subjectivity", which Husserl also contrasts to 
"objective subjectivity". The latter applies to "animal 
subjectivity" (animalische Subjektivität) that is external to the 
phenomenal world (Husserl 1987 [1931]: 31). 
As regards the ontologization of method specifically, the later 
understandings of Pyatigorski in this issue seem to proceed from 
the tradition of positivism — Lotman's however from the 
understandings of Husserl as described here. 
The concept of 'ontology' is associated by Husserl with 
science and philosophy.11 
10 transcendens (Lt) crossing boundaries. F. de Saussure sets language as 
opposite to speech on the basis of transcendentality in particular: outside speech 
(resp. text), language is a phenomenon that cannot be captured by the senses -
virtual (virtualis (Lt — apparent) — can be treated as being possible). On the 
same basis, 'meaning' should be seen as a language phenomenon, and 'sense' 
as a speech phenomenon. 
11 Husserl also counts philosophy as a science, which therefore excludes any 
confrontation between science and philosophy. He has even written a special 
monograph to argue this thesis — "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" 
(1911). 
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We could [—] say that [—] all a priori sciences without exception 
[—] have their origins in a priori transcendental phenomenology. [— 
-] This a priori system can thus also be characterized as systematic 
unfolding [Entfaltung] of the universal a priori or universal logos of 
all conceivable being, proceeded from the essence of transcendental 
subjectivity and therefore also intersubjectivity12. This in turn means 
that the completely and systematically developed transcendental 
phenomenology would be eo ipso the true and genuine universal 
ontology.ь (Husserl 1987 [1931]: 159. Emphasis — P. L.) 
The transcendental-subjective unfolding of being is, in Husserl's 
phenomenological system, a category with fundamental impor­
tance. Kant discovers in reality that which he himself inputs to 
the world with his own method: "As metaphysics, the sources of 
cognition of the intellect are not in the [real-world, ontological 
— P. L.] objects and in beholding them, but in itself [i.e. in 
metaphysics — P. I.]" (Kant 1982 [1783]: 147, 189)14. Thus: the 
dualistic conflict between the method (intellect) and the world 
(as Erscheinung) — on which Pyatigorski also bases his 
criticism. Husserl, in contrast to Kant, permits the "ontic facts" 
"to manifest" (phainomai) themselves, resp. open (sich 
entfalten).15 In addition to "unfolding" (manifesting), Husserl 
also uses, in describing this idea — and this is particularly 
important —, the concept of evidence {Evidenz) — "in the sense 
of [—] self-being-evident, being-present-as-one's-self' (Husserl 
1993 [1950]: 1408). 
12 logos (Gr) — concept, reason. Here: ancient intellectual essence; general 
legitimacy. 
13 
во ipso (Lt) — thereby. 
"For sensuous perception represents things not at all as they are, but only the 
mode in which they affect our senses, and consequently by sensuous perception 
appearances (Erscheinungen) only and not things themselves are given to the 
understanding for reflection". "These objects are not representations of things 
as they are in themselves, [—] but sensuous intuitions, that is, appearances, the 
possibility of which rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in 
themselves to something else, viz., to our sensibility." (Kant 1982 [1783]: 51, 
82). 
15 phainomai is the origin for the Greek word phainomenon. 
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In interpreting the "unfolding" of ontological facts and the 
universal logos and/or the "being-present-as-one's-self ' it should 
be remembered that in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological 
system the subject (ego) is not located in a world of objects, but, 
in the contrary: 
anything at all existing for the ego is constituting in itself [i.e. in the 
ego]. [—] as a phenomenological ego I have changed into a sheer 
observer of myself and for me nothing is valid that I could not find 
indivisible from myself, except for my sheer life and [that which] is 
indivisible [—] from this [sheer life — P. L.\. (Husserl 1993: 1418, 
1401 ; emphasis — P. L.) 
The ego itself is "split into the observer and the observed".16 
Consciousness is therefore object-centred and also "directed" (= 
intentional17). In other words, it could also be said that ego for 
Husserl is basically an autocommunicative phenomenon. 
Parallels are apparent in the semiotics of Juri Lotman. 
In order to differentiate the reduced sphere of being-present-
as-himself— i.e. "that which is being observed", Juri Lotman 
uses the category of 'existingLotman claims that a fact, which 
does not belong to any system or is not contrastable (comparable) 
with anything, cannot possess a meaning (Lotman 1970d: 48). In 
addition, the concept of 'existing' is signifying phenomenon and 
does not correspond with the biological or other such non-
signified characteristics of factual existence.18 (Appendix, p. 227) 
The category of 'existing' in Lotman's semiotics, therefore, 
means being a part of a certain system, and this in some definite 
signified function. 
Lotman himself has provided a vivid example of this. Tsar 
Ivan IV had the custom, when having an opponent executed, of 
16 Such wording is used by Ülo Matjus in his commentaries on Husserl (Matjus 
1993, 8: 1590). 
17 Intentionality (Lt intentio — attempt, intention, striving), in the words of 
Husserl, is "being aware of something" (Husserl 1993: 1399). 
18 In this analysis, there is a movement away from the problems of bio-
semiotics, and the aspect being analyzed acquires additional nuances, which in 
the 1970s had not yet received any noticeable scholarly attention. 
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having all the family members of the victim also killed. This had 
shocked the British ambassador residing in Moscow. But in the 
legal system of the 16th century, the concept of an 'individual' 
'existed' (resp. 'became apparent') for a western European and 
Russian in two completely different designated (= ontic) forms. 
The modern Englishman united his existential borders with his 
biological borders. In Russia, however, that had been unaffected 
by the legal system of the West, the individual of the 16th 
century could only be the family: an individual could not figure 
as a socially relevant unit in society — he was ontologically non­
existent (Lotman 1984, see also Appendix). 
The existence of binary oppositions, referred to by Aleksandr 
Pyatigorski, also finds expression as an intellect-based signifying 
structure. Countless antithetic constructions in cultural texts can 
be brought as examples of this, starting with the apposition of 
paradise and hell, or Christ and Anti-Christ (= Muhammad) in 
the self-reflection of various cultures. In the consciousness of the 
medieval European, Islam as an "obscene religion" that 
"succumbed to the passions" was the opposite of "moral" 
monogamy (Islam permits a man to be simultaneously married to 
four women.)19 etc, etc. 
But the existence of binary and other similar structures in the 
intellectual memory of the "observer" is virtual and potential. 
These structures become "existing" from the moment when they 
join the (textual and/or behavioural) communication chain as 
"being under observation" (cf. Lotman 1992a [1990]: 26). It 
should be again emphasized that "being under observation" is 
primarily an intellectual phenomenon — and also an ontological 
object. Perception of the world of "being-present-as-himself ' that 
exists according to Husserl's arguments "is motivated in my 
intentional life" (Husserl 1993: 1409). And the 
substantial characteristic [—] of the ego is to continually form 
intentional systems, and to hold those already formed whose indices 
19 For more details on the history of the binary (antithetic) apposition of Islam 
and Catholicism, see (Watt 1976 [1972]: 98-108). 
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are [—] the objects that have been considered, intended, assessed, 
handled, fantasized, and are fantasizable, etc, by the ego. (Husserl 
1993:1411) 
Here we can see a circumstance that is noteworthy for us: 
antithetic (binary) constructions on the level of the "observed" (= 
(behavioural) text), and on the level of the "observer" (= 
intellect), are mutually isomorphic and reproductive. From the 
perspective of the "substantial characteristic" (the "universal 
logos of being") of the ego, binarity consequently has an a priori 
intellectual quality that anticipates communication and is reduced 
from the psyche. Such a conclusion is also supported by 
developmental psychological data: in starting to talk, a child does 
not start with naming objects, but with acquiring the contrasting 
of objects (Jakobson and Halle 1962 [1956]: 499-500). It can 
therefore be claimed, in accordance with Husserl's thought 
processes, that the contrasting of objects in the ontological and 
insighted "sphere that is able to be observed" of the ego is the 
index of the intellect's binary algorithm. "Phenomenological 
self-interpretation exists a priori, so this then is valid for every 
possible, conceivable ego, and for every conceivable being, that 
is, for all conceivable worlds" (Husserl 1993: 1418). 
This analysis can be expanded with yet another important 
link. Namely, according to Juri Lotman (Lotman 1992a [1990]: 
26), Roman Jakobson and other scholars, binary oppositions are 
also part of the "self-structure" characteristics of natural 
language. Jakobson has reached the conclusion that the 
phonological structure of all natural languages is recurrently 
binary (Jakobson and Halle 1962; 1971a [1961]: 637 jj). This is 
witness to the situation where the reproductive mutual antithetic 
communication of the "being observed" and the "observer" is 
also regulated by natural language as a "natural" stability 
mechanism. 
To summarize, the conclusion can be drawn that from the 
viewpoint of phenomenological analysis, the reproaches by 
Aleksandr Pyatigorski — as regards "ontologizing" and 
"naturalizing" the method — are basically tautological since in 
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the phenomenological world of Husserl and Lotman method and 
world are not ontological opposites. In the ontologically reduced 
world, intellect, text and metatext (method) may — according to 
the logic of vertical isomorphism — mutually exchange places: 
they are in a complementary relationship (see 5.2.1.). 
And yet another detail. In one of his early articles, Juri 
Lotman noted that according to the "fundamental principle of 
logic", the "object language and the descriptive language 
(metalanguage) are hierarchically different levels in scientific 
description, which must not be confused: the object language 
cannot [in science! — P. L.] be its own metalanguage" (Lotman 
1970f: 89-90). It must, however, be kept in mind that, for 
example, the binary oppositions of Lotman, referred to by 
Pyatigorski, are simultaneously structural elements of both the 
object language and the metalanguage. The concept of vertical 
isomorphism meant for Lotman that the problem of the 
ontological opposition of language and metalanguage, and 
philosophical and scientific analysis, was taken off the agenda 
(which certainly does not mean the denial of the "fundamental 
principle of logic" in different contexts of scientific discourse). 
5.2.2.2. "Naturalizing" the object of the analysis. 
The second reproach by Aleksandr Pyatigorski referred to 
"naturalizing" the object of the analysis. 
Here also there is a certain terminological misunderstanding. 
An object or thing in a phenomenological system can 
understandably only be an intentional or consciousness object. 
The term 'intentional object' can even be substituted with the 
term 'intention' and 'intentionality', which has the more precise 
meaning of reference of the consciousness to an object: "Rather 
the whole of intentional ity is itself either the consciousness of 
evidence, this means possessing the cogitatum [the thing being 
cognized = the object — P. L.] as itself, or it is essencially [—] 
targeting self-giving [Selbstgebung], directed at this" (Husserl 
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1993: 1408).20 But in addition to this Husserl emphasizes that the 
phenomenological 'object' is not a "complex of sensory 
information", which is used, for example, to construct the 
Gestalt-psychological "image" (Husserl 1993: 1400). An 
intentional object (thing), in a phenomenological system, 
possesses no "natural" characteristics of a natural and/or factual 
existence. Husserl's objects "are opened" in the cognition 
process via 'essentiality', which is caught in direct 'insight' via 
intuition.21 Thus, the "insight of essence has nothing in common 
with perception, remembering or "experiencing" in the form of 
similar acts; or with empirical generalisation, into which 
meaning the separately experienced individual existence has 
been included" (Husserl 2000 [1911]: 705, 707). In the insight of 
essence, the object of the intention is eidos — the generality 
provided via the insight, and attainable only to the insight" 
(Husserl 1987 [1931]: 73); and the objects "being constituted as 
the community of thought-patterns". (Husserl 1993: 1405).22 
20 
'Intentionalism', as a central concept in both communication and 
epistemology, was introduced to philosophy by Franz Brentano. This same 
approach is developed in his language philosophy study by John Langshaw 
Austin, who differentiates in communication the illocutive (determining an act) 
and perlocutive (opening the consequences of the deed) communicative 
relationship between the addresser and the addressee (Austin 1962: 99-107; 
115-117). According to Lotman's semiotic-analysis logic, the opposite 
placement of the speaker-listener and listener-speaker in communication can 
be treated as a protoverbal conventional sign, or as a protoverbal sign-creation 
act, which have, for example, a perlocutive = indexical structure and which 
represents a certain relational algorithm. Lotman does not use the term 
'intentionality'. 
21 intuitus (Lt) — look, inner glance. Intuition is direct awareness that 
anticipates, or is opposite to, logical discussion, about the truth of some 
sentence or concept (Blackburn 2002 [1994]: 188) or the meaningfulness of an 
object of understanding. 'Insight' is synonymous with the term intuition. 
22 eidos (Gr) — form, sight, appearance. The term was first used by Plato in 
designating abstract forms and ideas. Already in 1929, Pyotr Bogatyryov and 
Roman Jakobson wrote about these same issues, carrying out analysis on the 
basis of natural language, saying that the typical product of naive realism "was 
[—] the thesis of young grammarians that the only real language was the 
individual language [--], that [—] the only genuinely reality is the language of 
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It is important to note here that both Immanuel Kant as well 
as the New Kantians do not recognize intellectual intuition in 
their philosophy.23 But this is indeed the very basis, as we have 
seen, for the whole of Husserl's analysis of intention. 
"Associations of thought", and thus the ego itself, are "eidetic" 
structures. With this term, Husserl emphasizes the apriority, 
unity and even imagery of the constructions of essence: 
The universal apriority pertaining to transcendental ego as such is a 
form of essenciality [Wesenform], which conceals in itself an 
infinite number of forms, the apriority types of the possible 
actualities and potentialities of life, together with objects, 
which in this universal a priori are constituted as actually existing. 
(Husserl 1987 [1931]: 76; see also 73, 77, 134, 139-142; emphasis 
— P.L) 2 4  
Husserl's intuitive essences are vividly illustrated by the concept 
of the monad, which also acquires a central role in Juri Lotman's 
semiotics.2^ With the term 'monad', Husserl denotes, on the one 
hand, that which is "substantially intrinsic to me", that "which I, 
in my complete concrete form, am in me" (Husserl 1987 [1931]: 
one specific person at one specific moment, and that all else was somehow a 
mere scientific, theoretical abstraction. However, there is really nothing that is 
to a greater degree foreign to modern trends in language theory. [—] modern 
language theory also knows "langue", this means a "collection of habits that a 
certain collective has acquired in order to ensure understanding of speech"" 
(Bogatyryov and Jakobson 1971 [1929]: 369-370; the authors quote Saussure). 
Insight (Anschauung) does exist in Kant's philosophy but is empirical in 
nature, covering the sensory comprehension of objects, and pure insight is that 
which organizes perceptions into experiences regarding objects of time and 
space (Kant 1982 [1785]: 41-42). 
24 It is important to note here that for Husserl (as opposed to Lotman and 
Peirce) the intuitive objects of direct insight are not signs (in the sense of the 
dual construction of this concept). Both Lotman and Peirce seek the signified 
equivalents of these phenomena. See also: Nöth 1999: 616-617. 
25 For more detail on the origin and implementation of the concept 'monad', see 
also Chapter 4, p. 129-132; also: Husserl 1987 [1931]: 131-134; 142-144 and 
Lotman 1993b 11989]: 369-372. 
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107). On the other hand, the world is the organized association of 
monads, which also has a constitutive function: 
My [—] ego [—] could only be a priori an ego that apprehends the 
world, belonging to an association of other similar egos, being a 
member of the association of monads that branches out from it. [—] 
for me it would not be possible to have any mass of monads without 
it being an organized associationx either in an explicit or implicit 
form. From here it follows that this mass constitutes in itself an 
objective world [—], that it acquires in this world a form in time 
and space and realizes itself in this [—] using the force of the 
inevitability of being. (Husserl 1987: 142-143; emphasis — P. L.) 
And it is particularly as such an "association of monads" that 
Juri Lotman has described the semiosphere (Lotman 1984), 
which he also calls a "semiotic universe" (Lotman 1993b [1989]: 
3 69)26. This space is filled by intellectual eidetic objects, where 
Lotman differentiates three classes: firstly, natural human 
consciousness (in the sense of the signifying algorithmized 
consciousness of a person), secondly, text, and thirdly, culture as 
collective intellect. These objects are hierarchically "passing-
through" monads, which, as we observed previously, are, on the 
one hand, isomorphic according to structure, but on the other 
hand, mutually (innovatively) generative: an identity can be 
treated as text, and text (culture) as intellect (Lotman 1993b: 369; 
1992a [1990]: 27-29). 
This "sign-creating (semiosic) situation" in the semiosphere 
did indeed initiate Aleksandr Pyatigorski's criticism. 
It seems, however, that the critic had not taken into account 
that in the phenomenological context, the information-exchange 
acts ((auto)communication) in the semiosphere, generated by the 
intellect resp. text, are neither "natural" (i.e. from nature) nor 
psychological — they are semiotic. Or to be more precise, the 
intellect, text and culture behave as "semiotic identities", 
whereby the concept 'identity' here should be treated (or 
~
b It is clear that it would have been quite impossible to quote Husserl here 
because of the censorship conditions. 
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actually: seen) as an eidetic object — as a monad and not as a 
metaphor in something belonging to play, artistic or — wider — 
aesthetic meaning27, or as an "animal" or object in the 
"naturalized" sense. 
The existence of a so-called "third world" created by sign 
systems, "located between" nature and the human psyche, was 
already indicated in 1632 in a penetrating and elegant manner by 
John Poinsot in his "Tractatus de Signis". Here we can read: 
In discussing a sign in general, we cannot be restricted in our 
analysis to categories of that which exists independent of thought, or 
to categories of that which exists dependent on thought, because a 
sign is verifiable and it functions regarding both.28 
Therefore, Juri Lotman's discussions on semiotic systems that 
are "capable of thought", on another text that "can initiate" the 
"capacity for thought" for a text, on semiosphere as an 
"organism", or on text and intellect as "semiotic identities" 
who/that have informational "inputs" and "outputs" — all these 
statements and concepts must be read, in the words of Lotman, as 
manifestations of a "semiotic [read: eidetic — P. L.] situation", 
"which marks a leap from being in Nature to being in Culture", 
since a "person does not just think but is also located in a 
thinking space" (Lotman 1993b [1989]: 369, 372; Lotman 1992a 
[1990]: 27-29]. When Lotman writes about thought-capable text, 
he definitely does not mean that, if the intellect starts to fulfil the 
role of text in communication, it then stops being the intellect, 
and vice versa. Lotman has repeatedly emphasized that although 
text is a (live) organism, in order to "initiate" the processes that 
can take place within, it is always necessary to connect it into a 
7 Of course only in the case where the semiotic identity resp. text itself is not 
an artistic/play/aesthetic text, and in the case where semiotic processes that 
produce new information ("expedient faultiness") do not dominate in the 
communicative act. 
28 This fundamental point of view for semiotic thought has not been forgotten. 
Walther von Wartburg has made an astute comment on this, and Boris Uspenski 
says in his recent monograph: "We talk about having command of a language, 
but actually it is language that commands a person" (Uspenski 2007: 144). 
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common "stream of current" together with the intellect. Nowhere 
has Lotman written that texts could "speak" to each other, 
independent of the intellect (Lotman 1992a [1990]: 27-28, 33; 
1977a: 4, 9-10, 13). 
5.2.2.3. Semiotics changing into "almost philosophy". 
Analysis of the essence of culture has undoubtedly been a 
constant and intense interest for Juri Lotman. Keeping this in 
mind, it seems that Aleksandr Pyatigorski is right when he 
blames Lotman for abandoning semiotics in favour of 
philosophy. It is nevertheless apparent that Pyatigorski, in 
making such a claim, does not take into account that a 
philosopher is still called upon to explain one substance via 
another substance, and he is not basically interested in the issue 
of which formal (signifying) means are used to sense, store, 
transform and communicate these substances; he is not interested 
what kind of signified relationships these substances mutually 
generate. In his analyses, Juri Lotman (and naturally semiotics in 
general) concentrates on the non-philosofical formal aspects of 
substances (and/or their essences), and expressively displays 
their signified abstract qualities of the abstract essences.29 
It should nevertheless be admitted that the semiotic 
instruments for the signifying analysis of essences have not 
always been properly developed and these could not have existed 
in the 1960s anyway (as with Lotman has become apparent in the 
case of magic, for example); but here too the heritage of Juri 
Lotman is comprised mostly of successes — for example, the 
description of mythological (together with Boris Uspenski) and 
artistic semiosis, and the signified nature of play (Lotman 1967c; 
29 The border between philosophy and semiotics, in the context of linguistic 
philosophy, may be hazy, but in general it is the case that the subject of 
philosophy can indeed be language, but the topic of research can only be the 
topics which are spoken in that language. Semiotics concentrates on language 
itself, on its form. 
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Lotman and Uspenski 1973). Let us also call to mind the witty 
panoramic attempt to categorize the Russian cultural epochs 
(Lotman 1970f). Here, Lotman typologizes the nature of culture 
via a signified substitution relationship ("It exists since it 
substitutes for something more important than itself') and via the 
syntagmatic operation of linking the signs ("It exists because it is 
part of something that is more important than itself'), and 
creates, by mutually combining two formal characteristics, an 
analytical whole that passes through nine centuries! Such an 
analysis should actually be interpreted as "philosophy" changing 
into semiotics, not vice versa. 
Another example. As we know, the age of enlightenment in 
France brought with it the modern understanding of public 
opinion and the citizen. This has had an important intellectual-
historical and also philosophical meaning. Juri Lotman, in his 
analyses of the age of enlightenment, describes the purely 
semiotic nature of this fact (Lotman 1970f: 26-32; 1979: 270-
276). It becomes apparent from Lotman's analysis that the 
concept 'person', according to the enlightenment understandings, 
could not be expressed at all by signs (signifiers) that indicate the 
class, racial, cultural or other social type characteristics of the 
person. It was Nature that was to be the denoter of everything 
'human'. All the "human" indicated by the denoters — person, 
group, ethnic identity, nation, mankind — had therefore to be 
isomorphic with the qualities of Nature. In describing mankind, it 
was sufficient to describe one person. The individual, according 
to the formal characteristics of semiosis, could be significantly 
equivalent to all other conceivable individuals — be they 
beggars, kings or officials. Following on, it unavoidably 
proceeds that public opinion could not be defined as a collective 
decision. No one has the right to usurp this. This was equivalent, 
as regards birth and function, to the singular opinion of a single 
individual. This individual had the sovereign right to express it, 
equally with everyone else. Lotman's semiotic interpretation, as 
regards the creation of the concept 'citizen' was derived from 
these formal characteristics. 
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Taking into account the above, it seems that the thesis about 
semiotics changing into philosophy is "almost'" inaccurate. 
5.3. The analytical and generative forms of the reproductivity 
of the intellect 
The subject of following treatment is the semiotic analysis of 
reproductive signifying behaviour, on the basis of analytical and 
generative characteristics. As already stated, the idea for such a 
categorization has been borrowed (whilst admitting certain 
changes) from Aleksandr Pyatigorski and Boris Uspenski, who 
implemented this schema in the creation of personological 
models (Pyatigorski and Uspenski 1967: 7-29; see also 5.1.). 
They associate the analyticality of semiotic behaviour with the 
imagining and assessment of the "ideal situations" of behaviour, 
on the past-future axis of behaviour — i.e. with mnemonics, 
which, according to sagacious observation of the authors, may 
have a ritualizing meaning. They treat the conversion/converting 
of autocommunicative or intersubjective behaviour into signs of 
other behavioural activities as the generativeness of behaviour 
(<порождающее поведение). According to Pyatigorski and 
Uspenski, the analyticality and generativity of behaviour has a 
collective character or a character that forms the me identity 
(Pyatigorski and Uspenski 1967: 11-15). 
Therefore, to be more precise, the following sections will 
observe ritual and code signals, as the structure, repertoire of text 
and algorithms that are stored in the (cultural) memory, as well 
as the ritualizing (sacralizing) reproduction and generativity of 
the mnemonic baggage in the process of (auto)communication. 
5.3.1. The analyticality of reproductive behaviour 
Looking at the reproductivity characteristics of the intellect from 
the aspect of cultural history, it becomes apparent that 
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exchanging the cyclical time model for historical thinking 
created, as Juri Lotman has written, "a constant conflict" 
between the "repeatability" (reproductivity) of behavioural forms 
and "internal dynamics" (innovation) (Lotman 1992b: 6, 21). 
Understandably, innovation and reproduction, in these contexts, 
acquired the role of structurally dominant opposites. 
The character of reproducing cultural phenomena depends on 
the orientation of the culture (intellect), (for example, it is 
possible to successfully block (collective) memory), on the 
storage mechanisms necessary for remembering (including the 
intellect-based algorithms that are of interest to us) and on the 
system of codes used to form memory patterns — texts.30 
Storage mechanisms and cultural codes are associated, on the 
historical plane, with the character of the information carriers. In 
considering communication that was pre-verbal and non-verbal, 
one cannot overlook the intriguing fact that man's predecessor 
homo sapiens began to use words only about 100 000 years ago, 
but homo habilis who possessed memory and communicated 
with gestures and sounds had, by that time, inhabited the earth 
for already a few million years. An unavoidable and semiotically 
weighty question arises: how, and using what means (what sort 
of signs), did they communicate — in that eternity-seeming time 
before they started to speak?! 
Let us illustrate this way of posing the question with at least 
one group of examples of pre-verbal-language topological 
semantics. The polite gesture used by contemporary humans as a 
greeting — right hand shaking right hand (shaking both hands for 
some peoples) — previously meant an agreement for avoiding 
aggression between the two greeters. People today are not aware 
In analyzing these aspects, one distances oneself from the historical, 
psychological and sociological problems of reproductivity, and reproductivity is 
viewed as a semiotic model, and memory and mnemonic operations as 
characteristics of this model. The semiotic model remains a "third world" 
"between" the real world (society) and the psychological world, and in this 
position it has a mediating and also constructive role regarding both as was 
already believed by Poinsot. 
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that associating the characteristics 'right' and 'left' with men and 
women, respectively, has been "almost universal" (Ivanov 
1968b: 11).31 However, the association of topological 'right' with 
positive characteristics and 'left' with negative characteristics 
has been clearly preserved (also in verbal-language semantics) — 
this must be considered universal and of course older than verbal 
language itself (Ivanov 1972: 114, 118). 
Although it is not possible to return to the age when verbal 
language began to form (and, as already stated, that is also not 
the intention here), it can still be emphatically claimed that 
nothing comes from nothing: it is clear that verbal language must 
have unavoidably (either directly or indirectly) taken over 
elements from the store of non-verbal communication. 
Movements, mime, sounds, song and behavioural signification as 
a whole created this syncretic background, into which verbal 
language was eventually woven. It is particularly in this context 
that one must agree with Mikhail Bakhtin when he reproof to 
"most linguists", who "see in a statement only the individual 
combination of purely language forms (lexical and grammatical); 
any other kinds of normative forms remain practically unnoticed 
by them and are not studied" (Bakhtin 1979: 259-260).32 The 
sign-creating syncreticity (multi-layeredness and multi-
languageness) of the information-exchange processes, referred to 
by Bakhtin, has been one of the basic characteristics of the 
structure of culture. This phenomenon that is much older than 
verbal language was probably first formed together with ritual 
and rituality. "Man", as aptly and laconically claimed by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, "is a ceremonial animal" (Wittgenstein 1997 
[1979]: 2537). 
31 That this is an ancient universality is confirmed, for example, by Stone Age 
burials, where the women were laid on the left side, and men on the right. For 
many peoples, houses were divided into a left wing for the women, and a right 
wing for the men (Ivanov and Toporov 1974: 267-268). 
It should be added, however, that in his attempt to determine the non-
language "forms" of a statement, Bakhtin did not aim to reduce them to 
universally valid structures. 
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5.3.1.1. Ritual and ritualizing reproductivity. 
The systematic analysis of archaic ritual is not the subject of this 
study. In this context we are interested in those formal aspects of 
ritual and rituality that connect ritual with modern discourse, and 
which, via algorithms of the intellect, have a universal charac­
teristic. 
Myths have explained to people who they are, as well as the 
world around them. Throughout the ages, myths have been, and 
are still today, called upon to confirm and hold perceptions of the 
world's (cosmic) order and the exemplars, which deserve to be 
remembered. The effectiveness of the myth was and is 
guaranteed by ritualized acts. Ritual is an instrument in society 
for the preservation, mediation and amplification of myths (see 
also Pyatigorski and Uspenski 1967: 23). For an individual, ritual 
is the "mechanism" whereby he is "dedicated into the memory of 
the group" (Lotman 1992b: 6). 
Thus, the mythological model has a projective structural axis, 
which connects the original sources (первоисточники) of the 
past (from the time of creation), and the ideal original forms 
(прообразы), with the present and the future (Meletinski 1976: 
169-171). The actant (be it either the individual or the group) 
reproduces acts that have their roots in the "stable semantic 
system" (in the cosmogonie ancient times) of the past. He also 
considers these events to be omen for both the present and the 
future (Uspenski 1989: 19-20. cf. also Eliade 1992 IV: 69). The 
teleological function of the past, which is borne for the 
participant in the ritual by the gods and patrum more, determines 
fate (future). 
From the aspect of sign-creation, two mutually-contrasting 
constructive origins can be noticed in the structure of ritual. On 
the one hand, it can be said that symbols, i.e. the alphabet of 
ritual (gestures, single acts, the entire signifying repertoire) is 
characterized by meaningful diffusion. Victor Turner, who has 
systematically studied archaic ritual, claims that every ritual, as a 
complete system, has "a core comprising dominant symbols", 
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which is always repeated at any performance of the ritual, and 
which is characterized by "extraordinary ambiguity [—] Each 
symbol expresses many topics and every topic is expressed 
through many symbols" (Turner 1983 [1973]: 33, 36, 40). Other 
authors who have also studied ritual indicate the meaningful 
elasticity of the signified elements of ritual, as well as their 
ambivalence and abundance of homological analogies that has 
also become apparent in the newer forms of ritual (Leach 1991 
[1971]: 43; Meletinski 1976: 165; Kolakowski 2004 [1982]: 
192). The structural significance of the indeterminacy of signs in 
magic, as we already know, has also been specifically studied by 
Umberto Eco (Eco 1997a; 1997b). Is it possible to unambi­
guously formulate the semantic meaning of the code signals 
"Good luck!"; "Merry Christmas!"; "Damn you!"?33 We 
generally do not even think about what these words themselves 
actually mean... Edmund Leach reminds us that the various 
Christian sects use exactly the same myths, and carry out exactly 
the same ritual acts, but they "disagree passionately" about what 
these rituals mean (Leach 1991 [1971]: 43). 
From this it can be concluded that the meaningful multi-
planedness of the signifying single elements of ritual is 
controlled by the function and rigid syntagmatic ordering of 
these very elements in ritual as a complete text/4 Thus the 
magical function of the above-cited three utterances can be 
completely unambiguously determined. In ritual, it is syntax that 
rises to dominate! 
33 A more detailed discussion of the code signal is found in 5.3.2.3. 
34 Thus does Victor Turner also define ritual as the "sequenceness of activities 
covering gestures, words and objects [—]" (Turner 1983 [1973]: 32). Konrad 
Lorenz draws attention to the situation that, in the case of ritualized behaviour, 
both animals and people "stick slavishly" to the sequence of the activities 
(Lorenz 1966: 280); in the opinion of Erik Erikson, ritualized behaviour must 
contain the agreed activity (interplay) of at least two individuals, which is 
repeated with "considered intervals" and in "repeated contexts" (Erikson 1969: 
712). But these repeats, in the paradigmatic plane, may "always be mildly 
varying" (Leach 1991 [1971]: 81). 
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These two constructive aspects are well illustrated by the 
example of the Eucharist sacrament of the Christian church that 
is familiar to all. It has all the characteristics of ritual, and at the 
same time it is a central element of evangelical discourse and the 
liturgy of the Christian church. 
Theologians, logicians and empiricists have crossed swords 
for centuries over the Biblical texts from which one could 
possibly draw the conclusion that 'bread' and 'the body of Jesus 
(Jesus Christ in the Eucharist)' is the one and the same substance 
(Matthew 26: 26; Mark 14:22; Luke 22: 19). This was nothing 
curious for the Catholics who proceed in their interpretation from 
metalanguage, where the code presumes the existence of 
miracles. The rationalist Martin Luther, however, claimed 
categorically that the "Catholics' 'bread is flesh' is completely 
absurd — bread cannot be flesh, and Jesus did not say 'panis est 
corpus meum ' but 'hoc est corpus meum "' (emphasis — P. L.). 
See Kolakowski 2004 [1982]: 184.35 Using such a code, Martin 
Luther takes off the agenda the semantic problem of the 
transsubstantiation, and even the transessentiation, of bread.36 
This declaration, however, is also meaningful in another 
context: Luther himself also identifies bread with the body of 
Jesus (Christ), but not because of the substance but because of 
the function in the structure of the Last Supper, which in turn is 
syntagmatically the homeomorphic analogy of Jesus' death by 
crucifixion — bread, wine, sacrificial lamb and Jesus himself 
now form a functionally and syntagmatically identical paradigm 
of sacrificial gifts despite being semantically varying. But the 
opposite placement in the act of the sacrificer (sacrifice) and the 
recipient of the sacrifice, is rigid, lasting and topologically 
unambiguous. Therefore, THAT (as essence and function) = 
35 panis est corpus meum (Lt) — bread is my flesh; hoc est corpus meum (Lt) 
— this is my flesh. 
36 transessentiatio < essentia (Lt — character) — transformation of essence; 
transsubstantion — transformation of substance. The Aristotlean interpretation 
of the transformation of substance would presume the transformation of the 
essence + form (i.e. physical transformation). 
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SACRIFICIAL GIFT (as essence and function), which seems to 
be the subject as indicated by Martin Luther. 
The accentuation of the level of expression and (syntagmatic) 
form, has been described by both Juri Lotman and Boris 
Uspenski. They have juxtaposed rituals with symbols on the level 
of signification, and concluded that these should be treated as 
antipodes — if the character of semiosis is considered. The 
relationship of the level of expression of a symbol (as a single 
sign) with content is "relatively arbitrary". Ritual, on the other 
hand, "provides content with form" (формирует содержание) 
and "this always presumes the issue of 'correct signing', 'correct 
naming'. The world can be seen as a complete text comprising of 
signs with different characters, where the content has been 
predetermined, and it is only necessary to know the language in 
order to bring together the level of expression and the content" 
(Lotman and Uspenski 1971: 152). 
Here it can already be seen that the semantic variety and 
multi-layeredness of single symbols is always controlled by the 
rigid complete structure of ritual. This generally valid aspect of 
ritual has been analyzed by Leszek Kolakowski on the level of 
religion. In his words, 
the language of myth, in a certain way, is closed or self-affirming [— 
-]. Everything that is said in the language of religion is 
comprehensible only in the complete semiotic framework of 
holiness [—] religion is not a collection of claims, it is a sphere of 
cult, where comprehension, knowledge, relatedness to the ultimate 
truth [—] and moral dedication perform as the one act, where a later 
separation into classes of metaphysical, moral and other decisions 
may be useful but unavoidably distorts the original meaning of the 
cult. (Kolakowski 2004 [1982]: 191, 194) 
Any ritual at all is an integral whole — a "single act", monad, 
World. For example, the series of burial acts (regardless of the 
character of the belief) or behavioural acts in initiation rites, are 
— regarding the content of the text — completely monofuncti-
onal, enduring and unable to be re-categorized. 
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Ritual, as a world, has three basic topological characteristics 
(groups of characteristics). 
1) ritual is a chain of acts, behavioural acts, which take place in 
the World that is divided into two spaces — opposite in the 
existential sense, which are separated by a common border, or as 
worded by Mircea Eliade — a "threshold" (Eliade 1992 [1957] I: 
55-56; Leach 1991 [1971]: 34-35); 
2) ritual acts are communicative — they have addressers and 
addressees. The addressor in a ritual can be either the speaker or 
the listener, or both the speaker as well as the listener:; 
3) the mutual relationship, placement, of the addressor and 
addressee in a ritual can be described as an act, whose 
signification is characterized by various types of positioning and 
projective characteristics of inter-actant behaviour. On the basis 
of these characteristics, it is possible to analyze the model that 
has been sketched here, describing the analytical, but also the 
generative characteristics of its operation. 
The "basic role of ritual", as emphasized by Juri Lotman, "is the 
organization of memory" (организация памяти) (Lotman 
1992b: 6). 
The basic characteristics of ritual deserve to be covered in 
more detail. 
Ritual, as already stated, is a discourse that is oriented to the 
reproduction of myth; it is a "memory mechanism" (Leach 1991 
[1971]: 38^0). Be the rituals reproducing myths of prehistoric 
creation, the sacrificial death of Jesus, the deeds of ancient 
heroes or rites honouring the heroes of the historic past — on 
each such occasion the reproducive event(s) are accorded 
irrefutability, immunity, majesty and authority, which may 
climax in holiness. In other words — the chain of the occurrence 
and operation of the described acts, as a syntagmatic whole, is 
surrounded by an aura of immunity, authority and sacrality. 
The concept 'sacral' was brought into scholarly use by Émile 
Dürkheim to characterize religious beliefs. He used this to 
contrast the religious world, as a closed system protected by 
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prohibitions, with the "profane" world. Thus it was he who 
divided the world into "sacral" and "profane" space (Dürkheim 
1965 [1912]: 52, 56). 
The relationship between these two existential categories is 
also analyzed in a monograph dedicated to this topic by Mircea 
Eliade. In his work, he extends the sacral sphere of validity by 
including in the sacral concept other existential spheres that 
border religion. 
According to his views, people from archaic societies tend to 
"live as much as possible in sacrality". For Eliade, sacral reality 
was something that is indeterminate — "ganz anderewhich is 
external to the natural experience of a person, to the ability of a 
person to express it, and is in contrast to everything that is 
profane (i.e. "natural"). (Eliade 1992 [1957] I: 52—53)37 Here 
Mircea Eliade indicates the difference regarding the signified 
characteristics between the sacral and profane spaces. Indeed, the 
contrast of sacral text (space) to the profane is often expressed, 
for example, through the indeterminacy of language: the speaker 
talks to the listener in a language incomprehensible to the latter 
(Tambiah 1968: 177-179).38 
As regards the concept 'naturalness', here Eliade means 
substantial, not culturally conventional naturalness.39 Profane 
37 In describing these features of sacrality, Eliade has used the timeless work by 
Rudolf Otto, "Das Heilige" (1917). 
38 Keeping the sacral space separate from the profane is also indicated in the 
"speaking in tongues" found in the Bible, which was introduced to Christianity 
from gnosticism (see 1 Corinthians 14: 1-25). For everybody in the profane 
space the language of the speaker is incomprehensible. This can be understood 
only by an "other-wordly" listener. According to Paul, someone "speaking in 
tongues" "speaketh not unto men, but unto God: for no man understandeth him; 
howbeit in the spirit he speaketh mysteries" (1 Corinthians 14: 2). 
39 A vivid example of the latter is the Enlightenment-era 'naturalnesswhich 
was the opposite, with a plus-sign, of everything that was signified (i.e. 
cultural). 'Natural' was equivalent to everything that was "untainted" by 
signification, such as a child, animal, "simple" person, "honest" feelings 
(Lotman 1970e: 26-32). As a complete opposite of this, however, the 
modernists claimed that the only "natural" environment was the space created 
by people, which was set in contrast to Rousseau-like "naturalness". The fact 
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naturalness as substantial naturalness contrasts with "other­
worldly" transcendental substance as the "mysterious" opposite 
of naturalness. This should be interpreted such that the "world" 
(i.e. our world) is actually a universe where the sacral has already 
been manifested"; "therefore a breakthrough from one 
[substantial — P. L.] level to another has become possible and 
repeatable". Following the steps of Rudolf Otto, Eliade 
associates the entire other-worldliness of sacrality with the 
"super-ample", "powerful force", before which people perceive 
their profound irrelevance (Eliade 1992 [1957] I: 52-53, 57). 
From the aspect of reproducive behaviour, there is another factor 
in Eliade's analysis that is noteworthy: he asserts that sacral can 
be equivalent to "power" {resp. force), "continuity", "activity" 
and even to "reality" (of course in the substantive and not social 
meaning!), and that this is the case in the eyes of both native 
tribes and "post-modern societies" (Eliade 1992 I: 53). The 
"healing power" of things and activity in ritual is also written 
about by Victor Turner (Turner 1983 [1973]: 40). Vladimir 
Toporov has noted a conclusion from Mikhail Yevzlin's 
monograph "Cosmogonies and Ritual", which is fitting to 
summarize this argument: "... ritual models nature, being in its 
own way an operational model, through which the world is 
controlled and managed" (Yevzlin 1993: 17). 
5.3.1.2. Reproductivity of ritual communication. 
Our next task is to describe the signifying behaviour (communi­
cation) that takes place in ritual. 
In defining ritual activity, the determination formulated by 
Emile Dürkheim is well-suited: a rite is an "instruction (rules of 
that Charles Baudelaire titled his famous essay "In Praise of Cosmetics [i.e. 
'non-natural' — P. L.]" was not of course a coincidence. Keeping on the same 
wave length, he also arrogantly mocks, in this essay, the French King of the 
time, saying: "Woe to him who, like Louis XV (who was a product of a not true 
civilization but of a returned barbarity), is capable of tasting only "simple 
nature"! (Baudelaire 1938 [I860]: 
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conduct) on how a person should behave when encountering a 
sacral object" (Dürkheim 1965 [1912]: 56). There should also be 
interest (by extending Dürkheim's determination) in how the 
sacral objects themselves "behave" in such an encounter. 
The original ritual is a group discourse that can be treated as 
an integral whole.40 The behaviour of the actants (group) in a 
ritual is functionally identical, and this enables, by the relevant 
simplification of the model, the description of the ritual as (a 
chain of) behavioral act(s) of a single adressor, which can be 
interpreted as the one (and only one) text — and (in principle) 
even as one sign. 
In order to be able to describe semiotically the ritual 
behavioural task formulated by Dürkheim, the "instruction" 
needs to be translated into the language of communicative and 
signified categories, which we have already briefly encountered 
in other contexts. 
In the semiotic description of ritual as a behavioural 
discourse, it needs to be considered that the addressor in ritual 
(who can be either / or we) is the generator of speech reality. 
The nature of reality in ritual deserves to be determined more 
precisely. 
'Objective reality' is used to mean that sphere of reality, 
which exists outside thought and speech. In the epistemological 
context, the relationship of subject — ego ~ me with its objective 
reality becomes important41. Semiotics "sees" reality through 
sign systems (via sign systems). 
The world of signs knows basically three types of realities — 
virtual, actual and speech. Virtual reality is a reality that exists as 
a closed system of language (or cultural language) meanings. 
This reality cannot be changed by either single individuals or 
specific situations: the same words can be explained using 
different words from this self-sufficient system, or via the 
40 See also Leach 1991 [1971]: 43^14. 
Husserl and other phenomenologists (as the reader already knows) have 
reduced this to an intellect-internal ontological phenomenon of objective 
reality. 
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internal rules of this system. But this also means that for the 
clarification of one's own thoughts, one does not need to carry 
objects around with one's self, as was done in the land of the 
Lilliput in Jonathan Swift's "Gulliver's Travels". 
Actual reality is a world of denotata, which is designated by 
signs. 
Speech reality is reality that is created in the me and you 
communication act, where the neutral, dictionary-like meanings 
of signs, as we all know from personal experience, are 
substantially transformed.42 This happens for various reasons, 
including those that are realized through the operations of the 
algorithms of the intellect that are examined here. 
It should be added that virtual reality is understandably a 
source for speech reality, and vice versa (although with a much 
slower tempo). 
Ritual is the egocentric recursive speech reality of me (resp. 
us). In the interest of the further analysis the aspects of this 
speech reality, it is essential to describe the sign-creating 
substrate, which "forms" the inter-actant communication in 
ritual. For this, we need to clarify the categorical repertoire of 
signs.4. Signs can be divided into three cathegories, according to 
the character of the reference: informative, performative and 
formative signs (Uspenski 2007: 50-52).44 
The object of reference for informative signs is not speech 
(parole), but only language (langue) — the world of virtual 
meanings, a system of concepts. Reference excludes actual 
42 In an actual speech act, he (they) can also be present, but with the mediation 
of some me (us). A separate he can only function in a potential speech act. In 
defining reality, the author has relied considerably on the new monograph by 
Boris Uspenski on the communicative space. See (Uspenski 2007: 9-10, 12, 14, 
35-36, 56). 
43 The following classification was worded by Boris Uspenski (Uspenski 2007: 
50-52). 
44 As stated previously, ritual as a complete text is treated here as one sign, and 
the group performing the ritual is treated as one actant. Such an approach is 
economic and semiotically justified for describing the communication model of 
ritual. 
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reality. An actant can of course also set its relationship with a 
real denotatum, which can be signified by, for example, the word 
'tree', but this reference is mediated: what is being signified here, 
in the semiotic sense, is still the class of abstract meanings — in 
this case 'tree\ 
In contrast, the reference of a performative sign is carried 
directly to the denotatum (incl. to some active act) of the actual 
reality (which can also be an imagined denotatum, to whom a 
real existence has been accorded). Denotatum is outside the 
sphere of abstract meanings. The meaning of a performative does 
not depend directly on language. A vivid example of this class of 
signs is indeed the proper noun: that designated by the proper 
noun is not a language phenomenon, but it also cannot be 
separated from the signifier — they are One. The signifier, often, 
has no meaning or sense.45 
Verbs that directly express action can also be performative 
(verbs in the narrow meaning of this term) (e.g. "...I swear") or 
utterances (e.g. "No Smoking!"), which start to bear the function 
of a name (Uspenski 2007: 51-52). 
Formative signs, as determined by Boris Uspenski, do not set 
direct relationships with reality (with actual or virtual, language 
reality), but only via the speech act — in the communication 
process. The direct object of the reference, in such a case, is 
communication, the communicative relationship itself. In 
addition, the formative sign could be connected with the 
denotatum, i.e. with the actual reality, even without that 
relationship being mediated by linguistic expression — such are 
pronouns and deictic adverbs, for example 'here', 'now', and 
others that designate a formative relationship with actual reality 
in communication (Uspenski 2007: 51-52). A formative 
reference is oriented to the topological form of communication. 
45 The concept of 'meaning' here is called upon to designate the intra-language 
reference for an informative sign; the reference of 'sense' is formed in the 
communication act itself. (It is immediately obvious that the extent of both 
these concepts partially overlap.) 
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The topological dimension that is disclosed in communication 
exists for all formative signs. 
The addressees of ritual — you (and he (they)) — may be 
god(s), spirit(s), patrum more, and also the actant himself as the 
autocommunicative addressee46. I (we) and you fulfil the role of 
either speaker or listener, or both speaker and listener — either 
taking turns or simultaneously47. Setting the relationships for the 
actants takes place in the World (in the monad), which is divided 
into the sacral and profane spheres, of which the actants are the 
signs. There is a border between the sacral and profane spheres, 
which separates the speaker(s) and listener(s) existentially, 
axiologically, topologically, and intellectually. 
We will not continue further with the existential status 
(meaning) of signs: this is determined by their belonging to either 
the sacral or profane world, which we have already 
characterized. 
The mutual relationship between these two spheres is 
axiologically "mapped" in the form of hierarchies that 
(symmetrically) contrast positive, neutral or negative values. 
What is more concealed, but particularly interesting regarding 
the objectives of this work, is the topological nature of the signs 
(actants) in the world that can be explicated via ritual 
communication. 
Let us first refer to the circumstance that it is just not possible 
to define axiological hierarchies by excluding topological 
parameters. The topological substrate in the text of rituals is also 
mediated by the structural characteristics of deictic and proper-
noun signs48. Pronouns are deictic signs (including personal 
pronouns that are particularly important from the communication 
aspect), which do not have a direct relationship with the objects 
that they signify, but only through the communication process. 
46 Recursiveness (recurrere (Lt) — to return) in ritual expresses a return to the 
one and the same motive and/or role for setting the relationships in the process 
of communication (cf. Eliade 1992,1: 57). 
47 Further details follow. 
48 deiknynai (Gr) — to refer to, affirm > deiktikos — able to refer to. 
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(For more detail, see Uspenski 2007: 12-13, 17.)49 Deicticity is 
an "orientation machine", which grammarizes and topologizes 
the mutual placement of actants (see also Merilai 1995, 10: 
2090-2091). Therefore, / is topologically determinable, as a 
formative sign, regarding the method of placement, in relation to 
you {him, their) and the other spatial substances that can be fixed 
as pronouns (adverbs). 
But, as has been said, the speaker(s) and listener(s) may also 
be connected, as proper nouns, which in the topological sense is 
a 0-distance: the sign fulfilling the function of a name (lexeme or 
act) is identified with the bearer of the name.50 
Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski have jointly declared that "in 
mythological consciousness the sign is analogous to proper 
nouns" and that "as a maximum abstraction, the general meaning 
of a proper noun will be reduced to myth" (Lotman and Uspenski 
1973: 284, 286) — and this in an existential, functional as well as 
in an intellectual sense. 
In summarizing the above, it can now be asserted that the 
actual communication between the profane and sacral sphere in 
ritual is speech reality that takes place in the form of formative 
and performative semiosis. 
5.3.2. The universal, generative functions of ritual 
The description of the performative and formative communi­
cation of the actants of ritual, on the basis of referential 
49 The word / (and other personal pronouns) has no meaning whatsoever in 
language if it does not refer to a person (persons) who says (say) this about 
himself (themselves) in a speech situation, and who is (are) signified by the 
personal pronoun. The person saying "I" communicates automatically either 
with another (others) — with you as an actual or potential addressee, and/or 
with himself— in autocommunication. But I, as opposed to a name (e.g. Mary), 
can be determined only via a speech situation and not via an object, which is 
natural in the case of a name as a sign (Uspenski 2007: 86). 
In the mythological sphere of ritual, proper nouns have a clearly expressed 
unconventional character, through which their ontological nature is emphasized 
(Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 286-287). 
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characteristics, casts light on the fact that the intellectual 
algorithms, which have been characterized in previous chapters 
as a priori intellect-based phenomena, have been explicated in 
the structure of ritual via certain sign-creating characteristics. 
However, all the algorithms of the intellect also have their 
own specific role in the structure of ritual, and together they form 
a systemic whole. 
Let us look at these functions (communication schémas) one 
at a time. 
It could be claimed that the actant, in reproducing the 
instructions (text) of the patrum more in the ritual, is in the 
operational sense the profane sphere's listener, who identifies 
existentially with a certain role in sacral acts and adopts the 
mythological language of the sacral sphere. This is mediated by 
the (cultural) memory, and a name (names) is (are) given to the 
act in that language. When the Romans had the rising to the 
heavens of the soul of the emperor enacted as an eagle swooping 
from a fire into the expanse (the eagle had been previously tied 
by the feet to a log and the lit fire burned through the ropes), then 
the archaic language of ritual does not permit this to be 
considered a "trick" (neither then nor now). In ritual, the eagle 
was identified with the emperor — not only symbolically but 
also mythologically. Amongst the people who witnessed this 
scene there were enough of those who gave meaning to the event 
by using the mythological alphabet of the sacralized sphere 
(using the same alphabet according to which the number "13" or 
a black cat crossing one's path are even today considered to be 
unlucky).51 Ernst Cassirer has emphasized that ritual as an act 
does not depict or imitate events, facts, persons or ideas, but is 
indeed these events, persons, facts themselves. "In mythological 
thought there is no category of the ideal." The performance of a 
dancer in a mythological performance is not a game: the person 
dancing is indeed (for example) a god, he identifies with the god 
1 Ethelbert Stauffer, who describes such scenes in his fascinating book, does 
not seem to consider this aspect (Stauffer 1966: 204). 
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(Cassirer 1966 [1955]: 38-39; see also Lotman and Uspenski 
1973: 282-293). This is a process that characterizes performative 
reference. Yevgeni Bertels has described ta'zije, which is a good 
characterization of such a reference/2 The performance that is 
described takes place annually on the anniversary of the killing 
of Husain ibn Ali, the leader of the Shiites and nephew of the 
prophet Muhammad (Ali's assassins were Sunnites). After the 
performance described by Bertels, the troupe of actors had to 
walk through the town, where the people greeted the participants. 
Russian prisoners-of-war, however, were forced to play the roles 
of the Sunnite assassins (the ritual events were staged in the 
second half of the 19th century, the time of the extensive invasion 
of Central Asia by Russia). All the "negative" actors were beaten 
mercilessly by the audience during the procession (and this 
apparently happened every year) (Bertels 1924). The audience 
here, for their interpretation of the performance, understandably 
used the mythological alphabet: the Russian prisoner's "name", 
due to the performance, became 'Husain 's killer'. 
In the process of identifying with something mythologically, 
the actant may even transform into the name of the space in 
which it is performing. 
When the Nenetz shamans carry out a ritual, they wear 
clothing where the headwear identifies with the Higher World 
(nuw nyangi), the gown with the Middle World (jer nyangi) and 
the footwear with the Under World (ngilad nyangi) (Hoppâl 
2000: 124)53. The identification acts of the microcosmos (!) and 
the macrocosmos {Expanse) can be treated in the same 
performative key (see Segal and Senokossov 1970: 80; Gurevich 
1972: 52-56; Meletinski 1976: 212). 
ta 'zije is a ritualized performance in Islamic culture for remembering certain 
sacral events. 
nuw nyangi — belonging to the heavens; jer nyangi — belonging to the 
Middle World; ngilad nyangi — belonging to the Under World (Nenetz 
language). (M. Hoppâl has quoted the 1998 study by L. Lar titled "Шаманы и 
боги" (Shamans and Gods).) 
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Such mythological acts should be able to be termed analytical 
behaviour, based on the classification of Pyatigorski and 
Uspenski that was previously introduced. It should also be kept 
in mind that the sacral sphere, which is reproduced by the 
magician or any participant of the ritual, is a hierarchized space 
in the axiological and topological plane, which is divided into the 
relative steps of "higher and common sacrality" (Segal and 
Senokossov 1970: 80).54 
But any kind of ritual has always had a pragmatic purpose, as 
has been unanimously asserted by scholars: it is called upon to 
influence spirits, gods, forces of nature and people themselves — 
ritual as a whole is generally a magic (instrumental) act, which is 
carried out or inspired by an actant (or a collective) that has 
"entered" the sacral sphere of its memory. 
It is then unavoidable that the addressor begins to fulfil the 
role of the speaker, at the same time as fulfilling the role of the 
listener. In this function it starts generating a behavioural text.55 
On the sign-creation plane, it also produces performative signs: a 
magical act — a behavioural, spoken or other kind of pointing 
act — is a name, the use of which thereby designates the 
indivisibility of the act, which is being signified, from the 
operation. Saying the word is equivalent to carrying out the 
signifying action (Uspenski 2007: 51). "Naming reality changes 
its nature and the character of behaviour." Juri Lotman's 
discussion (actually supposition), that "the original function of 
speech was associated with magic", also proceeds from the 
generative character of performative signs (Lotman 1992b: 8, 
54 From this approach one can logically derive that mythological performative 
reproduction, in the existential plane, may also be the so-called zero-option: in 
carrying out ritualistic operations, the sphere of sacral existence is not always 
"entered", and the operations are carried out as an everyday routine in the 
everyday profane rhythm. The more dangerous operations, and those that are 
marginal in some other sense, are generally sacralized. (See Malinowski 1926: 
107-119; Segal and Senokossov 1970: 76-77). 
55 Cf. Mauss 2000 [1904]: 154. The standard for the magicality of ritual could 
be considered to be mythological cosmogony, which is the paradigmatic model 
for all kinds of creation and being (Eliade 1992, IV: 53-57). 
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20). These claims are in accordance with the information of 
Clyde Kluckhohn on the Navaho Native Americans, who, in 
order to participate in ritualistic acts, were all obliged to be aware 
of the secrets of sorcery. Otherwise they would be in danger of 
dying during the presentation of the ritual (cited by Segal 1970: 
40). They were not observers. 
A magical effect is created directly, irreversibly, automati­
cally, and it is personalized. It is indeed the performativity of a 
magical act that creates a formal basis for the claim that "in 
folklore a person is automatically great, not thanks to other 
people, he is himself big and strong, he is capable of defeating 
the entire enemy force on his own (like Cuchulinn 6)" (Bakhtin 
1987 [1975]: 96). 
Therefore, mythological as well as magical acts have a 
performative role, on the sign-creation plane, in communication. 
It also becomes apparent that mythological and magical 
behaviour are partially overlapping concepts as regards structure. 
The differences in performation are indeed to do with the fact 
that the actant of a mythological act is the listener (this is a 
name-taking situation); the actant of a magical act is the speaker 
(this is a naming situation). Taking a name is an analytical 
mimesic act; whereas naming is a generative, irreversible 
performative act that implements force. But the use of force is 
often associated with the "amplifying" delegation of the role of 
speaker to a "third party".57 
The border-"probIem" is also different. In a mythological act, 
the profane and sacral spheres merge and the border ceases to 
exist. The actant of a magical act inspires a new border.50 A 
"
6 Cuchulinn — hero of Irish sagas. 
Compare here the Estonian or the Russian expressions: "Andku Jumal sulle 
(talle) tervist" (May God give you (him) health); "Õnn kaasa!" (Good luck!); 
"Бог в помощь!" ("God help us!"), etc. Here we have in all cases a (partial) 
delegation of the magical acts to a "third party". 
-"8 It should be noted that the primitive man who carried out a ritual was 
naturally not aware of the borders separating the spheres through abstract, 
categorical characteristics, but in the hierarchical form of existential and 
axiological values (see Lotman and Uspenski 1973: 283-284), and — nota 
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magical act presumes a border: the object that/whom is 
influenced/persuaded, is located "there", or it is not seen, or 
emphasizes (if it is seen), the addresser of the magical act 
emphasizes the location of the object in relation to it in the 
"other" sphere. Even when the object of the magic act is me (in 
an autocommunicative act) — even then the magicality of a 
behavioural act is only possible if two, existentially, axiology-
cally and topologically different parties are made aware of it.59 
This analysis permits observation of one more nuance — the 
secondary deictic characteristic of performative sign-creation. 
Boris Uspenski contrasts performative and deictic sign-creation 
on the basis of the direction of speech acts, which are said not to 
occur in the former case. It should be added, however, that we 
believe that a deictic structural characteristic could accompany a 
performative act — the signified image of this is the progression 
of the performation act, and the moves that transform these acts 
into a plot. The magical effect may be automatic (irreversible), 
but the act itself may be (and as a rule it is) lasting and 
semantically accented (in strict correspondence with the standard 
set by the patrum more)60. 
bene\ — all this within the limits of the intellectual "abilities", which have been 
given to humans, and the semiotic characteristics of which are being examined 
here. 
' The important — autocommunicative — addressee of ritual as a collective 
magical act is the group (collective person) itself that is performing the ritual. 
For example, the progress of the rite may even contain (antithetic) asides 
(metaphors) that have a "misleading" effect: a magical initiation rite may 
include sex change role play, which Carl Jung has treated as an element of an 
initiation archetype, but which actually does not overturn the final effect of the 
signified act — the magical acquisition of sex (Jung et al. 1964: 128-132). 
Mircea Eliade, however, has seen here a regular series of magical acts: "it is 
not possible to become a sexually mature man before one has experienced the 
co-existence of the sexes — androgyny; in other words: one cannot reach some 
kind of separate and definite realization of ways of being [the name cannot be 
taken — P. L. J before one has experienced a way of being, generally [i.e. before 
one has undergone the regulated sequence of name-allocation — P. L]" (Eliade 
1998 11958J: 175). 
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And one more generalizing obervation. A (profane) actant 
who "enters" a ritual act is, as already noted, simultaneously a 
listener, who reproduces the text stored in the (cultural) memory 
(= analytical act), and a speaker who generates text, influencing 
the gods, spirits and himself. It is noteworthy that the semiotic 
mechanism of such a dual role of listener/speaker is not at all 
marginal, i.e. ritual-specific. Boris Uspenski, in describing any 
kind of text-decoding process, has emphasized that "under­
standing" a text, i.e. the 'meaning' of a text as a "translation", 
cannot be separated at all from the communication process, and, 
in addition, "understanding has the character of thought-
creation". It then follows from the meaning of this claim that 
"understanding [reproducing — P. L.] is analogous to modelling 
[generation — P. L.], understanding is realized through 
modelling": in order to understand the text, the addressee must 
be capable of placing himself in the generating position of the 
addressor = the creator of the text (Uspenski 2007: 101, 112-
113).61 There is nevertheless a difference between their roles: the 
reproducer (the one understanding) places himself in the role of 
the listener, whereas the generator (modeler) is in the role of the 
speaker. 
The communication between the profane and the sacral in 
ritual is not limited to performative sign-creation, which is 
recurringly characteristic to ritual. The magical role of the 
addressor is supported by a religious submissive relationship to 
god(s), spirits, the authority of the patrum more. Belief in forces 
that are more powerful than man belongs by its very nature to 
ritual (Malinowski 1998 [1925]: 87-91; Wittgenstein 1997 
[1979]: 2532-2534). Supernatural forces "demand 'signs' of 
61 [ raditionally, these communication processes have been analyzed by 
contrasting coding (activity of the addressor) and decoding (activity of the 
addressee). See, for example (Jakobson 1968 [I960]: 353). Boris Uspenski 
believes that there apparently is no special decoding mechanism present in the 
human brain. In the brain of the addressee there are only the means to identify 
the formal elements of language (message), which is not sufficient, however, 
for switching from form to content. (Uspenski 2007: 111-112). 
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submission" (Leach 1991 [1976]: 83). Most of the major 
religions have founded the fundamental teaching on 
communication between man and God on this structural 
characteristic of ritual behaviour (and have accented this): 
according to the words of Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, 
religion was born from the "absolute feeling of dependency 
directed to godliness" (cited by Cassirer 1997 [1944]: 138). Cf. 
"And unto Adam he [God] said: ... for dust thou art, and unto 
dust shalt thou return." (Genesis 3: 17, 19). In Christianity, the 
submission of man to God has been formulated ontologically and 
(against the background of the bliss of the Garden of Eden) in the 
form of tragic imperatives: a sinner from birth, and the only way 
out (to God's shining love) for man destined to die from his 
sinfulness is the way of submission: "...lest he put forth his hand, 
and take also of the tree of life, and eat and live for ever ... the 
Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden, to till the 
ground from whence he was taken" (Genesis 3: 22-23). 
In religious acts, however, the listener may also place himself, 
in a way, in the role of a speaker. Following the spirit of those 
characteristics of magic that we have indicated previously: in 
order to achieve the mercy of the gods, the concepts of 
sacrificing to God (see Lotman 1992b: 13), and approaching 
God, have been brought into religio (into the knowledge that you 
depend on the gods) and into cults — "therefore, magic tricks" 
(Balthasar 1994 [1974]: 1900), which are echoed there in various 
kinds of symbolic acts. Both magical and religious instructions 
are provided (directed) by transcendental forces — a 'force' that 
is personified or identified (able to be identified) with the 
addressor (see also Malinowski 1998 [1925]: 87). In religious 
communication this force operates as a speaker in the function of 
an addressee who, in the process of ritual acts, is the 
communication partner for a submissive listener. 
From the aspect of sign-creation, the created situation is 
utterly formative: the major religions have accorded vertically to 
the me and you (or him) communication. The mutual placement 
of the addressor (listener) and addressee (speaker) is 
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emphatically topological. Hans Urs von Balthasar claims, in 
justifying the analogy between Christian and non-Christian 
mystography that "with the best that there is in him [man — P. 
L.\, he belongs 'up there'" (Balthasar 1994 [1974]: 1901). Mircea 
Eliade has also concluded that "no world can exist without 
verticality" (Eliade 1992, VI: 69). This verticality also has 
axiological weight: "And he [Jesus — P. L.] said unto them [the 
Jews — P .L.]: "Ye are from beneath, I am from above; Ye are of 
this world [profane — P L.], I am not of this world. I said 
therefore unto you, that ye shall die in your sins" (John 8: 23, 
24).62 Religious communication in both pagan and Christian 
ritual is hierophanic — revelationary: "the sacral reveals itself to 
us — through an actual or imaginary speaker (Eliade 1992,1: 53, 
emphasis — P. L.). The addressor of the ritual transforms in the 
religious formative position into a listener, who believes and 
submits to the proclamations that are accorded to God. 
The second manifestation of formative reference in the 
structure of ritual is the binary opposition of the sacral (resp. able 
to be sacralized) sphere to the profane sphere.63 The (world) 'out 
there' — the (world) 'here\ them-us and the numerous 
variations of such opposites (yin-yang, heaven-earth, the dead-
the living, right-left, mythological twins, orphan-master's 
daughter, etc are polarized (see Abramyan 1977: 72-73).64 The 
organization of the world on the basis of polar characteristics is 
an ancient manifestation of universal classifications. Apparently 
62 The dominance of this up-down vertical positioning in the topological 
relationships of the addressee-addressor in ritual must nevertheless be 
considered to be recent, and a phenomenon cultivated by the major religions. 
As asserted by Edmund Leach, the border that separated the sacral 'other world' 
from the profane sphere could be the sky, the sea, mountains, a forest or desert 
(Leach 1991 [1971]: 72). 
63 Antithesis has been analyzed in more detail in Chapter 3 of the book. 
64 The Chinese yin as the dark beginning is in turn divided into a series of 
mythological similarities, according to which everything female — the earth, 
moon, north, gloom, death, even numbers, etc are opposites of the light 
beginning—yang, which is similar to maleness, sky, sun, south, light, life, odd 
numbers, etc (Riftin 1982: 547). 
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this communicative operation — that is characteristic of the 
intellect — has found such an extensive culture-textual 
embodiment due to the natural need to contrast chaos and 
cosmos and the outside world beyond the horizon (foreign) to 
one's own world. 
Archaic culture, as emphasized by Dmitri Segal, is antinomic 
both on the paradigmatic as well as on the syntagmatic plane. 
Every time a behavioural act affects one of the poles of a 
contrast, there is also indication of the other (Segal 1973: 39). 
The addressee of the reference in antithetic communication can 
be defined as the existential, axiological and/or topological 
antipode (mirror projection) of the addressor, and vice versa 
(Abramyan 1983: 136-137)65. Outside this communicative 
contrast the antithetic characteristics of neither actant are relevant 
or they even retreat (e.g. the us-them concept). All this expresses 
the direction of the reference towards deictic and topological 
processes — i.e. formative sign-creation. But the formative 
reference between the two antipodes does not necessarily have to 
be entirely exclusive. For example, if with two opposite fratrias66 
one is depicted as the embodiment of negative values and the 
other as dominantly positive, then, for both of them it could be 
"hinted" that some value(s) from the other opposite pole is (are) 
also present.67 Very rigid antithetic structures are relatively 
recent and are particularly apparent in the cultures located in Old 
and New Testament areas of influence (Segal 1973: 40, 42, 44) 
and, as seen in Chapter 3, in certain types of modern cultures. 
The antithetic placements in rituals that are connected by 
formative reference may be existential ('this-worldly" contra 
'other-worldly'), calendar-based (everyday and solstice-time 
behaviour), functional (identity-change during carnival time), 
role-based (activity that in common practice symbolizes life may, 
65 Chapter 3 examines this formal phenomenon as a symmetrical reduction and 
mirror projection of Soviet ideology. 
66 fratria — association of tribes in the prehistoric period. 
'
7 In some cultures, for example the Navaho Native Americans, this "hint", 
according to Clyde Kluckhohn, is even obligatory (see Segal 1973: 40]. 
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in a shamanic act, denote death) (Segal 1973: 40—41 ), effect-
based (white and black magic; every magical act can have a 
magical counter-act — Malinowski 1998 [1925]: 85), ontoge­
netic and social (a change of social status or sex that 
accompanies an initiation rite). One thing, however, is clear: 
antithetic formative reference is a recurring characteristic in the 
structure of ritual. The border between two opposite spheres may 
run between the profane and sacral, between two sacral spheres, 
or between a sacral sphere and one that could be sacral ized. One 
of the poles of antithesis in ritual must be a sacral factor, or a 
factor that can be sacralized, of a positive value scale. 
Formative reference in antithetic semiosis makes it possible to 
draw one more general (and somewhat problematic) conclusion. 
Culture scholars have noticed, whilst researching antithetic 
communicative placements, that archaic formative antinomity is 
not apparent just on a functional or pragmatic behavioural plane, 
but also on a more abstract cognitive level (Segal 1973: 39). We 
have already referred to Boris Porshnev regarding his 
information that the personal pronouns denoting I and we have 
appeared in language considerably later than the pronouns 
denoting they and he (Porshnev 1979 [1966]: 81). This brings us 
to the inevitable conclusion that the formative reference for the 
semantic identification of 'he' and 'they' could not have 
proceeded from I and we. What could have the person in the 
archaic era then have meant, semantically, with the use of he and 
they? There is only one presumed answer: the he and they of 
ritual was constructed as an enantiomorphic mirror projection of 
behavioural models that had taken root in the tradition of the 
actants of a sacral (holy) sphere. The referential object that was 
thus created as a negative sign could, in turn, be the antithetic 
basis for the formation of I (we). This is a presumption, but it 
does enable the explanation of both the secondariness and 
vagueness of the concepts of / (and we), and also the structural 
meaning of these performative acts in ritual, which we 
characterized above as the mythological identification act of the 
addressor of a ritual with the sacral sphere (with the patrum 
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more). Indeed, / and we probably lacked — for a long time — a 
separate identity from the patrum more. 
We have hitherto characterized the mythological, magical, 
religious and antithetic functions of semiosis in the 
communication between the profane and sacral sphere of ritual. 
But there is yet one other form of reference, and its applicable 
function, which should be called metaphoric or figurative. 
To delve deeper into this concept, let us proceed from one of 
the classification schémas of Roman Jakobson, which permits the 
characterization of figurativeness in a wider context and 
systematically. Jakobson adds figurativeness (metaphoricality) to 
Peirce's well-known triple reference system 
icon/index/symbol — as a new, fourth element, and calls it 
artifice68 (Jakobson 1985h [1975]: 215-216). 
This step is supported by the following logic. Jakobson 
postulates that Peirce's triad actually combines elements of two 
binary opposing pairs. These base oppositions are, on the one 
hand: 'contiguous'-similar' and, on the other hand: 'factual — 
'imputed'. Having transferred this observation to Peirce's 
system, Jakobson concludes that the "contiguity" of the level of 
expression, and the level of content, of the sign is "factual" in the 
index', in the symbol the "contiguity" becomes "imputed". The 
"factual similarity" of the two components of the sign in the icon 
is converted into "imputed similarity" in the (creative) artifice 
(resp. metaphor). In addition, Jakobson draws attention to one of 
the topological peculiarities of the referential structure of 
metaphor, which is in accordance with the temporal 
characteristics of Peirce's reference scheme. In other words, 
Peirce links the icon with past experience, the index with present 
experience, and the symbol with future experience. Jakobson 
claims that reference, in such a system of characteristics, is 
' * Jakobson is actually talking about a figurative sign (reference act). Jakobson 
claims that he borrowed the term from Gerald Hopkins's "Poetic Diction" 
(1865), where Hopkins characterizes the figurativeness of parallelism 
(artificiality) in poetry. (A good illustration of this is the cumulative 
metaphoricism of the parallelism rows in Estonian runic verse.) 
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characterized by the atemporality of the artifice: the equivalent 
"parallel" components of metaphor are always located in a 
"common context" (and this even when it is elliptically 
implicated) (Jakobson 1985h [1975]: 215—216]. 
This observation by Jakobson deserves to be developed 
further. It could be claimed that all five types of the sign 
(functions) (mythological, magical, religious, antithetic and 
figurative) in ritual can be differentiated and described in the 
context of three semiosic paradigms, which are the category of 
reference (performative, formative, informative); form of 
reference (icon, index, symbol and artifice), as well as the 
communicational and existential mode of linkage of the 
components of the sign (similar-contiguous; factual-imputed). 
See Table 1 for a representation of this system. 
This operational schema of communication lacks a very 
important feature, which characterizes the analytical 
reproductivity of the intellect, and which is present in the same 
way in all five types of ritual semiosis. (For this very reason it was 
also left out of the representation described in Table 1). The 
typology of signified communication in ritual is invalid without it. 
As previously stated, the addresser in ritual does not behave 
according to his own volition: his generative acts rest rigidly on 
certain mnemonic baggage, the authority of which is exhibited by 
ritual as a whole. This adds to the typological structure of 
communication one more sign-creating element - the "umbilical 
cord", which links the act to the sacralizable values ofpatrum more. 
In the language of reference categories, this is a case of formative -
autocommunicative - semiosis, which is characterized by genuine 
iconicity. Typologically, this is mythological semiosis. As an 
example, it is particularly obvious how the analytical mnemonic 
semiosis of signs such as black, homosexual, jew, etc, and 
dependent behavioural precendents, are as often as not governed by 
formative sacralized icons, with the character of collective relicts, 
that have accumulated in (collective) memory. The durability of 
such relicts can often be measured in thousands of years... 
In the context of the Table 1, the following needs to be said 
about metaphors in general and metaphors in ritual. 
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69 The table should be treated as an initial operational tool for organizing gene­
rative orientation. Actual processes are naturally more dynamic and may be 
intertwined. 
70 Linkage is described from the viewpoint of the linker. 
71 fhe abbreviations Mt, Mg, R, Ant and Mf may be used in the following text 
in the manner indicated in Column 1. 
72 See 2.2. for more detail on the genuine icon. 
' A symbol is a synchretic reference form, which as a rule contains iconic and 
indexical elements. 
74 Bnantiomorphic symmetry can be described as endophoric and/or exophoric 
iconicity. For more detail, see 2.2. 
75 Here is meant enantiomorphic similarity with a negative sign (see Chapter 3). 
6 Conditional similarity is valid for example in musical semiosis and also in 
abstract art. For more detail, see Jakobson 1985d [1970]: 327. In order to 
comprehend the metaphoric indeterminacy of sign-creation, reference needs to 
be made to the "formula of play" as expressed by Lotman, and referred to 
previously. Translated into the language of psychological concepts, this could 
also be expressed as: I know that S^P, but at the same time I believe that S=P. 
194 Universals in the context of Juri Lotman's semiotics 
Metaphor belongs to the system of tropes as one of the many 
mechanisms (functions) of "semantic indefiniteness".77 A trope 
is created on the contact border between two languages and, as 
claimed by Juri Lotman, it is, in that context, "isostructural, with 
a creative consciousness".78 A trope "comes to the fore in 
systems that are oriented to complexity, ambiguity and the 
inability to express the truth" (Lotman 1981a: 18). 
In defining a metaphor, I will use as my basis John Searle's 
discussions that are in accord with the standpoints of Juri 
Lotman. Searle himself does not write about formativeness but, 
in essentially accenting the formativeness of the metaphor, Searle 
claims that the metaphor is a speech act, where the meaning of 
the utterance "S is P" becomes "S is R". In attempting to further 
explain the principles of what it is that can even connect "P" (in 
the statement "S is P") with "R", Searle lists the following 
possibilities: 
i) things that are P, according to definition, are R; 
ii) things that are P, are conditionally R; 
iii) things that are P, are said or are believed to be R; 
iv) things that are P, are not R nor are they similar to R-things and 
they are not believed to be R; nevertheless there remains the fact of 
our sensibility (due to either culture or nature), that we actually 
perceive this connection. (Searle 1979: 107-108) 
Here Searle concludes that metaphors, which are not created on 
the basis of any "rules" or "principles", can also be products of 
our mental capacity. 
Metaphors (and other tropes) have special relationships with 
ritual. We must begin with the observation that archaic ritual has 
rigid rules. Ritual is behavioural text with constant functions that 
is cyclically mediated. The events of a ritual take place (they are 
reproduced) in a sacred (resp. sacralized) sphere, from which a 
77 Lotman defines a trope as "two elements that hold meanings that are mutually 
incompatible, between which, in a certain context, an adequacy-relationship is 
formed" (Lotman 198la: 10). 
78 iso- <isos (Gr) — same, equal. 
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reverent, submissive distance is kept that is protected by taboos.79 
Multiple meanings and uncertainty on the pragmatic level of 
ritual are in principle excluded — "in mythological text itself, a 
metaphor as such is actually impossible" (Lotman and Uspenski 
1973: 293). Indeed, a magic act has the purpose and role 
encompassing the whole (the eagle flying out of the flames is the 
soul of the emperor —factually), a performative name is unique, 
and the enemy is the symmetrical antipode of the predictably 
sacralized standard.80 
But in addition to the cyclical worldview, a vectorial 
development also emerged. The need to remember ever 
increasing amounts of information "gave birth to the memory 
mechanism, which was artistic by its very nature" (Lotman 
1992b: 20). This "artistic" (ambivalent, i.e. having the structural 
order of play) memory model (where, putting it simply, one sign 
has at least two simultaneous meanings) received an immense 
boost when man learned to separate the word, and the thing 
signified by the word, from each other. But the text with 
"indefinite" meaning stayed, in addition to the sacral ritual, as 
"chatter" in the profane sphere. Metaphoricality could emerge on 
the border of transition from the sacral to the profane sphere. 
Here the different languages clashed, where one part was formed 
by collective and "legitimate" languages, and the other part by 
individual and occasional languages. 
And even when the profane sphere with its "games, drinking-
sprees and permissiveness" broke down the rigid borders of the 
sacral world, the initial result was the ritualization (i.e. 
legitimization) of profanity (ambiguity) itself (Lotman 1992b: 
20). All this is particularly vividly seen in the medieval carnival 
14 If such a relationship does not exist, then it is a case of a practical act, which 
is not given a signified meaning. 
xo Clyde Kluckhohn, whose research is cited by Dmitri Segal, has also noticed 
in his studies on the Navaho that opposites are always constructed so that the 
antipode contains "at least one characteristic that is inherent to the opposite 
category" (Segal 1973: 40), which of course does not remove antithesis itself as 
a principle in the structuring of material. 
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culture, which has been thoroughly documented by Mikhail 
Bakhtin. In the Saturnalias and Christian passion plays, God and 
the emperor may be re-personified, "in play", as a slave, a 
criminal or a jester (Bakhtin 1987 [1975]: 106). But play or 
artistic quality (metaphoricality), which is a priori a character-
ristic of human intellect, finally and irreversibly destroyed the 
borders between the sacral and the profane world, joined the 
other sign functions in ritual, and transformed ritual into art — in 
the form of folk legends, folk tales, heroic epics, dramatized 
passion plays. But this did not mean at all the complete 
disappearance of sacral language from ritual, as can be seen, for 
example, from the performance of ta'zije that took place one-
and-a-half centuries ago. 
These discussions are not being conducted for their own sake, 
but illustrate the fact that metaphor, as an intellectual algorithm, 
belongs as a type of sign and as a function of text, also of newer 
rituals, in a certain culturally dominant and traditional system, 
where it has a definite generative role in giving meaning to the 
world, in addition to the other semiosic and communicative 
algorithms — instrumental means — that have already been 
observed. 
5.3.2.1. Ritual and code text. 
Ritual is a poly functional discourse. It collects the heterogenic 
specific structural elements into a synchretic, monolithic, united 
whole. The code system that forms the structure of the ritual has 
been productive in the generative sense. In adapting to the 
triumph of profane culture, it has found itself new spheres of 
implementation. 
Ritual as performance, together with its mythical plot has 
created a text type, which has had a lasting, reproductive effect in 
culture that has complemented and extended ritual. Here I have 
in mind code text, which was covered in another context in 
Chapter 4. 
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Juri Lotman has described the concept of code text rather 
sparsely. Except for recognizing that code and text are accented 
synchronously; that in communication each element of such a 
text can be treated as a paradigm that has been "subconsciously" 
stored in (cultural) memory, which "organizes" this memory, that 
code text, from its own viewpoint, is a monolithic syntagmatic 
whole, although it may be polyvalent in structure; and that it has 
in discursive processes a generative role, which appears, for 
example, in crime novels or in the exuberant production of the 
code in magic tales in the form of various text varieties — except 
for these features, he has not said anything else that is relevant81 
(Lotman 1981b: 6-8). 
The textual reproductivity oriented to code has also been 
described by other semioticians from the Tartu-Moscow school 
and by Lotman even earlier, without using the term 'code text'. 
Analogous logic in analysis has been used by Isaak Revzin in 
studying crime novels (Revzin 1964: 38-40); Vladimir Toporov 
constructs St Petersburg text, implementing a methodology that 
is close to code text analysis (Toporov 1995b [1971/1993]: 194— 
195; 1995a [1972]: 279-281). 
The body of text with the stories of Christian saints should 
also be added to the repertoire of code text, since it has the 
relevant characteristics for this genre. In the Islamic tradition, 
this is supported by the discourse depicting the "way" (tarJqat) of 
the sufis, which is no less voluminous. The path to Knowledge (= 
God) contains moving descriptions of submitting to Knowledge, 
absolute trust (tawakkul) in God, a repertoire of onerous practical 
81 The Vladimir Propp methodology, referred to by Lotman in the case of the 
code-text nature of magic tales, was oriented towards deriving — from the 
various texts that Propp presents as variants of one text — the common code 
that is the basis of all the texts (Lotman 1981b: 6-7). 
Such ideas, according to which the code in a magic tale is, in relation to the 
text, a sovereign and dominant element, should be sought from even earlier 
studies. (Propp actually transforms this code text into a metatextual description 
(Propp 1969 [1928]: 23-28).) I'm referring here to the descriptions by Axel 
Olrik of the epic laws of magic tales (Olrik 1909), and the type registers of folk 
tales (including Estonian folk tales) compiled by Antti Aarne (Aarne 1918). 
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and mystical devices (tarïq-al'amal) for reaching the goal, and 
consistent and strict opposition to the attractions of the profane 
world, in order to finally disappear, dissolve in Knowledge 
if ana), which leads to super-existence (bakä), into the embrace 
of eternity and the absolute, which a sufi may also experience 
before he has to leave this world.82 
What is noteworthy with code text is that the informational 
weight of the text drops to a minimum. In the functional sense 
the text circulates like a code, which the addressor and the 
addressee must know in order to understand each other. Code 
text does not add new knowledge, but generates a new text 
variant on the basis of a common code.83 This is the way we 
should interpret medieval stories about saints, and also their 
genial topsy-turvy variation in the parody "Decameron", where 
the text enantiomorphically "copies" the (always commendable) 
strivings of the holy man in his tribulation-strewn path to heaven 
— although with the difference that Boccaccio's heroes have to 
"chase the devil to hell" in order "to get to heaven" (see 
Boccaccio 1957 [manuscript 1354], II1-4 etc). 
As we know, code is a collection of conventional rules and 
restrictions, which ensures the comprehension of the message in 
communication.84 The concept 'code text', as has been said 
previously, connects the categories of code and text: in a 
communication process both code and text are structurally and 
functionally accented. This claim — that seriously affects the 
character of communication — deserves more detailed expla­
nations. 
The essence of the topic has been captured by Lotman in a 
completely different context, and already in 1971, when he was 
82 One of the obvious examples to illustrate this topic is definitely Ibn Tufail's 
"Living Son of the Vigilant", translated and commented by Haljand Udam (Ibn 
Tufail 1992 [12th century]). 
As indicated by Lotman, information on such a transformation has an 
especially important place in autocommunication (Lotman 1973b: 238). 
84 Vivid examples of code are the Morse code alphabet or the grammatical 
system of any natural language. 
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looking at the process of "learning culture" (Lotman 1971: 167— 
170). Having an interest in how the way of learning in a culture 
depends on the character of the code of the culture, Lotman 
compared the process of learning culture with learning a natural 
language, and drew some conclusions from it that throw light on 
this set of problems. 
Acquiring the mother tongue does not require a child to know 
any rules at all. These are replaced by texts. The child remembers 
what is said about something and, by copying the way it is said, 
begins to independently produce text. But to put together even 
the most elementary of foreign language sentences, the learner 
generally has to cram a whole series of rules. Of course, as we all 
know, in practice the learning styles are mixed: even in learning 
the mother tongue we cannot escape rules, and we can acquire a 
foreign language through a textual language environment. It is 
also important, that in learning any natural language — be it the 
mother tongue or a foreign language — the semantics and 
pragmatics (not to mention the modality and intellectual context 
added by the addressor and addressee) of the texts mediated by 
language remain external to language — being outside the 
border, a second-rate playground — as a sovereign and "closed" 
system85. 
Whereas two of the learning methods described here can be in 
principle implemented and combined for any natural language, it 
is different with culture. The method through which culture is 
(must be) learned, is dictated by the internal structure of culture 
itself. "Some cultures see themselves as a sum of certain 
precedents, ways of usage and texts, others as a collection of 
norms and rules. In the first case, right is that which exists, in the 
second case, that exists which is right" (Lotman 1971: 167). 
Hence the learning mechanism, the way of learning itself in the 
acquisition of culture, is not external to the language of culture, 
It was of course tiresome to study Russian in Soviet-era schools, when the 
textbooks overflowed with sentences such as "On the wheat fields of the Lenin 
kolkhoz the quarterly plan was exceeded", but ideology still cannot (could not) 
deform the quite independent grammatical oneness of language. 
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but is itself also a part of culture. In this connection, one of the 
culture types presumes being supported by custom, by text, in the 
learning process, whilst the other — by rules, grammar, code. 
According to this, the World that is brought into culture is also 
given meaning. The code, which is brought into "text"-culture, is 
transformed into precedence, an example; precedence, however, 
having chanced into "rule"-culture, begins to function as 
grammar, code. The principle of "being a text-collection"' or 
"being a rule-collection" changes into an implicit program that 
generates culture (кулътурообразующая программа). This 
question becomes particularly meaningful from the standpoint of 
the self-awareness of culture 
when culture inputs self-concept into its memory. [—] The model of 
oneself in some culture generally brings to the fore in it certain 
dominants, on the basis of which a unified system starts to be 
constructed, which is to fulfil the role of this culture's text-
autoreflection, and the role of the self-deciphering code. (Lotman 
1971:170) 
Ritual, I would dare to claim, is such a text type that definitely 
unifies in itself text, custom, precedence as well as grammar and 
the task of a self-deciphering code. This also means that 
mythological, magical, religious, antithetic and metaphoric signs, 
as well as functions in culture, can fulfil a certain unified 
autoreflexive and generative role as code elements. 
According to the term, code text can also have such a role. 
Apparently, or perhaps most vividly, this parallelism can 
particularly be seen in magic tales. It is probably this that Eleazar 
Meletinski, Sergei Neklyudov et al., had in mind when they 
wrote in their analysis of the semantics of magic tales that 
"globality is the specific characteristic of magic tales in 
particular", since the magic tales as a genre "model the world as 
a whole" (Meletinski, Neklyudov et al. 1970: 9). In addition, the 
"skeleton" of reality — the code used to classify the world, is 
emphatically conventional, collective, traditional and rigid. And 
this is indeed what the term code text denotes. 
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The entire magic tale is constructed on semantic and/or 
syntactic contrasts: rich-poor, our-other, enantiomorphically 
connected "wise"-"foolish", "home"-"forest", third (attempt) 
and first+second (attempt) — this is the way the Ant-code is 
implemented. 
Just about the whole progress of the story presumes unusual 
procedures, the use of miraculous formulas and uncanny means 
to achieve the aims, the intervention of a "third party" using "a 
force" (... then the old woman took and blew the silver whistle, 
and ...; ... the eagle ordered the boy to drop the grain of sand — 
and it grew into a tall mountain...) — this is the way the Mg-
code is implemented. 
The unconditional belief in / trust of helpers ("third party"); 
readiness to submit to all their wishes, commands and even 
punishments (... it is just as well that you called me "my good 
woman", otherwise...). Without the mercy of a helper, all greater 
goals are unattainable. This is the way the /?-code is 
implemented. 
The functional identification of natural and supernatural 
behaviour: the miraculous (character) becomes "natural" and the 
natural (character) becomes miraculous; the identification of the 
activity of the characters with rigid, conservative syntactical 
rules, which as indicated by Axel Olrik, the addressee of the 
story already knows — the law of repetition ( Wiederholung), law 
of the number three (dreizahl), stage duality (szenische Zweiheit), 
opposites (Gegensatz) and numerous other "magic tale laws" — 
this is the way the Mt code is personified. 
The polysemantic parallelism of the miraculous and the 
ordinary; the "co-flickering" of the ordinary (unconditional) 
behavioural form and the conditional: the metaphorizable 
complementarity of poverty and wealth, misfortune and fortune, 
laziness and initiative, good and evil, etc: knowledge + destiny + 
belief that poverty is also simultaneously wealth, that misfortune 
conceals fortune (that is known in advance), etc, etc — this is Mf 
code. 
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All these five codes (resp. code elements), sign types and sign 
functions known from rituals are the constructive dominants, the 
constructive frame of the magic tale as a World. 
Yet, it requires only some delving into the structure of saintly 
literature, romances of chivalry, or their literary processing, to 
notice the reproduction of code-textual dominants that are known 
from rituals. Cervantes, who parodied with inspiring wittiness the 
romances of chivalry (to be more precise, "Don Quixote" was 
more like a travesty), was generous in his use of the R-code, 
depicting Don Quixote's almost slave-like submission to his 
idealized notion of Dulcinea, raising the unpolished farm girl to 
the status of a saint86; constant identification games by the 
characters, events and actions with what they actually are not; the 
identification of the structure of the entire novel (on a certain 
formal level) during the lifetime of Cervantes with the highly 
popular type of genre — the romances of chivalry (Mt); the 
constantly peculiar procedures that Don Quixote dreams up to 
achieve his miraculous aims, or that are implemented, using 
contagious wit, to make a fool out of Don Quixote (Mg); fighting 
"enemies", windmills, and the tragicomical opposition of Don 
Quixote's and the circle of knight's worldwiews, the tragic 
contrast of Don Quixote's sacral world with the depressing but 
also comical vulgarity of profane everyday life (Ant); and of 
course an emphasized multi-planeness that permeates the entire 
novel, where the backbone is the figurative "dislocation" of the 
chivalry cult — the constant ambiguous and coinciding 
parallelisms of the text type and its parody (Mf). (Cervantes 1955 
[1605-1615]). 
86 The code of the novel parodies the medieval cult of the lady as a cliché of the 
romances of chivalry, the roots of which in turn lie in the custom of sufis to 
depict their relationship with God in the form of highly sensual (not to say, 
erotic) poetry and rituals. In order to illustrate this, I refer to a Persian poet 
called Ansari (1006-1089) and his rubaii (the Estonian [approximate] 
translation by Haljand Udam is held by this author but not yet published): "Into 
my veins flowed love, we were joined. /Through his will, my transformation 
miracle was born. /My friend, with himself he filled me to the brim, /I even 
became him, although I bear my name." Ansari's friend here is God. 
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5.3.2.2. The concept and structure of code signal. 
The sources for the concept of code signal are, firstly, the 
phenomenological concept of intellect, secondly, the dual-
categoriy of ritual and code text, and, thirdly, the treatment of 
text as a signal. 
The phenomenological concept of intellect, in this context, 
does not require additional commentary (see 4.3.4.2.1., 5.1. and 
5.2.1). However, the relationship of code signals with the 
concept of ritualized text, does deserve closer examination. 
Code signal, the same as code text, is a related concept of 
ritual — on the semantic, syntactic as well as on the pragmatic 
plane. But as regards the capacity of the concept, it is narrower. 
It is probable that the formation of the structure of the code 
signal can be traced back to that beginning stage of the 
mythological language described by Juri Lotman, "when 
practical behaviour, and giving it signified meaning, was not yet 
differentiated". An act could have become a receptive source for 
the semantics of a certain form of cultural behaviour (Lotman 
1992c: 12). Indeed, this connection can be particularly clearly 
seen in certain very archaic deposits of cultural texts, such as in 
"expressive phraseology" or in other words — abusive language, 
which, as proven by Boris Uspenski's observations, have deep 
magical, religious and mythological roots (Uspenski 1994a 
[1983, 1987]). An act (of abuse), and its given semantic meaning, 
have been inseparable, and presume real results — that has been 
the code signal. "Go to hell!" (let us not quote the "triples"), 
which nowadays we interpret metaphorically (figuratively), was 
probably a sanction of magical "force" that was clearly 
unambiguous in archaic cultures. 
Insofar as the 'signal' of the code signal is text, then we 
should start with the concept of 'signal'. 
The term 'signal' already unambiguously betrays the fact that 
this is a concept expressing communication. A signal as a sign 
presumes contact that is direct, or interpreted as direct, and has 
the only possible interpretation. This means that the addressor 
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and addressee of the signal must be located in the one chronotype 
and the one "situative space" (Uspenski 2007: 33, 103). In this 
sense, the relationship created as a signal is causative 
(teleological), automatic and conventional (Leach 1991 [1971] 
12-13). Signals do not presume feedback nor require translation; 
otherwise they would not fulfil their objective. For this reason, a 
signal does not have cognitive weight. 
Aleksandr Pyatigorski implemented the concept of a signal in 
order to describe the functioning of text. The purpose of this 
approach was to reduce text to an "elementary concept", which 
essentially meant the elimination of the internal structure of text, 
the multiplicity of its elements, and of the observation of mutual 
functions. As such, the text can be interpreted as a behavioural 
act. In the communication process it is now possible to follow the 
character of the variants of communicative associations 
(разновидности связи) and of signalization that have been 
caused by text — as a signal, and which may also have non-
linguistic (e.g. topological) characteristics (Pyatigorski 1962: 
144-147). 
Indeed, the concept of code signal must be treated in this very 
way. Juri Lotman, in sketching the magical, religious and artistic 
(play-specific) communicative relationships in his "Lectures", 
has actually proceeded from the criteria described above, but has 
not called these special forms of text code signals nor has he 
explored these characteristics in detail. 
Next we will attempt to model the general characteristics of 
this category that is important for culture. 
On the one hand, code signal is an element of the arsenal of 
culture codes, which has its roots in ritual; on the other hand, 
code signal is an intellectual phenomenon — an algorithm that a 
priori is manifest in the operations of the intellect. Therefore, 
code signal is an intellectual phenomenon that is formed into 
text. 
Code signal, as a behavioural act (in the wider, semiotic 
meaning of the word) has the characteristics of a signal. Such a 
signal is realized in the topological form of "stage duality" 
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(szenische Zweiheit)81 The actants of this duality are the 
addressor and the addressee, of whom the latter must indeed be 
located in the one speech reality with the addressor, and in the 
same chronotype, but does not necessarily have to be explicitly 
determinable ("Down with opportunism!", "Let there be light!"). 
An activity taking place in a sphere of primary reality (i.e. in a 
situation that presumes direct reaction) means that 
communication must take place between me (us) and you, or him 
(them) who has (have) been transformed into its (their) role, and 
whom can be considered to be the listener and speaker.8B The 
addressor and addressee of a signal can perform both as listener 
and as speaker. (For example, the addressor can be, as we know, 
a listener in a religious code signal.) 
The addressee is a structural element of code signal as text. 
For example, the listener of the magical code signal "Be 
damned!" and the content of the curse form a performative, 
indivisible whole — a name.89 
Regarding sign-creation, code signal — as the reader already 
knows from the analysis of the categories of sign-creation that 
are present in ritual — is either performative (in the case of Mt 
and Mg) or formative (Ant and R; Mf may combine both). 
Topologically, both performatives represent the 0-distance — 
for example, a curse (Mg) or also a mythological performative. 
The Baltic Chain in 1989 was a chain of mythological acts 
hundreds of kilometres long, formed of individuals from three 
nations: each 7' am holding 'your ' hand as the signans (denoter) 
87 Axel Olrik, in studying fairytales, noticed already a hundred years ago that 
there are never more than two actors at one time participating in a fairytale 
discussion — strict szenische Zweiheit reigns (Olrik 1909: 5-6). 
88 Boris Uspenski uses the term 'primary reality' (первичная реальность) to 
denote the actual speech act that unites communication partners (Uspenski 
2007: 86, 89). 
89 It should be added that Lotman has treated the inclusion of the addressee into 
the concept of text in a different context to the problem of the common memory 
of the addressor and the addressee; a common memory changes the addressee 
and its notion of its auditorium into a part of text (Lotman 1977b: 55-56; see 
also Uspenski 2007: 176). 
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of a sign was a sign of a name that, together with the signatum, 
formed a Name, with the content of desire for freedom that ties 
me (an Estonian, an Latvian, a Lithuanian) with you (an Latvian, 
a Lithuanian, an Esthonian) and with you (a Lithuanian, an 
Estonian, an Latvian).90 
As is known, during the World War II battles the hundreds of 
thousands of Soviet soldiers who were sent to the front line, often 
to almost certain death, were generally inspired by the slogan "3a 
Сталина, за Родину!".91  This is a combination of magical self-
sacrifice (Mg) and submission to the "Great Leader" (R), who 
actually did have the status of God — in the semiotic meaning — 
for the masses during the war.92 
Let us also look at an example of a second sign type — 
antithesis (Ant) — that also belongs to the formative sign-
creation class. 
The code signal "Долой эстонский фашизм!" that was 
extensively declared during the April unrest in 2007 was 
intended to mean that "fascism" is something that characterizes 
an Estonian as a typical fascist "element".93  Due to the 
symmetrical reduction typical of antithetic contrasts, there was a 
tendency — during these events — to see this "element" or 
substance in Estonians "generally", or "attached" to every 
Estonian and every Estonian thing (for example, cheese or the 
railway...). According to the enantiomorphic structure of 
90 This sentence, understandably, is the interpretation of signatum. See below 
for the essence of signatum. 
91 
"For Stalin, for the Homeland!" (Russian). 
9
" This signal mechanism, in my opinion, casts light on one of the tragic 
miracles of the Second World War: this author is completely convinced that 
these signifying relationships of religious submission and magical sacrifice 
were very important factors in helping the Soviet side defeat Germany in the 
war. (But of course: who could have then, or could now statistically register 
these effects?...) 
93 
"Down with Estonian fascism!" (Example of the anti-Estonian propaganda 
war carried out by official circles in Russia.) A much milder wording would 
have been "Down with fascism in Estonia!" which could be interpreted as a 
partial-decision (some S are P). 
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antithesis, such a determination of course contrasts automatically 
with the Ms-substance — that has the contradictory opposite 
"plus"-sign — of the addressor itself. 
In addition to contradictoriness, however, there is another 
interesting structural dominant that draws attention. It stands out 
that fascism's concept itself— that, which is discussed, that, as 
to what the word actually means (including whether or to what 
extent such a signified phenomenon has occurred in Estonia at 
all) — all this, as became apparent on the April "battlefield", was 
not at all important. There was (is) absolutely no interest shown 
in this.94 What turned out to be important was only the pragmatic 
purpose of creating a "plus"-whole as an opposite to "fascism" 
— the positive, "patriotic" image of "us" that unites people. But 
here too it remains completely unclear, as to what these words 
and this image actually signified ~ signify. 
When we again cast a glance at the other examples of code 
signal that we have analyzed, an unexpected fact becomes 
apparent. It turns out that all the relationships of code signals 
bear the seal of the same semantic fuzziness. This fuzziness can 
be seen in the "cursing" (that is denoted by "... Damn! .... " or, 
for example the call: "Long live..." the same could be asked 
about the human chain that crossed three countries (what is it that 
is operationally (specifically!) designated by holding hands in the 
context of the realization of freedom?); the concept of 'fascism' 
(regardless of the fact that the object of the reference was 
actually Hitlerism or National Socialism95) — for the apparently 
99 per cent of those who wanted to attach the word to Estonians 
— stayed a genuine "black box"; and what — for someone 
rushing to their death — was the actual and specific content of 
the slogan about Stalin, who was being treated as God? For the 
interpretation and comprehension of such types of expressions in 
' It is true that there were a series of fakes, using absurd arguments, but these 
did not manage to add anything important to the presence of negation. 
The latter term has not been used by Soviet ideologues, or by subsequent 
groupings under their influence, probably due to the undesirable associations 
that could be created via the signifier 'socialism'... 
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communication, attention needs to be drawn to another 
characteristic that Boris Uspenski accorded to a signal, and 
which, together with concept, has also become a new usage of 
code signal. A signal "in principle does not presume the creation 
of dialogue" and it "presumes a direct reaction by the addressee-
party, which is not comprehension in the meaning denoted by 
this word", since there is no mutual coordination of the 
experience of the actants, and the "conceptualization of reality 
that proceeds from this" (Uspenski 2007: 103, italics by P. L.). 
This matter, related to the structure of signalization, "permits" 
the signal to be semantically fuzzy (of course, not the traffic 
lights!). It would not be superfluous to add that in certain sign-
creation situations, and of course primarily in code signals, this 
communication "error" becomes natural, necessary and even 
obligatory. Consider, in addition to propaganda wars, the wider 
aspect of ideological "processing", advertising, religious and 
mystical rituals, and of course magic — the effectiveness of all 
these communication forms that are reducible to code signals "is 
fed" by the (mysterious) fuzziness of the meaning of signs, 
which does not exclude at all the completeness and precision of 
the pragmatic purpose of text as a whole. No rite is likely to 
escape this characteristic. 
If we presume (and we do) that the structures of code signal 
and ritual are related, then this conclusion permits us to cast light 
on one contradiction that an attentive reader may notice in our 
analysis of ritual. 
We have asserted earlier the existence of notional multi-
planeness of ritual on the one hand; and on the other hand, 
however, we have described the rigidity of the structural 
elements of ritual. There is now reason to declare this 
contradiction to be imaginary. One of the important 
characteristics of the rigidity of ritual, and now we can also say 
— of code signal — is indeed semantic fuzziness. Fuzziness in 
ritual turns out to be conceptualized. The formal characteristics 
of rigidity, however, can be defined in terms of sign types, and of 
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the performation/formation of these, as well as of reference 
forms (see Table l).96 
The notional fuzziness of code signals creates yet another 
question about what feeds this fuzziness. It is apparent from our 
examples that the semantic dominant of all the described 
communicative relationships is the sacral or sacralized sphere of 
the World ('our' patriotic being-free dream, the transcendental 
ominous pressure of becoming damned, me as a sacrifice to God 
etc). All these modalities are values of the sacral sphere that are 
in contrast to the profane sphere of culture. These objects of real 
or virtual reality, from the standpoint of the text of a code signal, 
are implicit: the text refers to these sacral fuzzinesses in the case 
of a name (naming) performatives, or implicitly, but also because 
of "analytical" pressure from the enduring conventional rules — 
in the case of formatives. This creates a legitimate question: are 
there formal indicators in the structure of code signals that are 
able to "form" and generate the sacralization of the dominants of 
the speech act? 
In order to be able to answer this question, we need to make a 
communication-theoretical detour. 
There is a class of elements in the codes of natural and other 
languages, where the meaning cannot be determined separately 
from the speech act (from the notification). For example, 'me' 
96 The phenomenon of information fuzziness in communication cannot be 
narrowly reduced to a phenomenon of social psychology, rhetoric or cultural 
history. For example, Umberto Eco, with his exceptionally rich database, has 
attempted in his research (based also on the standpoints of Pico della 
Mirandola) to tie the Hebrew language, as the language of Adam and Eve, with 
the functions of Biblical language: "In order to use this sacral language more as 
an operational force than as a communication means, it was not even necessary 
to understand the [Hebrew — P. L.\ language. [—] The more non-transparent it 
was, the brighter the aura from its "evocation" seemed, and the more its 
prescriptions avoided the intellectual powers (intelligences) of people, the 
clearer and more inevitable they became [must have seemed — P. L.] for the 
supernatural forces" (Eco 1997b: 51). There is reason to believe that although 
the connection pointed out by Eco definitely exists, it is probably secondary in 
relation to the other semiotic mechanisms. 
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cannot be anything else but a person (1) who says about himself: 
"me" (2). In essence, this is the case with a category that points 
to another message. This is a message in a message. Such a 
switching act of notification has also provided this category with 
a name — shifter97. The colour green in a traffic light is a 
denoter for stopping traffic (index); 'green' itself in this context 
means nothing else at all (it does not refer to anything else) — 
there is no other message here. Some peoples (also the Sami, 
according to Vyacheslav Ivanov) have the custom whereby every 
person has his own unique song (Ivanov 1998: 554). Song is the 
genuine icon of such a person; although the actual singing of this 
song (as a speech act) unavoidably denotes the person for whom 
song is the name. Song here is also an index. Roman Jakobson, 
following on from the example of Charles S. Peirce, has claimed 
that shifters combine the functions of symbol and index. He has 
defined shifters as indexical (indicative) symbols (Jakobson 1972 
[1957]: 97). Shifters, as has emphasized René Thom, have in the 
speech act a prominent role coordinating placements in time and 
space (Thom 1975 [1970]: 203-205). Following on from this 
theme, Roman Jakobson has especially examined verb categories 
(on the basis of Russian), and has described the shifterian nature 
of the categories of time and mode (Jakobson 1972: 100-109)98. 
In addition to these elemental grammatical categories, 
however, Jakobson introduces another, where its ability to be 
implemented seems as well to extend beyond the borders of the 
grammatical system of natural language. He calls this category: 
'evidentiality'.99 Evidentiality is a category of natural language 
and, as I presume — of cultural language too. Jakobson takes 
97 shifter — switching mechanism, switcher. 
98 Indeed: I sit, I sat, I have sat as signs expressing activity do not refer only to 
sitting as the location of a body (symbol), but also localize the time during 
which 'sitting' takes place. 
99 Jakobson provides the English word 'evidential' as a translation for the 
Russian-language term 'засвидетелъствованность . (The presence of eviden­
tiality in the grammar of natural language is illustrated by Jakobson using the 
example of the Bulgarian and Macedonian languages.) 
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into account three "facts": the fact being actually transmitted 
(En)100, the transmitting fact (Es) and, in addition to this, the 
transmitted fact of transmitting a fact (Ens) — i.e. "the 
information source denoting the fact that is being transmitted". 
Therefore: 
speaker E transmits a message about an event, based on the message of 
some other person [it would have been more precise perhaps to use here the 
word 'source' — P. L.] (on that which can be cited, i.e. on information that 
has been obtained from someone), on dreams (on information obtained via 
manifestations), on presumptions (on presumed data) or on one's own past 
experience (on data drawn from memory). (Jakobson 1972: 101) 
The source and data, which are "cited" or used by the addressor 
of a code signal, proceed from the sacralizable experience of 
patrum more that has been stored in memory. 
Here it is necessary — proceeding from the communicative 
specifics of ritual (and code signal) — to augment Jakobson's 
analysis. In the context of ritual (and therefore code signal), 
which is bidirectional in the sense that it links analytical and 
generative semiosis, it is not possible, in my opinion, to interpret 
a shifter as an "indexical symbol". In the analytical "direction", 
which in ritual (code signal) plays the Ens function, it is not the 
case of a symbol. In this direction (in the case of all five code 
signals), it is a case of a formative operation, where the content, 
from the viewpoint of the addresser, is identification with the 
sacral sphere. Such a semiosis is expressed by a genuine icon. 
This is why shifters — if they are examined in the context of 
ritual semiosis — should be seen as text structures, of which one 
element — Ens — is a genuine icon, and the other element is, 
respectively: in magical semiosis — an index, in mythological 
and antithetic semiosis — a genuine or endophoric icon, in 
religious (submissive) semiosis — a symbol, and in creative-
reference (in metaphoric semiosis) — an icon and a symbol. 
100 The sign 'E' denotes fact; 'n' (from the English word 'narrate') denotes the 
topic of the message, and's' (= English word for 'speech') denotes the message 
itself. 
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It can therefore be said that the existential space of code 
signal is divided — topologically and operationally — into three 
spheres, which are the sacral denoting sphere (in memory), the 
profane everyday sphere of the addressor and the sacralizing 
(able to be sacralized) generative sphere. It could be said, 
topologically speaking, that the fact of evidentiality, which 
(usually) precedes a generative act, is the common structural 
characteristic of all code signals.101 Evidentiality connects all the 
code signals with the norms of the sacral space (patrum more) 
that can be reproduced. The code signals, therefore, are double 
shifters: firstly, via the shifteriality of me (us), and, secondly, via 
the automatic reproduction of the sacralized codes of patrum 
more. 
It can now be said that the signalization process in code signal 
raises, via evidentiality, the status of the profane addressor, 
activating its analytical and generative force. 
The significance of code signals in communication seems to 
be supported by one circumstance that deserves attention. A 
magic tale, as illustrated previously, is an inexhaustible 
collection of code signals. As we have already emphasized, a 
magic tale — as a collection of code signals — contains no new 
information. Everything is known in advance — the characters, 
the trials and the happy ending are known by heart. But it is 
nevertheless the case that children can endlessly plead that the 
same story be read to them, over and over again. There is reason 
to believe that the magic tale with its repertoire of evidentially 
emphasized code signals, and the substantive imperativeness of 
its syntagmatic structure, is a dominant source for a child 
learning a culture. A child relates and attunes its a priori system 
of intellectual algorithms with text, which in turn is evidential to 
101 The differences in time categories in mythological and historical conscious­
ness have been studied in detail by Boris Uspenski. There Uspenski writes that 
in the mythological consciousness the past is simultaneously an omen for both 
the present and the future (Uspenski 1989: 20); a magical act annuls altogether 
the temporal succession of a magical act and effect formative and also the 
performative semiosis creates temporal and topological zero-distances. 
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the pragmatic repertoire of their implementation, as the sphere 
that encompasses the whole World... It is quite strange how a 
child is capable of intuitively comprehending the analytical and 
generative meanings of these mnemonic patterns. As already 
indicated in 3.2.2.1, asemantic texts that have been thoroughly 
organized syntagmatically, become the initiators of our 
associations. 
Therefore: mythological, magical, religious, antithetic and 
metaphoric code signal are shifters, and sacralizing 
'evidentiality', together with semantic indeterminability, are 
characteristic of the structure of code signals. Code signals are 
also probably the a priori algorithms of intellect. 
5.3.2.3. Code text and code signal. 
As we have seen, code signals are consistently represented in the 
structure of ritual. Insofar as code text also belongs to the 
unifying paradigm of code signal and ritual, then this parallelism 
dictates a need to mutually compare code signal and code text. 
The two-part nature of the terms designating code signal and 
code text accents the circumstance that in both cases a signifying 
integrity is denoted where code and text (resp. signal) compete 
— i.e. the dominants of two beginnings. The dominant function 
of code means that neither of these text types generates new 
information, but the texts reproduce as versions of a certain 
proto-form. They are reproducing text types, and they are 
characterized by the rigidity of structure, whereby the structure 
itself here also has a reproductive nature. Hence both text types 
have a mnemonic, orientation-creating basic value that organizes 
(cultural) memory. 
An important structural characteristic that makes code signal 
and code text similar is the evidential sphere that is considered 
sacralized resp. authoritative. The authoritative or sacralized 
actants (objects) of the evidential sphere are located, compared to 
the profane space, in separate spheres, where they have / they set 
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(have set) for themselves "game rules" that differ from the 
profane space. 
Using the concepts of 'detective', 'third son' ('third attempt': 
right-hand path), 'forest', 'orphan' etc in speech indicates — i.e. 
"transmits the fact of transmission" — that the detective is 
{should be) Sherlock Holmes or Poirot, that the third son is a fool 
who turns out to be wise, that the third attempt = success, and 
turning right leads one to one's purpose, that a forest is a 
mysterious environment that indicates caution, but also 
wonderous possibilities, and that an orphan is the embodiment of 
defenceless goodness. Elmar Holenstein presents a curious 
example from the article published by Roman Jakobson in 1931, 
titled "Der russische Frankreich-Mythus", which illustrates 
particularly vividly how evidentiality "works" in an antithetic 
code signal. An uneducated farmer's son from northern Russia 
who was disappointed in the Bolsheviks was in Moscow at an 
agricultural exhibition, where he happened to see a camel for the 
first time in his life. He shouted in distress: "Those scoundrels, 
look at how they have mutilated that horse!" (Holenstein 1976a 
[1974]: 58). Similar antithetic evidential logic was also used by 
medieval Catholics, when in speaking of polygamy they thought 
of hell, and identified Muhammad with the Anti-Christ. Readers 
who have already familiarized themselves with the previous 
chapters do not need additional explanation regarding that behind 
the fact of evidentiality are in turn rigid formal structural 
characteristics (in this case derived from antithetic 
contradictoriness). (In one of Mark Soosaar's documentary films, 
a starving child deliberated thus: "If there is something 
elsewhere, then it must be paradise because our life here is hell.") 
The difference between code signal and code text is initially 
apparent because the code text is a discourse with a developed 
script. It is characterized by the profusion and typological variety 
of code signals belonging to text (as we experienced when we 
looked more closely at magic tales or Don Quixote). Signal as a 
text represents a one-sided and one-time behavioural operation. 
Code text is dialogical, whereas code signal is monological. In 
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contrast to code signal, which has a maximum of two actants102, 
and one viewpoint that is directed to reality, code text is 
characterized by the abundance of characters and viewpoints. 
It is also important that the relationship with reality is 
different for the actants that embody the viewpoints of both text 
types. The addressor of code signal is an actant who is in the 
space of speech reality: this is a case of me-you-(ox a he- acting 
as ayoM>relationship, which is described in the terms of "speech 
generation". (For more detail, see Uspenski 2007: 36, 38). The 
deictical me-relationship also ties the addressor of the code signal 
with actual reality, i.e. with reality that is the substance of 
communication (see also Uspenski 2007: 12, 56). 
It can therefore be said that code signal observes reality "from 
the inside", whereas code text observes "from the outside". This 
is why the addressee of code text as a discourse is indetermined. 
The addressee of code signal is an element of the structure of 
text. 
Both code text as well as code signal are shifters, but code 
signal is a double shifter: firstly — via me; secondly — due to 
the evidential act, and thirdly — due to the time-topological 
coordinates of actual reality. The time-topological relationships 
of code text are mediated by the text-external viewpoint. 
The sign-typological nature of the behaviour that proceeds 
from the viewpoint is also determined by the space of reality. 
The relationship of the code signal's viewpoint with reality is 
mythological; the relationship of the code text's viewpoint is 
metaphorical (artistic). 
The cultural-historical and intellect-based connection of both 
code text and code signal with ritual necessitates the mutual 
complementarity of the texts that are denoted by these concepts. 
I his can be illustrated with the example of advertising. 
When advertising is treated as a communication type, the one-
to-one concurrence of the structure with the formal characteris­
tics of magic behaviour become apparent. 
The actant may also be one collective (mass). 
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The provider of advertising (transmitter) is a company that 
takes upon itself the role of the magician. The company 
formulates a magical act in the form of an advertising clip, etc. 
This act is concentrated on formulae, which in the advertisement 
are associated with a brand — a trademark that is used to identify 
the products (ideas) of a certain company (resp. party). The 
brand is surrounded by a sacral aura: we all know what fatal 
accidents may befall those who dare to tamper with the holy 
form of the brand, or who attempt to besmirch its authority. But 
no advertisement can "work" without referring to the sacral 
space surrounding the (evidential) brand, and this reference, 
according to the deep conviction of the company, must be one of 
the basic factors in achieving the effect. The sensing of brand 
characteristics in advertising is functionally identical with a 
shifter-type temporal category in grammar. This is evidentiality. 
The sole objective of a magical act is effect. Effect in 
advertising, just as in magic, is achievable through communica­
tion mechanisms, which have the sole purpose, not of the 
transmitted information reaching the brain of the consumer, but 
that it be realized in the form of an automatic purchasing reflex 
(voting, act). And for this, as we know, billions (even trillions) 
are spent throughout the world. 
One component of this communication mechanism, as in 
magic, is the "third party", whose 'force' is used to convince a 
person buy a product (adopt an idea). "Third parties" — and we 
cannot help but notice them when we are out on the streets — are 
the people decorating the advertising stands and building walls: 
David Beckham, Madonna, Erki Nool or someone else, on whose 
skin, or body, or by whom, etc, etc, the product being advertised 
is to achieve an effect-supporting "additional force". 
It is indeed interesting that the structure of advertising is 
connected to ritual as a text type in an even deeper way. All five 
communicative basic functions, and semiosis types, of ritual, are 
very obvious in the structure of advertising. 
Advertising constructs a consumer's relationship — that is 
devoted and excludes criticism — with the company, with His 
5. Universal forms of the reproductivity of intellect 217 
Holiness and with everything that represents the company. 
Structurally, this relationship (placement) is isomorphic with the 
religious code signal. The unavoidable contrasting of the goods 
(ideas) being advertised with most of the "present", "ordinary", 
"previous" goods (ideas) is explicitly or implicitly antithetic. 
Every good advertising clip creates a blissful atmosphere that 
accompanies the purchase — the mythological effect of blending 
into the sacral sphere. There is no further need here to describe 
the magicality or figurativeness of advertising. 
It can thus be concluded that advertising also bears the 
dominant characteristics of code text. This example should also 
unambiguously indicate the vitality and relevance of ritual and 
rituality in modern culture, and that the system of algorithms of 
the intellect may also take place effectively in text types that 
seem remote from ritual. 
SUMMARY 
The following summary does not aspire to present a statistical list 
of all the problems analyzed in the monograph, but concentrates 
on substantive dominants. Therefore, the following needs to be 
said about the analysis of universals and its context in the 
semiotics of Juri Lotman. 
In the preceding pages, the author needed to find an answer to 
the question, as to what actually are the "communicative 
functions" of social texts, which Juri Lotman had in mind in the 
schema of his Fourth Lecture that is also published here. This 
quest immediately brought to the fore a number of fundamental 
questions: (1) were there any other functions, besides semiotic 
functions that formed a schema, which could be treated as 
belonging to the same sequence? (2) what kind of isomorphic 
signified characteristics belong to texts that bear such functions? 
(3) do texts that fulfil such functions form a systemic whole, and 
if they do, then what is the source that generates this wholeness? 
and also (4): what guarantees the reproductivity of these 
functions (i.e. their remaining in the reproductive arsenal of 
culture)? 
Two of Lotman's ideas were taken as the point of departure 
for the discussion. In the Fourth Lecture he claims that social text 
and social function are "separate things": in society, social 
function has "its own life" and may be "very enduring". From 
this it could be concluded that Lotman's "social functions" are 
apriority phenomena, as regards to text. Secondly, Lotman did 
not tie his "functions" to any specific text type, with any culture 
or era, from which it proceeds that he accords such functions 
universality. 
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In analyzing the communication algorithms that bear these 
two characteristics, the author happened upon unexpected 
circumstances that had become apparent in Lotman's texts. 
It became clear that Lotman had interpreted such functions 
everywhere as virtual, language (in the Saussure-like meaning of 
this term) phenomena. This was in accord with the fact that 
Lotman had not terminologically analyzed textual equivalents 
anywhere that were applicable to these functions (not taking into 
account the use of the concepts 'proper noun' and 'myth' in 
mythological analysis, or defining the concept of 'antitext' and 
'anticulture'). This discovery is understandably also reflected in 
this monograph: in the first three chapters, the author has initially 
called code signals "universal algorithms", then "cognitive 
structures", then "schémas" and "imagination schema". (The 
latter term was borrowed from the research tradition of Lakoff 
and Johnson, but the author soon realized that the research 
paradigms of the Tartu-Moscow school did not coincide with the 
cognitive-linguistic empiricism that is represented by the 
Chicago school.) 
It then became apparent that the schema in the "Lectures" 
remained the only attempt to determine the repertoire and 
systematicness of these algorithms, and that Lotman has not 
posed the question anywhere later on regarding the numerical 
value of the phenomena belonging to this schema (the 
necessity/lack of necessity of increasing/decreasing this number). 
He does begin, soon after the "Lectures", to study the 
mythological and antithetic communicative functions that belong 
to the same sequence as the elements of the schema (both 
together with Boris Uspenski, and occasionally in different 
contexts). In both cases, these analyses are characterized by the 
textual implementation field that has been thoroughly developed. 
In his independent activities, Lotman delves particularly 
thoroughly into the analysis of metaphoricality in the structure of 
artistic and play-quality texts, without dedicating himself there 
either to the study of 'metaphoricality' exclusively. 
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But it is not just the number of functions belonging to this 
repertoire that Lotman leaves open — he also does not raise the 
question anywhere, as to which semiotic common characteristics 
these functions possess in communication, and which text with 
common characteristics they do produce. Understandably there 
are problems that remain unresolved, which are associated with 
the system of functions, their generative source and mechanisms 
that generate reproductivity (all this is limited to only analyzing 
functions, proceeding either from the listener or speaker). 
In the light of these facts, this author was forced to admit that 
— notwithstanding the significant ideas and intriguing start of 
the search for solutions in this direction of study, which is the 
determination of the formal common characteristics of the 
mythological, magical, religious, antithetic and metaphoric 
communicative algorithm — the search has stopped half-way. 
Nevertheless, it should be immediately emphasized that many 
of the thoroughly researched semiotic concepts, without which it 
would not be possible at all to define the algorithms of the 
intellect and their applicable "social functions", did exist in Juri 
Lotman's works (the reader also had the possibility to become 
acquainted with these). It is indeed a shame that the Tartu 
professor did not implement these himself (did not have the time 
to implement?). This is why the author wants to emphasize that 
this monograph is to a great degree an attempt to reconstruct a 
complete system in the form of a model, proceeding from 
Lotman's ideas, which actually could have been produced by Juri 
Lotman himself. My system proceeds from ideas that could be 
called the conceptual axis of Juri Lotman's semiotics. 
Here I have in mind three fundamental categories, denoting 
phenomena which in culture have a universal character, and into 
which the reader had the opportunity to delve more deeply in the 
previous pages. It is indeed these that form the universal context 
that was taken into account in the titling of the monograph. These 
categories are 'intellect', 'vertical isomorphism', and the 
complementary, constitutive and generative role in culture of the 
innovative and reproductive processes of culture. 
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The idea of vertical isomorphism permitted the discovery of 
yet another aspect of Lotman's heritage — i.e. the phenome­
nological background for his semiotic system, which I examine 
in some detail. I was guided to this background, and the nature of 
Lotman's semiotic contacts, by one of Aleksandr Pyatigorski's 
three reproaches to Lotman in 1994. As the reader already 
knows, Pyatigorski believed that the "naturalization" of culture 
in Lotman's semiotics had resulted in a situation where it was 
possible to speak "not only of 'how I comprehend culture' 
(which has also been spoken of previously) but also of how one 
specific culture comprehends another culture or itself' 
(Pyatigorski 1994: 326). In again commenting on this misunder­
standing between Lotman and Pyatigorski, I would like to draw 
attention to a new aspect, which could have caused the erroneous 
interpretation of Lotman's conceptual bases (this has also 
happened elsewhere). The crux of the matter is as follows. 
When Lotman describes the issue of the mutual 
complementarity of intellect, text and culture, and the mutual 
exchangeability of functions, he definitely does not mean that, if 
the intellect starts to fulfil the role of text in communication, it 
then stops being the intellect, and vice versa. Lotman has 
repeatedly emphasized that although text is a (live) organism, in 
order to "initiate" the processes that can take place within, it is 
always necessary to connect it into a common "stream of 
current" together with the intellect. Nowhere has Lotman written 
that texts could "speak" to each other, independent of the 
intellect. 
Lotman's standpoint, which Pyatigorski, in my opinion, has 
erroneously interpreted, creates an important contact with his 
semiotic concept and Eduard Husserl's analysis of intention that 
is independent of dualism and accents intuitiveness and 
"essentialism". 
The key concept in the monograph is the five code signals. 
The code signal belongs to the category of universals. 
Universality as a concept in general is treated in the monograph 
as a phenomenon of speech reality : the universal elements of the 
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intellect and culture are characterized by functional and structural 
constancy, but they are variationally explicit in the speech 
processes. 
The term 'code signal', and its applicable concept, are derived 
from Lotman's concept of 'communicative function', 'intellect', 
'code text\ and from the concept of 'signal' defined by 
Pyatigorski. Code signal, in relation to speech and behaviour, is 
an apriority and universal intellect-based algorithm. It is a 
phenomenon that is constitutive (in the context of vertical 
isomorphism), reproductive (mediating cultural memory), 
communication-structure-determining (of the mutual placement 
of actants) and generative (sign-creating). The systematic 
description of the concept of code signal has been the principle 
goal of this monograph. 
From the repertoire of code signals, the author has selected 
for closer observation the intellect's magical (two conceptual 
schémas!) and antithetic algorithms, and in describing their 
structures in some detail, has noticed in both structures the 
referential "bidirectionality", which can also be treated as an 
analytical (in the area of memory) and generative (in the area of 
sign-creation) functional characteristic of code signal. 
This dual character of the structure of code signal became 
fully apparent to the author only when he discovered (through the 
concept of code text) that all five code signals form the basic 
functional structure of ritual. 
Being a relict of ritual, code signal reproduces the basic 
characteristic of the structure of ritual — the obligatory 
interlinking of the profane and sacral worlds. In this context, 
every code signal is a so-called double shifter: as a signal it 
makes explicit the тие-уоы-relationship; via 'evidentiality' it 
must always be linked to the sacral sphere, which indeed gives 
the code signal the required authority and exclusivity. Code 
signal is a ritualising form of communication; and ritual has 
determined, historically and functionally, both the repertoire of 
code signals as well as the important characteristics of structure 
(partially via code text). 
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Therefore, there is reason to emphasize that in talking about 
the semantics of code signals, it is not possible to be limited to 
the analysis of the verbal meanings of a statement. The ritualized 
and sacralized semantic basic structure of code signal is apriority 
and intellect-based, and can be described via topological, 
generative and evidential reproductive characteristics manifested 
in communication and autocommunication. The intellect-based 
basic structure is probably older than verbal language, and it has 
developed relationships, of various levels of dependency, with 
verbal language, but such an analysis was not part of this study. 
The author believes that in his examination of the concept of 
code signal he filled a certain gap in the intellect-analysis of Juri 
Lotman, and developed to completion this valuable idea that he 
initiated in 1967. He also hopes that revealing the intellect-based 
and ritual-based nature of code signals in the monograph will 
enable the better understanding of, for example, the uncritical 
communicative act of submission of the intellect may be an 
emotional burst or an intellectual operation, which has the name 
of a religious code signal. A metaphoric communication act may 
be a rhetoric speech act; but when this ambiguous message is 
evidentially connected with a sacral memory field, an aesthetic 
structure is created that has the value of a code signal. When 
Marcel Duchamp attached a pissuar to the wall of a Paris gallery, 
this metaphoric act acquired a sacral dimension via reference to 
those artistic manifests that contrasted the exposition of a pissuar 
to "profane" "other" "ordinary" art. Here it must be added that 
despite the thorough analysis of metaphor, this structural 
characteristic of metaphorical code signal has also not been 
described by Lotman. The author sees here a contact point 
between semiotics and aesthetics that has a promising future, and 
could be the point of departure for further study. 
This hint permits the hope that these previous lines could be 
of some use to researchers and practitioners of communication 
theory, propaganda (including advertising), (social) psycholo­
gists, folklore scholars, and in the fields of rhetoric and of course 
aesthetics. Perhaps this book can help cool down the passions of 
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those people who in their attacks on religion and religiosity have 
not bothered to delve deeper. 
For the description of Juri Lotman's own semiotics system, 
the problems examined here should create a new, spatial 
dimension. The author would like to hope that on these pages he 
has managed to reconstruct and realize some of Lotman's ideas 
that remained unimplemented by the leader of the Tartu-Moscow 
semiotics school. And this has been to a great degree possible 
due to the other masters of the Tartu-Moscow school, whose 
ideas I used in fulfilling this task. 
APPENDIX 
Juri Lotman 
SEMIOTICS OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIETY 1 
(Lecture] I 17 Nov 1967 
Semiotics deals with issues of signification and communication. 
But what is it, when we talk about man, that justifies us thinking 
about communication at all? To what extent is the concept of me 
connected to signification and communication? 
The science of the 19th century created a conception of 
personality as a biological being. For us the boundaries of 
personality have been associated with the boundaries of the 
biological unit. On the other hand, the 19th century overturned the 
conceptions of man [being valid until then], and the boundary 
between man and beast became certain for us. This is the base for 
Darwinism. 
1 This lecture series was given at the end of 1967 at Tartu University on the 
initiative of students interested in social issues (particularly in sociology). These 
lectures (as with most of J. Lotman's lectures) have not been published. Of this 
series, the notes of only one listener (Marju Lauristin) have survived, and even 
this arrives for the first time on the reader's table after being transcribed by me, 
and in an incomplete state, since one of the four lectures was missed. I received 
the texts of the lectures in the summer of 1968 and rewrote them by hand, 
preserving completely the wording used by the note-taker, the abbreviations, 
language and punctuation. (The original text has been lost by the note-taker.) It 
should be said that an important part of the lectures has been reproduced by J. 
Lotman, with minor or major changes, in two works (Lotman 1967c and 
Lotman 1970e). This publication of the "Lectures" is a first edition, if one does 
not take into account the publication of an excerpt of the fourth lecture that was 
an appendix to an article (see Lepik 2002a). 
The missing parts of word abbreviations and the words not included in the notes 
but necessary for understanding the text are added in square brackets. The 
footnotes are by the author. 
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However — classical natural science has not enveloped 
everything [in the animal kingdom]: for example suicide by 
animals, which hints [at that], that the unit is not a single animal 
but a population. Altruism amongst animals cannot be explained 
by the fight for an individual existence. There are cases (over­
population) where animals cease reproducing. The concept of a 
biological being is unclear. 
A single being cannot be made to coincide with an "atom" in 
a given system. 
The understanding that a single being in human society 
corresponds with a being that possess clear boundaries is far 
from universal. 
It is easy to be convinced that the concept of personality itself 
cannot be separated from the concept of communication. 
On the other hand, this concept depends on the character of 
communication. 
Approximately, there are 2 categories of communication: 
a) within an organism 
b) between organisms; 
within [organisms] takes place signless [communication] 
between [organisms] takes place sign [communication] 
(Communicating with oneself via signs cannot be considered 
communication within an organism)2: 
, i.e. At-Ati 
Autocommunication proves to be an interesting and extensive 
category of communication. It is associated with memory. 
2 The't' in the scheme apparently denotes 'message', and the V' indicates that 
the reception (perception) of the message is always connected to the 
transformation (change) of this certain category. 
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It is clear that the personality is the joining of [its] certain states 
with the help of memory. 
Man uses words to organize his self (to overcome pain, etc). 
My behaviour is to a great extent dependent on how I call 
myself. 
Recognizing oneself: "I am not yet a villain". 
The problem of "me" and the "other" is always a signified 
problem. 
Moving within one culture we consider much to be "innate", 
"natural", etc. Much of what we consider natural proves to be a 
characteristic of speaking with oneself. 
The problem of personality is a problem of language as the 
connection system between me and you. 
Paradoxes. 
Belief in the relativity of oneself, including the relativity of 
scientific language — otherwise it would be a case of religion. 
"Russian justice" (12th century): killing the person who 
insulted one's honour — compensation was not demanded [from 
the killer]. A blow with the fist was worse than killing with a 
sword. With a sheathed sword — worse than with the blade, 
"damage" — "personality"3 
I killed a person but with the blow of my fist I insulted the clan. 
Mayakovski: "to melt as a droplet into the masses" [approximate 
translation]. The right to a university education in the 1920s 
depended on social background. (A person existed as a part, just 
as in the Middle Ages.) 
Existing is a vital element of self. But it is apparent that the 
concept of "existing" is itself signified and does not correspond 
to the concept of biological existence. 
Hegel has "existing" peoples = [peoples], who are connected 
to the [developmental] processes of the world, and "non-
existing" peoples. 
1 The point of this apposition is unclear. 
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Existing means being connected. But being connected is itself 
also different. A person who in the Middle Ages did not belong 
to a fraternity did not exist at all, he was a zero. Killing an enemy 
was a deed, killing an outcast was not. 
But this is not so in every culture. To the enlighteners existing 
meant being whole. Rousseau: it is the person himself who 
exists. 
With the collective growing my part reduces, I become a part, 
[i.e.] nothing at all. 1 
In possessing a servant I am the slave of my servant, I am a 
fractional part, I do not exist. 
To be a part, this has different meanings in different cultures 
— demeaning or solely justifying. 
For the medieval person the other world — that is not directly 
provided to us — is very meaningful. 
I 
"us" УРЛ 
In principle, the whole world holds together just like an immense |L< 
word, which has an expression (everything that we see) and 
content — meaning, purpose. We notice in the word that which 
is associated with meaning and do not notice anything else: £65 
В. ш 
I 
In the Middle Ages: who "lives"? Only those who "represent". 
Which love is more valuable than others? That in which love 
itself means something. And this is all the more valuable the 
more removed it is from practical activity. || 
Explaining the behaviour of a person using economic reasons 
— this is undoubtedly correct in our language. But in the 
language of knights it is pointless. \ 
But the sign is also a part. A part that has a relationship with 
the whole, not as a fragment, but as a representative: I represent fe 
in myself the whole: insulting me is not insulting a part, but fy 
insulting the whole. 
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The personality in the Middle Ages was not repressed, it 
either did not exist or represented its group in its entirety. 
The world is constructed from parts, not: О О О О Q, ,but: 
just like a matryoshka. 
The whole is deeper than the part, but isomorphic with it. 
Moving from the part to the whole is movement in the direction 
of depth. With one word everything is said (for God). 
The greatest range of rights was used by either the prince or 
the beggar. 
During the time of absolutism [there was] another 
understanding: I exist only as a son of my state, I have only a 
part of the rights. 
Thus we are convinced that the most basic, even habitual 
concepts — existing, benefit, etc, prove to be derived from that 
language which organizes the given association. We can imagine 
the history of social relationships as the history of languages, and 
the typology of social groups as the typology of languages. 
[Lecture] II 
We could imagine a social structure, which dictates social 
behaviour as a certain language. The activity of a person in 
society can then be imagined as talking; acts, imaginings become 
words, which can be assessed as right or wrong from the 
viewpoint of that language. 
Any individual behaviour whatsoever is a certain linking with 
an organized association, which has rules of behaviour that are 
made explicit (legal, for example) or not made explicit, but 
which nevertheless exist. The feeling that rules have been 
violated betrays their existence. 
Not only the violation of a rule, but also the freedom to follow 
the rules betrays the foreigner. ("You speak Greek too well!") 
Over-enthusiastic following of norms is equivalent to violation 
[of the norms]. 
230 Universals in the context of Juri Lotman 's semiotics 
Whereas linguistic communication was provided primarily by 
"comprehension", then in social mechanisms the most important 
is "non-comprehension". This is one of the most central social 
problems. One [and the same] mechanism [forms the basis] of 
comprehension and non-comprehension. 
To comprehend the world, compare that world with some other. 
Contact itself presumes being able to speak not only a natural 
language, but also other languages, starting with the simplest, 
closely linked to natural language (gestures), to the very distant 
ones. The entire system of contacts, therefore, is multi-layered. 
In his behaviour, man is similar to a polyglot. Behaviour is 
regulated by complex systems. The polyglotism of behaviour 
determines: 
a) differentiation of associations — different behavioural styles 
in different situations and in different places. 






(Culture) NB! — distorted interpretation 
of behaviour! 
Living is a system of rules — 
[it includes] norms just as in 
language. Only in the 
environment of foreign living 
conditions does the ordinary 
seems unordinary 
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The situation forces upon [its own] language. But the thing is 
that any social behaviour whatsoever is speaking in many 
languages.4 
Therefore, practical items are also almost always signs (a spade 
in practical life; a spade in a museum). 
Cultural types in connection with types of meaning. 
There are two types of meaning: 
a) something has a meaning because it substitutes for something 
else. 
о 
~ —> semantic meaning. 
b) a + b = c. Meaning is created through dependence between an 
element and its neighbours in the same row of elements; (We can 
change the semantic meaning if we substitute [values for the 
elements] a = 5 etc; but [in the second type] this is not necessary, 
we can express "a" via "b" [etc]). [Thus is created] syntagmatic 
meaning. 
Just imagine the various types of cultural meaning5 
4 In the notes, this is followed by half a blank page. 
5 Here are obvious gaps in the notes. In the notes, the table presented by J. 




This is why the following table is presented as the version published in an 
article by J. Lotman in 1970, where the same typology of meanings is analysed. 
In the interests of ease of reading, it has also been slightly simplified here I See 
Lotman 2000 (1970): 401]. The "plus" and "minus" signs denote the existence 
or non-existence of "semanticity and "syntagmaticity in the cultural type. 













There are four cultural types: 
1. Medieval (semantic) [cultural type] 
2. Syntagmatic [ " ] 
3. Enlightenment (—) [ " 
4. Semantic-syntagmatic -
(e.g. Hegelianity) [ " ] 
[I. Medieval cultural type] 
The whole world (and man) receives meaning through an essence 
that is external to him. In order to have meaning it is not 
necessary to belong to any kind of series of signs. In order to 
have meaning 
a) the sign must have a material expression (real world, man); 
b) every thing [must be] unique; 





saint — sinner — soldier — slave 
However, the world is not their sum but movement from a slave 
to a saint. In order to have meaning I do not have to form a group 
with another soldier, sinner, etc (although practically this is 
unavoidable). The theory divides the groups [into parts]: 
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soldier 
druzhina <— soldier 
Practice — <— soldier 
monastery <— 
It is interesting how practice and theory fight. (The theory-
practice relationship is generally interesting.) 
The monastery theory: keep away from the masses, remain 
alone, become yourself the expression of all. Medieval people 
strive for solitude that is the norm — to the hills, deserts, forests. 
In practice, this results in colonization (next to one cave springs 
up another, etc). 
In the same way, a killing that is carried out by a group is not 
held in honour, whereas a duel is. 
It seems to us that it is natural for man to strive towards the 
majority, but in various systems "belonging to the majority" is 
valued in various ways. 
In the Middle Ages: striving towards the minority is the norm. 
It is proper to join the ranks of those who live worse. 
It seems natural that man strives to be successful. But the 
concept of "success" depends on the language. In the Middle 
Ages, the highest reward was a death that was realized by 
following the rules (death in battle). Death at home in bed was 
equal to life. (In the Galicia-Volynia chronicles there is the 
scornful expression: "those lovers of life".) 
The success of a saint is concealed in the system of 
relinquishing, non-success — in the system of acquiring. 
Meaningfulness increases at the cost of 
a) separation from the [common] row [or] 
b) reduction of the material part of the sign. 
It is more valuable when the meaningfulness aspect is more 
important that the expressiveness aspect. 
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Such a type of cultural system does not only offer a system of 
meanings, but also provides a system of values. In connection 
with this, prescriptive standard behavioural norms are also 
created, which in every system are divided amongst two target 
groups: 
a) the group of people who carry out acts, 
b) the group of people who do not carry out acts. 
Carrying out an act from the viewpoint of the cultural system 
[This] could be interpreted as a series of prohibitions. Behaviour 
is a chain of prohibitions. It is interesting that in a given system 
there are always 2 groups of people: 
1) those for whom the prohibitions are total; 
2) those who have the right to violate prohibitions. 
The groups can be differentiated according the strictness of the 
norms. 
An action is that vital behavioural act that is used to violate a 
certain prohibition. 
monsters f Safe place 
corpses /them ^ \ for the 
homeV (home)) Hving 
Normative everyday activities at home, no miracles occur.The 
witch chases you only to the borders of home, not crossing them, 
living 
There are two types of heroes: "us" and "them". 
The safer the home is, the more terrifying the forest. Build a wall 
between you and the "out there", and immediately the "there" 
starts seeming dangerous. 
A hero can go "there" and return from "there". 
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Important social motive: 
us them 
ours theirs 
The action is the violation of some kind of social prohibition, 
violating the borders. 
In the Middle Ages: 
behavioural act is an internal act 
expression is an external act 
The basic prohibitions apply to the system of internal acts. 
II. Syntagmatic system 
This is system of practical behaviour. ("Enough of our 
mystification!"6) There is the practice that in the Middle Ages 
had been promoted to theory. In a syntagmatic system only real 
practical life exists. 
Since this is the only real situation, there exist people who 
form a chain. 
The whole possesses meaning — progress, state, church. 
Meaning is created via belonging. 
That which exists separately has no purpose. 
"We are building a theocratic state, but you want to know 
how the Earth rotates." — That is pointless! 
The first [= medieval] system did not introduce external time. 
The world as meaning was presented as it was, movement took 
place within it. 
The second [= syntagmatic] system takes into account external 
time. 
I l  I  1 1  1 1  I  ^ open series 
6 This quote and the following quotes apparently indicate quotes by 
Peter I. 
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Altruism is again demanded from an individual but in another 
sense: 
useful is that which is beneficial to the whole. The majority is 
more valuable than the minority, it is victory to join the majority. 
Losing is equivalent to betrayal. 
There is a biting description from the 14th century with the 
same story as in "Igor's Campaign". That which was heroic in 
the 12th century, now seems laughable ("Story about a battle on 
Pyana"). 
A person himself has no meaning, what is meaningful is his 
place in the system. 
Grozny: "You, Your Majesty, you are just like a god — you 
create greatness out of (very) little." 
Grozny to Kurbski: "I will not destroy the system but I will 
fill it with whatsoever I like." 
Grozny identifies himself with the system. 
Peter I explains the killing of his son, saying that he is 
"worthless". 
Peter goes even further — he also brings himself into the 
system, he promotes the system to a principle driven by 
capriciousness. 
Practice is declared, but the actual facts are pushed into the 
background and the system is emphasized. Bureaucracy is 
syntagmatics in its purest form — ranking. No question is raised 
about the right to fill a gap. 
[Lecture III is missing] 
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Lecture IV 22 December, 1967 
If we wish to use texts to study society or people, we must first 
clarify the nature of signs and the rules for their use (these 
depend on the culture types). 
We are accustomed to easily being able to separate, for 
example, scientific texts from religious texts, etc. We act as if we 
know how to decipher them in different ways. 
We study each of these different texts in different ways. We 
say that there are various types of signs: 
natural language signs — we define these with the aid of 
grammar and dictionaries, or we compile these [i.e. a grammar, a 
dictionary]; 
myth — we assume that it is possible for us to create some kind 
of rules in order to clarify [= to interpret] the signs and grammar 
of mythological texts; 
scientific text — but here we do not implement the ways of 
studying myth. 
This seems to be quite obvious. But it is not really the case. We 
could, for example, take a scientific text and show that in certain 
situations it could function as a religious text. 
Even an everyday phenomenon can acquire the features of 
myth, or other uncharacteristic features. (Penicillin may function 
not only as a medicine but also as a mythological unit — as the 
Redeemer.) 
If we make some kind of scientific discovery and start to treat 
it as the redeemer in all situations, then the result is religion. 
It does not suffice to know the text. One must know its 
function in society. Different texts may fulfil the one function. (A 
religious function could be fulfilled by sport, war, science, 
medicines, etc.) There is a certain interdependence between text 
and function, but this is not a linear one. 
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Social function must be differentiated from social texts! If we 
say that science has replaced religion, this generally means the 
replacement of texts, because the religious function has been 
preserved in society. (An article by a French doctor on the crisis 
in medicine: the relationship of the patient with the doctor must 
be religious. A critical relationship hinders the medical effect. It 
is difficult to be one's own doctor, teacher, adult. Here the 
relationship of trust [is valid], and this is not based on 
knowledge.) 
[There are] a number of relationships of which some [are such 
where the individual is in a mutual relationship in the role of] a 
speaker, and others [where the individual is] in the role of a 
listener. 
NON-SIGNS7 SIGNS 
I. PRACTICE II. MAGIC 
I am doing something Something is being done to me 8 
III. SCIENCE IV. RELIGION, BELIEF 
I am obtaining the truth (procedure) am being given the truth 
Therefore, we have four functions: 
I [PracticeJ. My activity takes place in the sphere of practical 
activity, not of signs. 
7 It is probable that the classification takes into account that the practitioner in 
acts without a signified function (I) always has a relationship with non-signified 
reality, while the scientist (II) — of course, if he is a natural scientist — has this 
relationship most of the time. In magical and religious relationships, the 
individual always deals with signified structures.. 
If something is being done to me, which I could just as well do myself, then 
this relationship is invalid (Note by J. Lotman). 
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II [Magic]. A situation where [you] yourself are in principle not 
able to affect anything in practice, you only receive. If you do not 
know the laws on the basis of which you are being given 
something (for example, [the unexplained appearance of a] taxi), 
a magical situation is created. 
A person creates a connection between himself and this 
situation, and with the activity, in order to be deserving of the 
arrival of the inexplicable gift. A person does much, which 
cannot be explained on a conscious level, and [which is] 
practically useless regarding having an effect on things that 
cannot be influenced. (When the taxi is late, we try "to speed it 
along" [by pressing our feet against the body of the car]; NB! A 
ticket queue before a performance! [: pushing up against the 
person in front of us]) Magical function: I hope that something 
beneficial for me will happen, which [is] inexplicable to me and 
is something I cannot influence. The activity has a signified 
nature in order to demonstrate its trust regarding this unknown 
power. 
III Science. It is assumed that as a result of some procedures, I 
am able to obtain the truth. Science begins where there is 
procedure. It is the start of formalism. If the procedure [is] 
incorrect, the result is not considered to be the truth. In science, it 
is not the truth that is that important, it is the way to the truth. 
The giver is unnecessary. Regarding giving, a critical attitude is 
dominant, [a scientific relationship is characterized by] a non-
trusting relationship. 
IV Belief. Religion. [This is] also truth, but it is assumed that 
this [is] held by someone who has to actually give it. The subject 
is not capable of getting it himself. Truth here is an act of 
dedication. Activity here has another meaning than it does in 
science. The giver comes to the fore, the one who is 
indispensable, and with whom a special relationship of trust is 
created. [The situation presumes the question:] What should I do 
in order that I will be given something? 
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Why is that people [generally] are unable to believe — as in 
God. This has various meanings. In the case of God, there is 
unlimited trust, which in principle cannot be controlled. (In the 
case of science, since [the scientist is] himself active, esotericism 
is inconceivable.) Regarding religion, it is a case of a giving 
situation, [whereas] the question is immediately raised: who are 
the ones to receive, and who do not. [There is] a need for a 
particular signified action, in order to be worthy. 
I [Practice and] III [Science] are speaker [texts]; II [Magic] and 
IV [Belief] — listener [texts]. 
We can observe how, for example, a scientific text becomes a 
religious one, or even magical one, how it changes from a 
speaker text to a listener text. 
We can therefore say that on the one hand there is a certain 
historic typology in action, where [in a certain era] certain types 
of texts dominate, for example [in cultural history] there are 
mythological periods, religious periods, scientific periods. [On 
the other hand, the functions under observation could be in a 
combination:] prayer — [can fulfil both] religious + magical 
[functions]; religious texts have certain scientific functions, etc. 
To be a listener is not to be a remnant from the past. Science 
cannot fulfil all social functions. There are undoubtedly a number 
of texts, where a scientific approach can prove to be damaging. 
The reverse is also true: unlimited faith in some scientific 
concept gives it a religious function. 
Previously [we observed instances, where] the text, in a 
certain function, always [has] the one meaning. The function of 
the text may change but it has only one function at a time. 
There is a function, which is different from the four 
[previous] functions, which also has its own texts. 
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A text which is simultaneously in two languages has two 
simultaneous functions9: 
[In] a play situation there are two behaviours (= text 
meanings) [initiated] simultaneously. The game can be ruined in 
two ways: 
the children tend to see the chair covered in tiger stripe fabric as 
a genuine tiger — no play is initiated; 
the adults are unable to imagine that the chair is a tiger — no 
play is initiated; 
Art also unites at least two [behaviours simultaneously] 
If art is interpreted as having a single meaning we are unable 
to comprehend it. We are then unable, based on this, to properly 
interpret society, for example. 
Why does mankind need such a multiplicity of meaning? 
NB! (Not to be confused with allegorical multiple meanings. 
For every reader, this means [only] one!) But in the theatre, each 
[element has] at least two [simultaneous] meanings. If we 
believed that there was real life on the stage, the enjoyment of art 
would disappear completely, [the performance] would become 
the same as peering through a keyhole. 
In watching a movie, 1 ) we become involved just as if the 
events were real life, but 2) we do not interfere. 
If we perceive the same text as being religious, we would 
have switched to the one behavioural system. When Lope de 
Vega lost consciousness when listening to a mass and imagining 
the sufferings of Christ, music was for him not art, but religion. 
Religious attitudes are disastrous for both art and science! 
Why do people play throughout life, and throughout history? 
This is studied by ethnographers (historians deal with "more 
serious" things, politics, for example!) 
Animals start to play once there is non-instinctive behaviour. 
Amoebas do not play! 
9 Here the note-taker is apparently mistaken: there is one function that is 
realized in the text at least as a structure with a double meaning. 
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Animals play in order to teach. 
1) Play is the teaching of such behavioural types that are not 
provided for by the genotype, with the help of bio-information. 
2) Play is the creation of emotional models. 
The play function does not have to be filled by play texts. 
Theatre is enough for one social group, others need war 
notices or gladiators. 
In human society there exists a complicated system of play, 
where the functions of which are basically 
a) training 
b) conditional promising, solution. 
Death is a non-codable system. Nevertheless, in war it has to be 
"coded", creating an emotional model to achieve victory over an 
unconquerable enemy. 
It would be interesting to monitor in which epochs, for which 
social layers the need [is created] for a happy end. This need 
becomes the most frequent during catastrophic epochs! 
(Chernyshevski: The gloom in literature demonstrates that the 
actual situation is improvable.) 
Encouraging words are spoken to the hopelessly ill! 
The happy end has a specific function — a fictitious solution, 
a play situation. 
In which environment is there a love for "noble", "refined" 
literature? 
The most idealizing literature is loved by whores. 
The literary scholar and the sociologist have different 
approaches to a text: 
literary scholar: which language is used by the author? 
sociologist: into which language is it translated by the reader? 
The reader always tends to translate an ambivalent, play text 
singly. The dual approach is characteristic of the author. 
I 
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Single [interpretation] — "the message of thought" "moral" etc 
— is characteristic of the reader. The reader expects one-sided 
answers. 
This is a condition for art. There is no genuine writer who 
does not despise literature. Pushkin: ["]When such a tragedy is 
taking place under one's eyes, who has time to think about the 
flea circus of literature?["] 
Art — it is a game to be taken seriously. 
Art cannot be reduced to one function, but it must be able to 
be translated into it, although with some losses: and the reader 
must know that these losses exist, and that it could be the most 
important that ends up amongst the losses. 
Art is different to play, because it has simultaneously multiple 
meanings as well as one meaning. 
Only a multitude of meanings — this is a luxury. 
Only one meaning — this is not art. 
Non-art can also perform in the function of art, particularly if 
we approach a foreign culture, or, for example, are enthused by 
the poetics of the Gospel, or enjoy a conflagration from its 
aesthetic side.10 
An absolutely habitual language is switched out of the 
cultural system. 
The listener always demands the habitual; he is always 
annoyed by the speaker's "philosophizing" (умничание). This is 
why every new system usually starts with a scandal, it is received 
as something indecent until it becomes habitual, and therefore, 
banal. 
This is why art always disturbs us. If it does not disturb us 
then it is not working. If Beethoven is "pleasant", "non-
disturbing", then we are not actually accepting him any more. 
Therefore, the state of the listener is a state of dissatisfaction 
with the speaker. 
1 0  Here the author contradicts himself: the fact that Lope de Vega fainted did 
not necessarily mean that he stopped hearing the art in the music! 
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Art is always destined to cause scandal. Derzhavin knew there 
would be scandal when he rhymed "muse" with "arbuus 
(watermelon)". 
Art is active on the background of an outdated form. The 
listener, however, tends to consider it faulty (неправиль­
ностью]I. 
This occasionally leads to explosions (иконоборчествои ). In 
various epochs, various opportunities arise for the listener to 
dictate his will. 
If the listener and the speaker mutually ignore each other, no 
communication takes place. 
1 1  art looting, iconoclasm. 
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It is sometimes thought that the only people who think 
religiously are those who go to church and believe in God, that 
it is only quacks and good-for-nothings who deal with mag­
ic, or that metaphors are the sustenance of only poets and 
literature lessons, and that it is only children who are afraid 
of bogeymen or who crave to listen to magic tales. 
But this is not the case at all, and this book attempts to explain 
why. 
The roots of one possible explanation can be found in the 
semiotics of Juri Lotman. In his lectures - that are also being 
published for the first time as an Appendix to this book -
Lotman has sketched the fruits that could have developed 
from these roots. The author of this book has taken it upon 
himself to examine more thoroughly the connections between 
the roots and the fruits. The author believes that the result of 
this examination is indeed in accord with the essence of the 
Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics. 
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